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A CONSTRUCTIVE VERSION OF TARSKI’S GEOMETRY
MICHAEL BEESON
Abstract. Constructivity, in this context, refers to a theory of geometry whose axioms
and language are closely related to ruler and compass constructions. It may also refer to
the use of intuitionistic (or constructive) logic, but the reader who is interested in ruler
and compass geometry but not in constructive logic, will still find this work of interest.
Euclid’s reasoning is essentially constructive (in both senses). Tarski’s elegant and concise
first-order theory of Euclidean geometry, on the other hand, is essentially non-constructive
(in both senses), even if we restrict attention (as we do here) to the theory with line-circle
continuity in place of first-order Dedekind completeness. Hilbert’s axiomatization has a
much more elaborate language and many more axioms, but it contains no essential non-
constructivities. Here we exhibit three constructive versions of Tarski’s theory. One,
like Tarski’s theory, has existential axioms and no function symbols. We then consider a
version in which function symbols are used instead of existential quantifiers. This theory
is quantifier-free and proves the continuous dependence on parameters of the terms giving
the intersections of lines and circles, and of circles and circles. The third version has a
function symbol for the intersection point of two non-parallel, non-coincident lines, instead
of only for intersection points produced by Pasch’s axiom and the parallel axiom; this
choice of function symbols connects directly to ruler and compass constructions. All three
versions have this in common: the axioms have been modified so that the points they
assert to exist are unique and depend continuously on parameters. This modification
of Tarski’s axioms, with classical logic, has the same theorems as Tarski’s theory, but we
obtain results connecting it with ruler and compass constructions as well. In particular, we
show that constructions involving the intersection points of two circles are justified, even
though only line-circle continuity is included as an axiom. We obtain metamathematical
results based on the Go¨del double-negation interpretation, which permit the wholesale
importation of proofs of negative theorems from classical to constructive geometry, and
of proofs of existential theorems where the object asserted to exist is constructed by a
single construction (as opposed to several constructions applying in different cases). In
particular, this enables us to import the proofs of correctness of the geometric definitions
of addition and multiplication, once these can be given by a uniform construction.
We also show, using cut-elimination, that objects proved to exist can be constructed by
ruler and compass. (This was proved in [3, ] for a version of constructive geometry based
on Hilbert’s axioms.) Since these theories are interpretable in the theory of Euclidean
fields, the independence results about different versions of the parallel postulate given in
[5, ] apply to them; and since addition and multiplication can be defined geometrically,
their models are exactly the planes over (constructive) Euclidean fields.
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§1. Introduction. Euclidean geometry, as presented by Euclid, consists of
straightedge-and-compass constructions and rigorous reasoning about the results
of those constructions. Tarski’s twentieth-century axiomatization of geometry
does not bear any direct relation to ruler and compass constructions. Here we
present modifications of Tarski’s theory whose axioms correspond more closely to
straightedge-and-compass constructions. These theories can be considered either
with intuitionistic (constructive) logic, or with ordinary (“classical”) logic. Both
versions are of interest.
In [3, ], we gave an axiomatization of constructive geometry based on a version
of Hilbert’s axioms (which contain no essential non-constructivities). In [5, ], we
obtained metamathematical results about constructive geometry, and showed
that those results do not depend on the details of the axiomatization. In this
paper, we focus on formulating constructive geometry in the language and style
that Tarski used for his well-known axiomatization of geometry. What is striking
about Tarski’s theory is its use of only one sort of variables, for points, and
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the small number of axioms. Here we give what may be the shortest possible
axiomatization of constructive geometry, following Tarski’s example.1
In [5, ], we discussed Euclidean constructive geometry in general terms, and
worked informally with a theory that had three sorts of variables for points, lines,
and circles. Here, in the spirit of Tarski, we work with a one-sorted theory, with
variables for points only. In order to provide terms for points proved to exist, we
need some function symbols. Tarski’s axioms have existential quantifiers; we are
interested (both classically and constructively) in extensions of the language that
provide function symbols to construct points. Three of these symbols are Skolem
symbols that correspond immediately to ruler and compass constructions: one
for extending a segment ab by another segment cd, and two for the intersection
points of a line and circle. (In our previous work we also had function symbols
for the intersection points of two circles; here we will prove that these are not
needed, as the intersection points of two circles are already constructible.) Then
we need a way to construct certain intersection points of two lines. Such points
are proved to exist by versions of Pasch’s axiom; so one obvious approach is just
to provide a Skolem symbol for a suitable version of Pasch’s axiom. (This has
been done for decades by people using theorem-provers with Tarski’s axioms.)
However, Tarski’s version of Pasch’s axiom allows “degenerate cases” in which
the “triangle” collapses to three points on a line, or the line through the triangle
coincides with a side of the triangle. In these cases, the point asserted to exist is
not really constructed by intersecting two lines and does not correspond to a ruler
and compass construction. Therefore, even with classical logic, Tarski’s axioms
need some modifications before they really correspond to ruler and compass
constructions. To start with, we require that the points in Pasch’s axiom be
not collinear. Then we have to “put back” the two fundamental axioms about
betweenness that Tarski originally had, but which were eliminated when Tarski
and his students realized that they followed from the degenerate cases of Pasch.
Finally, we have to restrict the segment-extension axiom to extending non-null
segments, i.e.,ab with a 6= b, since extending a null segment is not done by laying
a straightedge between two points. More formally, the extension of segment ab by
a non-null segment cd will not depend continuously on a as a approaches b, while
ruler and compass constructions should depend continuously on parameters. The
resulting modification of Tarski’s classical axioms we call “continuous Tarski
geometry”. If we add the function symbols mentioned above, then all those
function symbols correspond to ruler and compass constructions, and Herbrand’s
theorem then tells us that if we can prove ∀x∃y A(x, y), and A is quantifier-free,
then there are finitely many ruler and compass constructions t1, . . . , tn such that
for each x, one of the ti(x) constructs y such that A(x, y).
We said that ruler and compass constructions should depend continuously on
parameters, but there is a problem about that: we need to distinguish axiomat-
ically between the two intersection points of a line and a circle. Since lines are
given by two distinct points, our solution to this problem is to require that the
two intersection points of Line (a, b) and circle C occur in the same order on L
1Readers unfamiliar with Tarski’s geometry may want to read [30, ], which summarizes the
axioms of Tarski’s geometry and gives some of their history; but we do give a basic explanation
of Tarski’s axioms in this paper.
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as a and b. Thus if a and b are interchanged, the intersection points given by
the two function symbols also are interchanged.
All the changes discussed above make sense and are desirable even with clas-
sical logic. They connect the axioms of geometry with ruler and compass con-
structions and, in the case of Pasch’s axiom, with its intuitive justification. The
degenerate cases of Pasch have nothing to do with triangles and lines; they
are really about betweenness relations between points on a single line, so it is
philosophically better to formulate the axioms as in continuous Tarski geometry.
Having the smallest possible number of axioms is not necessarily the criterion
for the best version of a theory.
There is also an issue regarding the best form of the parallel axiom. Histori-
cally, several versions have been considered for use with Tarski’s theories. Two in
particular are of interest: the axiom (A10) that Tarski eventually settled upon,
and the “triangle circumscription principle”, which says that given three non-
collinear points, there is a point e equidistant from all three (which is then the
center of a circle containing the three points). Classically, these two formulations
are equivalent, so it is just a matter of personal preference which to take as an
axiom. Constructively, the two versions mentioned are also equivalent, as follows
from the results of [5, ] and this paper, but the proof is much lengthier than with
classical logic. Euclid’s own formulation of the parallel postulate, “Euclid 5”,
mentions angles, so it requires a reformulation to be expressed in the “points
only” language of Tarski’s theory; a points-only version of Euclid 5 is given in
[5, ] and repeated below. In [5, ] it is proved that Euclid 5 is equivalent to
the triangle circumscription principle, which is considerably shorter than Euclid
5. We follow Szmielew in adopting the triangle circumscription principle as our
parallel axiom, although our results show that we could have retained Tarski’s
version.
There is also “Playfair’s axiom”, which is the version of the parallel axiom
adopted by Hilbert in [15, ]. That version, unlike all the other versions, makes no
existence assertion at all, but only asserts that there cannot exist two different
lines parallel to a given line through a given point. This version, making no
existence assertion, appears to be constructively weaker than the others, and in
[5, ], it is proved that this is indeed the case.
Our aim in this paper is a constructive version of Tarski’s geometry. The
changes described above, however, make sense with classical logic and are the
primary changes that allow a connection between proofs from Tarski’s axioms
and ruler and compass constructions. If we still use classical logic, proofs in this
theory yield a finite number of ruler and compass constructions, to be used in
the different cases required in the proof. To make the theory constructive, we
do just two things more: (1) we use intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic,
and (2) we add “stability axioms”, allowing us to prove equality or inequality
of points by contradiction. The reasons for accepting the stability axioms are
discussed in §7.2 below.
It turns out that no more changes are needed. This theory is called “intu-
itionistic Tarski geometry”. As in classical geometry, we can consider it with or
without function symbols.
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Even though this theory is constructively acceptable, one might not like the
fact that the Skolem symbols are total, i.e.,they have some (undetermined) value
even in “undefined” cases, where they do not actually correspond to ruler and
compass constructions. Therefore we also consider a version of Tarski geometry
in which the logic is further modified to use the “logic of partial terms” LPT,
permitting the use of undefined terms. In this theory, we replace the Skolem
function for Pasch’s axiom by a more natural term iℓ(a, b, c, d) for the intersection
point of Line (a, b) and Line (c, d).
The main difference between constructive and classical geometry is that, in
constructive geometry, one is not allowed to make a case distinction when prov-
ing that something exists. For example, to prove that there always exists a
perpendicular to line L through point x, we may classically use two different
constructions, one of which works when x is not on L (a “dropped perpendic-
ular”), and a different construction that works when x is on L (an “erected
perpendicular”). But constructively, we need a single construction (a “uniform
perpendicular”) that handles both cases with one construction. In this paper
we show that such uniform constructions can be found, using the Tarski axioms,
for perpendiculars, reflections, and rotations. Then the methods of [5, ] can be
used to define addition and multiplication geometrically, as was done classically
by Descartes and Hilbert. This shows that every model of the theory is a plane
over a Euclidean ordered field that can be explicitly constructed.
Having formulated intuitionistic Tarski geometry, we then study its metamath-
ematics. using two logical tools: the Go¨del double-negation interpretation, and
cut-elimination. The double-negation interpretation is just a formal way of say-
ing that, by pushing double negations inwards, we can convert a classical proof
of a basic statement like equality of two points, or incidence of a point on a line,
or a betweenness statement, to a constructive proof. (The same is of course not
true for statements asserting that something exists.) This provides us with tools
for the wholesale importation of certain types of theorems from the long and
careful formal development from Tarski’s classical axioms in [25, ]. But since we
modified Tarski’s axioms, to make them correspond better to ruler and compass,
some care is required in this metatheorem.
Cut-elimination provides us with the theorem that things proved to exist in
intuitionistic Tarski geometry can be constructed by ruler and compass. The
point here is that they can be constructed by a uniform construction, i.e.,a
single construction that works for all cases. We already mentioned the example
of dropped and erected perpendiculars in classical geometry, versus a uniform
perpendicular construction in constructive geometry. Using cut-elimination we
prove that this feature of constructive proofs, so evident from examples, is a
necessary feature of any existence proof in intuitionistic Tarski geometry: an
existence proof always provides a uniform construction.
On the other hand, our version of Tarski geometry with classical logic, which
we call “continuous Tarski geometry”, supports a similar theorem. If it proves
∀x∃y A(x, y), with A quantifier-free, then there are a finite number (not just
one) of ruler and compass constructions, given terms of the theory, such that for
every x, one of those constructions produces y such that A(x, y).
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Readers not familiar with intuitionistic or constructive mathematics will find
additional introductory material in § 7.
I would like to thank Marvin J. Greenberg and Victor Pambuccian for conver-
sations and emails on this subject, and the anonymous referees for their detailed
comments.
§2. Hilbert and Tarski. It is not our purpose here to review in detail the
(long, complicated, and interesting) history of axiomatic geometry, but some
history is helpful in understanding the variety of geometrical axiom systems.
We begin by mentioning the standard English translation of Euclid [9, ] and the
beautiful commentary-free edition [10, ]. Euclid is the touchstone against which
axiomatizations are measured. We restrict our attention to the two most famous
axiomatizations, those of Hilbert and Tarski. Previous work on constructive
geometry is discussed in [5, ].
2.1. Hilbert. Hilbert’s influential book [15, ] used the notion of betweenness
and the axioms for betweenness studied by Pasch [22, ]. Hilbert’s theory was
what would today be called “second-order”, in that sets were freely used in
the axioms. Segments, for example, were defined as sets of two points, so by
definition AB = BA since the set {A,B} does not depend on the order. Of
course, this is a trivial departure from first-order language; but Hilbert’s last
two axioms, Archimedes’s axiom and the continuity axiom, are not expressible
in a first-order geometrical theory. On the other hand, lines and planes were
regarded not as sets of points, but as (what today would be called) first-order
objects, so incidence was an undefined relation, not set-theoretic membership. At
the time (1899) the concept of first-order language had not yet been developed,
and set theory was still fairly new. Congruence was treated by Hilbert as a
binary relation on sets of two points, not as a 4-ary relation on points.
Early geometers thought that the purpose of axioms was to set down the
truth about space, so as to ensure accurate and correct reasoning about the one
true (or as we now would say, “intended”) model of those axioms. Hilbert’s
book promoted the idea that axioms may have many models; the axioms and
deductions from them should make sense if we read “tables, chairs, and beer
mugs” instead of “points, lines, and planes.” This is evident from the very first
sentence of Hilbert’s book:
Consider three distinct sets of objects. Let the objects of the first set
be called points . . . ; let the objects of the second set be called lines
. . . ; let the objects of the third set be callled planes.
Hilbert defines segments as pairs of points (the endpoints), although lines are
primitive objects. On the other hand, a ray is the set of all points on the ray,
and angles are sets consisting of two rays. So an angle is a set of sets of points.
Hence technically Hilbert’s theory, which is often described as second order, is
at least third order. (We say “technically”, because it would not be difficult
to reduce Hilbert’s theory to an equivalent theory that would really be second
order.)
Hilbert’s language has a congruence relation for segments, and a separate
congruence relation for angles. Hilbert’s congruence axioms involve the concept
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of angles: his fourth congruence axiom involves “angle transport” (constructing
an angle on a given base equal to a given angle), and his fifth congruence axiom
is the SAS triangle congruence principle.
Hilbert’s Chapter VII discusses geometric constructions with a limited set of
tools, a “segment transporter” and an “angle transporter”. These correspond
to the betweenness and congruence axioms. Hilbert does not discuss the special
cases of line-circle continuity and circle-circle continuity axioms that correspond
to ruler and compass constructions, despite the mention of “compass” in the
section titles of Chapter VII.
Hilbert’s geometry contained two axioms that go beyond first-order logic.
First, the axiom of Archimedes (which requires the notion of natural number),
and second, an axiom of continuity, which (rephrased in modern terms) says that
Dedekind cuts are filled on any line. This axiom requires mentioning a set of
points, so Hilbert’s theory with this axiom included is not a “first-order theory”
in a language with variables only over points, lines, and circles.
2.2. Tarski. Later in the 20th century, when the concept of “first-order the-
ory” was widely understood, Tarski formulated his theory of elementary geome-
try, in which Hilbert’s axiom of continuity was replaced with an axiom schemata.
The set variable in the continuity axiom was replaced by any first-order formula.
Tarski proved that this theory (unlike number theory) is complete: every state-
ment in the first-order language can be proved or refuted from Tarski’s axioms.
In addition to being a first-order theory, Tarski also made other simplifications.
He realized that lines, angles, circles, segments, and rays could all be treated
as auxiliary objects, merely enabling the construction of some new points from
some given points. Tarski’s axioms are stated using only variables for points.
He has only two relations: (non-strict) betweenness, “b is between a and c”,
and “equidistance”, E(a, b, c, d), which means what Euclid expressed as “ab is
congruent to segment cd”. We abbreviate E(a, b, c, d) informally as ab = cd. We
have listed Tarski’s axioms for reference in §4 of this paper, along with the ax-
ioms of our constructive version of Tarski geometry, adhering to the numbering
of [30, ], which has become standard.
Tarski replaced Hilbert’s fourth and fifth congruence axioms (angle transport
and SAS) with an elegant axiom, known as the five-segment axiom. This axiom
is best understood not through its formal statement, but through Fig. 1. The
5-segment axiom says that in Fig. 1, the length of the dashed segment cd is
determined by the lengths of the other four segments in the left-hand triangle.
Formally, if the four solid segments in the first triangle are pairwise congruent
to the corresponding segments in the second triangle, then the dashed segments
are also congruent.
Tarski’s 5-segment axiom is a thinly-disguised variant of the SAS criterion for
triangle congruence. To see this, refer to the figure. The triangles we are to
prove congruent are dbc and DBC. We are given that bc is congruent to BC
and db is congruent to DB. The congruence of angles dbc and DBC is expressed
in Tarski’s axiom by the congruence of triangles abd and ABD, whose sides are
pairwise equal. The conclusion, that cd is congruent to CD, give the congruence
of triangles dbc and DBC. In Chapter 11 of [25, ], one can find a formal proof
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Figure 1. Tarski’s 5-segment axiom. cd = CD.
d
a b c
D
A B C
of the SAS criterion from the 5-segment axiom. Borsuk-Szmielew also took this
as an axiom (see [6, ], p. 81, Axiom C-5).
An earlier version of Tarski’s theory included as an axiom the “triangle con-
struction theorem”, which says that if we are given triangle abc, and segment
AB congruent to ab, and a point x not on Line (A,B), then we can construct
a point C on the same side of Line (A,B) as x such that triangle ABC is con-
gruent to triangle abc. It was later realized2 that this axiom is provable. For
example, one can drop a perpendicular from c to Line (a, b), whose foot is the
point d on Line (a, b), and then find a corresponding point D on Line (A,B),
and then lay off dc on the perpendicular to Line (A,B) at D on the same side
of Line (A,B) as x, ending in the desired point C. Of course one must check
that this construction can be done and proved correct on the basis of the other
axioms. But as it stands, this construction demands a case distinction about
the order and possible identity of the points d, a, and c on Line (a, b). Hence, at
least this proof of the triangle construction theorem from the axioms of Tarski’s
theory is non-constructive.
Tarski’s early axiom systems also included axioms about betweenness and
congruence that were later shown [13, ] to be superfluous. The final version of
this theory appeared in [25, ]; for the full history see [30, ].3 The achievement of
Szmielew and Gupta (who are mainly responsible for Part I of [25, ]) is to develop
a really minimal set of axioms for betweenness and congruence.4 Hilbert’s intu-
itive axioms about betweenness disappeared, leaving only the axiom ¬B(a, b, a)
and the Pasch axiom and axioms to guarantee that congruence is an equivalence
relation.
2.3. Strict vs. non-strict betweenness and collinearity. The (strict)
betweenness relation is written B(a, b, c). We read this “b is between a and c”.
2 Acording to [30, ], Tarski included this principle as an axiom in his first two published
axiom sets, but then discovered in 1956-57 with the aid of Eva Kallin and Scott Taylor, that it
was derivable; so he did not include it in [29, ]. (See the footnote, p. 20 of [29, ].) But Tarski
did not publish the proof, and Borsuk-Szmielew take the principle as their Axiom C-7 [6, ].
3Note that the version mentioned in [1, ] is not the final version used in [25, ]; inner
transitivity for betweenness was eliminated in [25, ].
4We would like to emphasize the important contributions of Gupta, which are important to
the development in [25, ], and are credited appropriately there, but without a careful study
one might not realize how central Gupta’s results were. These results were apparently never
published under Gupta’s own name, and still languish in the Berkeley math library in his
doctoral dissertation [13, ]. However, you can get that thesis and others from the ProQuest
database, accessible from most university libraries.
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The intended meaning is that that the three points are collinear and distinct,
and b is the middle one of the three.
Hilbert [15, ] and Greenberg [12, ] use strict betweenness, as we do. Tarski
[30, ] used non-strict betweenness. They all used the same letter B for the
betweenness relation, which is confusing. For clarity we always use B for strict
betweenness, and introduce T(a, b, c) for non-strict betweenness. Since T is
Tarski’s initial, and he used non-strict betweenness, that should be a memory
aid. The two notions are interdefinable (even constructively):
Definition 2.1. Non-strict betweenness is defined by
T(a, b, c) := ¬(a 6= b ∧ b 6= c ∧ ¬B(a, b, c))
In the other direction, B(a, b, c) can be defined as
T(a, b, c) ∧ a 6= b ∧ a 6= c.
If we express B(a, b, c) in terms of T(a, b, c), and then again express T in terms
of B, we obtain a formula that is equivalent to the original using only axioms
of classical propositional logic. We mention this point to emphasize that using
these definitions, Tarski could have taken either strict or non-strict betweenness
as primitive. In fact, to show that these definitions are “inverses” in the sense
mentioned, we need only intuitionistic logic plus the stability of equality and be-
tweenness. Therefore (since we do accept stability of equality and betweenness),
neither B nor T is inherently more constructive than the other.
Why then did Tarski choose to use non-strict betweenness, when Hilbert had
used strict betweenness? Possibly, as suggested by [30, ], because this allowed
him to both simplify the axioms, and reduce their number. By using T instead
of B, the axioms cover various “degenerate cases”, when diagrams collapse onto
lines, etc. Some of these degenerate cases were useful. From the point of view of
constructivity, however, this is not desirable. It renders Tarski’s axioms prima
facie non-constructive (as we will show below). Therefore the inclusion of degen-
erate cases in the axioms is something that will need to be eliminated in making
a constructive version of Tarski’s theories. The same is true even if our only aim
is to connect the axioms with ruler and compass constructions, while retaining
classical logic.
We next want to give a constructive definition of collinearity. Classically we
would define this as T(p, a, b) ∨T(a, p, b) ∨T(a, b, p). That wouldn’t work as a
constructive definition of collinearity, because we have no way to decide in general
which alternative might hold, and the constructive meaning of disjunction would
require it. In other words, we can know that p lies on the line determined by
distinct points a and b without knowing its order relations with a and b. But we
can find a classically equivalent (yet constructively valid) form by using the law
that ¬¬(P ∨Q) is equivalent to ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q). By that method we arrive at
Definition 2.2. Col(a, b, p) is the formula expressing that a, b, and p lie on
a line.
¬(¬T(p, a, b) ∧ ¬T(a, p, b) ∧ ¬T(a, b, p))
or equivalently, in terms of B,
¬(¬B(p, a, b) ∧ ¬B(a, p, b) ∧ ¬B(a, b, p) ∧ a 6= p ∧ b 6= p ∧ a 6= b)
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Informally, we use the notation Line (a, b) to stand for the line determined by
distinct points a and b, so “c lies on Line (a, b)” means a 6= b∧Col(a, b, p). Thus
Col(a, b, p) only expresses that p lies on Line (a, b) if we also specify a 6= b. We do
not put the condition a 6= b into the definition of Col(a, b, p) for two reasons: it
would destroy the symmetry between the three arguments, and more important,
it would cause confusion in comparing our work with the standard reference for
Tarski’s theories, namely [25, ].
2.4. Pasch’s axiom. Hilbert’s fourth betweenness axiom is often known as
Pasch’s axiom, because it was first studied by Pasch in 1882 [22, ]. It says that if
line L meets (the interior of) side AB of triangle ABC then it meets (the interior
of) side AC or side BC as well. But Tarski considered instead, two restricted
versions of Pasch’s axioms known as “inner Pasch” and “outer Pasch”, illustrated
in Fig. 2.
Figure 2. Inner Pasch (left) and outer Pasch (right). Line pb
meets triangle acq in one side. The open circles show the points
asserted to exist on the other side.
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Outer Pasch was an axiom (instead of, not in addition to, inner Pasch) in
versions of Tarski’s theories until 1965, when it was proved from inner Pasch in
Gupta’s thesis [13, ], Theorem 3.70, or Satz 9.6 in [25, ].5 Outer Pasch appears
as Satz 9.6 in [25, ]. The proof given in [25, ], applied to the formulation of
outer Pasch with strict betweenness, is constructive. The proof is complicated,
however, in that it depends on the ability to drop a perpendicular to a line from
a point not on the line. As we shall discuss extensively, proving the existence of
such perpendiculars is problematic: easy constructions require either line-circle
continuity or the parallel axiom, and only with Gupta’s complicated proof do we
5But apparently, judging from footnote 4 on p. 191 of [30, ], Tarski knew as early as 1956-57
that outer Pasch implies inner Pasch; in that footnote Tarski argues against replacing outer
Pasch with inner Pasch as an axiom, as Szmielew and Schwabha¨user chose to do. Also on
p. 196 of [30, ], Tarski attributes the idea for the proof of inner Pasch from outer Pasch to
specific other people; the history is too long to review here, but he credits only Gupta with
the derivation of outer Pasch from inner Pasch.
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have dropped perpendiculars without either of those assumptions. In §12.1 we
shall show how to use the double-negation interpretation (a metamathematical
tool developed by Go¨del) to ensure the constructivity of the proof of outer Pasch
without checking it line by line. The unsatisfied reader has the choice to either
check the proof directly, or look ahead to §12.1, which does not depend on the
intervening material. We will use outer Pasch as needed.
After Gupta proved outer Pasch from inner, Szmielew chose to take inner
Pasch as an axiom instead of outer Pasch, although a footnote in [30, ] shows
that Tarski disagreed with that choice (on grounds of how easy or difficult it is
to deduce other things). Gupta’s thesis also contains a proof that outer Pasch
implies inner Pasch.
It is not completely clear why Tarski wanted to restrict Pasch’s axiom in the
first place, but two good reasons come to mind. First, the restricted forms are
valid even in three-dimensional space, so they do not make an implicit dimen-
sional assertion, as the unrestricted Pasch axiom does (it fails in three-space).
Second, there is the simpler logical form of inner (or outer) Pasch: unrestricted
Pasch needs either a disjunction, or a universal quantifier in the hypothesis,
so the condition to be satisfied by the point whose existence is asserted is not
quantifier-free and disjunction-free, as it is with inner and outer Pasch. This
simplicity of logical form is important for our purposes in constructive geometry,
but for Tarski it may just have been a matter of “elegance.”
2.5. Sides of a line. The notions of “same side” and “opposite side” of a line
will be needed below, and are also of interest in comparing Hilbert’s and Tarski’s
geometries. One of Hilbert’s axioms was the plane separation axiom, according
to which a line separates a plane into (exactly) two regions. Two points a and b
not on line L are on opposite sides of L if a 6= b and there is a point of L between
a and b, i.e., the segment ab meets L.
Definition 2.3.
OppositeSide (a, b, L) := ∃x (on(x, L) ∧B(a, x, b))
Of course, in Tarski geometry, we cannot mention lines directly, so L has to
be replaced by two distinct points, yielding a 4-ary relation.
The definition of being on the same side is less straightforward. Hilbert’s
definition of SameSide (a, b, L) was that segment ab does not meet L. That
involves a universal quantifier:
∀x¬(B(a, x, b) ∧ on(x, L)).
One can get an existential quantifier instead of a universal quantifier by using
Tarski’s definition, illustrated in Fig. 3:
Definition 2.4. a and b are on the same side of L if there is some c such
that both a and b are on the opposite side of L from c. Formally:
SameSide (a, b, L) := ∃c, x, y (B(a, x, c) ∧B(b, y, c) ∧ on(x, L) ∧ on(y, L))
Another advantage of this definition is that it works in more than two dimen-
sions. It can be proved equivalent to Hilbert’s definition above (as is discussed
in section 2.7 below), if all points are restricted to lie in the same plane; but in
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Figure 3. Tarski’s definition: a and b are on the same side of
line L, as witnessed by point c on the other side.
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Tarski’s geometry, planes are a defined concept (using SameSide) rather than a
primitive concept.
Hilbert took it as axiomatic that a line divides a plane into two regions. In
Tarski’s system this becomes a fairly difficult theorem:
Theorem 2.5 (Plane separation theorem). If p and q are on the same side of
line L, and p and r are on opposite sides of L, then q and r are also on opposite
sides of L. Formally,
SameSide (a, b, L) ∧OppositeSide (a, c, L) → OppositeSide (b, c, L)
is provable in neutral constructive geometry (i.e., without using the parallel ax-
iom).
Proof. This is proved in Gupta [13, ], and also as Satz 9.8 of [25, ]. The proof
follows fairly easily from outer Pasch and the definition of SameSide , and occurs
in [25, ] right after the proof of outer Pasch. The proof (from outer Pasch) is
completely and unproblematically constructive.
2.6. The parallel axiom according to Hilbert and Tarski. As is well-
known, there are many propositions equivalent to the parallel postulate in clas-
sical geometry. The main point of [5, ] is to establish which of these versions
of the parallel postulate are equivalent in constructive geometry, and which are
not. Hilbert’s parallel axiom (Axiom IV, p. 25 of [15, ]) is the version we call
Playfair’s Axiom, introduced by Playfair in 1729: There cannot be more than
one parallel to a given line through a point not on the line. Tarski’s axiom A10
as published in [25, ] is a more complicated statement, classically equivalent.
Specifically, it says that if p is in the (closed) interior of angle α, then there exist
points x and y on the sides of α such that T(x, p, yt). Of course, one cannot
mention “interior of angle α” directly, so the formulation in Tarski’s language is
a bit more complex. Szmielew’s manuscript, on which Part I of [25, ] is based,
took instead the “triangle circumscription principle”, which says that for every
three non-collinear points a, b, c, there exists a point d equidistant from all three
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(thus d is the center of a circle passing through a, b, and c, thus circumscribing
triangle abc).6
In [5, ], we considered the parallel axiom from the constructive point of view,
and gave a points-only version of Euclid’s parallel postulate, called “Euclid 5”, as
well as a stronger version called the “strong parallel postulate.” These turned out
to be constructively equivalent, though the proof requires the prior development
of considerable “machinery” based on Euclid 5. We also showed that the triangle
circumscription principle is equivalent to the strong parallel postulate, and hence
to Euclid 5. In this paper (Theorems 9.2 and 9.3), we show that Tarski’s parallel
axiom is equivalent to Euclid 5, too. Hence all the versions of the parallel
postulate that make an existential assertion turn out to be equivalent.
For the reason of simplicity, we follow Szmielew in using the triangle circum-
scription principle as the parallel axiom in Tarski’s theories.7 The center of the
circumscribed circle abc can be constructed with ruler and compass as the inter-
section point of the perpendicular bisectors of ab and bc; the point of the axiom
is that these lines do indeed meet (which without some form of the parallel ax-
iom, they cannot be proved to do). The axiom lends itself well to a points-only
theory, since it does not actually mention circles. It merely says there is a point
equidistant from the three given points.
Tarski and Givant wrote a letter to Schwabha¨user “around 1978”, which was
published in 1998 [30, ] and has served, in the absence of an English translation
of [25, ], as a common reference for Tarski’s axioms and their history. The letter
mentions equivalent versions of the parallel axiom: the two mentioned above
and a “Third version of the parallel axiom”, which says that if one connects the
midpoints of two sides of a triangle, the connecting segment is congruent to half
the third side. In spite of the name “Third version of the parallel axiom”, the
letter makes no claim that the different versions are equivalent (in any theory at
all). One has to be careful when speaking about “versions of the parallel postu-
late.” According to [28, ], p. 51, any statement that holds in Euclidean geometry
but not in the standard hyperbolic plane is (classically) equivalent to Euclid’s
parallel postulate in Tarki’s geometry with full first-order continuity axioms (Ax-
iom (A11) of [30, ]). In other words, there are only two complete extensions of
neutral geometry with full continuity. But no such thing is true in the theories
considered here, which have only line-circle and circle-circle continuity (one as
an axiom, and one as a theorem).
Indeed, the “third version” mentioned above (which we here call M , for “mid-
line”) is not equivalent to the parallel postulate (in neutral geometry with line-
circle and circle-circle continuity), but instead to the weaker assertion that the
6The triangle circumscription principle is equivalent (with classical logic) to Euclid’s parallel
axiom. Euclid IV.5 proves the triangle circumscription principle; the converse implication was
first proved by Farkas Bolyai, father of Janos Bolyai, who thought he had proved Euclid’s
parallel postulate, but had actually assumed the triangle circumscription principle. See [12, ],
pp. 229–30 and p. 240.
7The change in the parallel axiom was apparently one of the “inessential changes”
Schwabha¨user introduced in publishing Szmielew’s work. I have not seen Szmielew’s man-
uscript, but base what I say about it here on [30, ], page 190.
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sum of the angles of every triangle is equal to two right angles. The non-
equivalence with the parallel axiom is proved as follows:
Theorem 2.6. No quantifier-free statement can be equivalent to the parallel
axiom in neutral geometry with circle-circle and line-circle continuity.
Proof. We give a model of neutral geometry in which M (or any quantifier-free
formula that is provable with the aid of the parallel axiom) holds, but the parallel
axiom fails. Let F be a non-Archimedean Euclidean field, and let K be the finitely
bounded elements of F, i.e.,elements between −n and n for some integer n. (Then
K is Archimedean but is not a field, because it contains “infinitesimal” elements
whose inverses are in F but not in K.) The model is K2. This model is due
to Max Dehn, and is described in Example 18.4.3 and Exercise 18.4 of [14, ],
where it is stated that K2 is a Hilbert plane, and also satisfies line-circle and
circle-circle continuity, since the intersection points with finitely bounded circles
have finitely bounded coordinates.
Since F2 is a model of geometry including the parallel axiom, M holds there,
and since M is quantifier free, it holds also in K. Yet, K is not a Euclidean
plane; let L be the x-axis and let t be an infinitesimal. There are many lines
through (0, 1) that are parallel to L in K (all but one of them are restrictions to
P of lines in F 2 that meet the x-axis at some non finitely bounded point). That
completes the proof.
Discussion. As remarked above, it follows from Szmielew’s work [28, ], p. 51,
that M is equivalent to the parallel axiom in Tarki’s geometry with classical
logic and the full first-order continuity axiom (A11). The question then arises,
how exactly can we use elementary continuity to prove Euclid 5 from M? Here
is a proof: Assume, for proof by contradiction, the negation of Euclid 5. Then,
by elementary continuity, limiting parallels exist (see [12, ], p. 261). Then
Aristotle’s axiom holds, as proved in [14, ], Prop. 40.8, p. 380. But M plus
Aristotle’s axiom implies Euclid 5 (see [12, ], p. 220), contradiction, QED.
This proof is interesting because it uses quite a bit of machinery from hyper-
bolic geometry to prove a result that, on the face of it, has nothing to do with
hyperbolic geometry. That is, of course, also true of the proof via Szmielew’s
metamathematics. Note that a non-quantifier-free instance of elementary conti-
nuity is needed to get the existence of limiting parallels directly; in the presence
of Aristotle’s axiom, line-circle continuity suffices (see [12, ], p. 258), but Aristo-
tle’s axiom does not hold in P . Finally, the proof of Theorem 2.6 shows that the
use of a non-quantifier-free instance of continuity is essential, since quantifier-
free instances will hold in Dehn’s model (just like line-circle and circle-circle
continuity).
2.7. Interpreting Hilbert in Tarski. The fundamental results about be-
tweenness discussed in section 5.3, along with many pages of further work, en-
abled Szmielew to prove (interpretations of) Hilbert’s axioms in Tarski’s theory.
Neither she nor her (posthumous) co-authors pointed this out explicitly in [25, ],
but it is not difficult to find each of Hilbert’s axioms among the theorems of
[25, ] (this has been done explicitly, with computer-checked proofs, in [7, ]).
Here we illustrate by comparing Hilbert’s betweenness axioms to Tarski’s: Both
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have symmetry. Hilbert’s II,3 is “Of any three points on a line there exists no
more than one that lies between the other two.” We render that formally as
a 6= b ∧ b 6= c ∧ a 6= c ∧B(a, b, c) → ¬B(b, a, c) ∧ ¬B(a, c, b).
This can be proved from Tarski’s axioms as follows: suppose a, b, and c are
distinct, and B(a, b, c). Then ¬B(b, a, c), since if B(b, a, c) then B(a, b, a), by
inner transitivity and symmetry. (See §4 for the formulas mentioned by name
here.) Also, ¬B(a, c, b), since if B(a, b, c) and B(a, c, b), then B(a, b, a) by inner
transitivity and symmetry.
Hilbert has a “density” axiom (between two distinct points there is a third).
This is listed as (A22) in [30, ], but was never an axiom of Tarski’s theory. Den-
sity can be proved classically even without line-circle or circle-circle continuity:
Gupta ([13, ], or [25, ], Satz 8.22) showed that the midpoint of a segment can
be constructed without continuity. It is also possible to give a very short direct
proof of the density lemma:
Lemma 2.7 (Density). Given distinct points a and c, and point p not collinear
with a and c, there exists a point b with B(a, b, c).
Remark. The proof requires only an axiom stating that the order is unending
(here the extension axiom supplies that need), the inner form of the Pasch axiom,
and the existence of a point not on a given line. This theorem has been known
for sixty years [18, 19, 21, ], as it turns out, and rediscovered by Ben Richert in
2014, whose proof is given here.
Proof. Extend ap by ac to point r, and extend rc by ac to point s. Apply inner
Pasch to scrap. The result is point b with B(a, b, c) (and B(p, b, s), but that is
irrelevant). That completes the proof.
As discussed above, one can prove in Tarski’s system (using the dimension ax-
ioms) that Hilbert’s and Tarski’s definitions of SameSide coincide; and Hilbert’s
plane separation axiom becomes a theorem in Tarski’s system.
Hilbert’s theory has variables for angles; but in Tarski’s theory, angles are
given by ordered triples of non-collinear points, and the theory of congruence
and ordering of angles has to be developed, somewhat laboriously, but along
quite predictable lines, carried out in [25, ]. Some details of the Tarskian theory
of angles are discussed in §8.11 below; the upshot is that (even constructively)
one can construct a conservative extension of Tarski geometry that has variables
for angles and directly supports the kind of arguments one finds in Euclid.
It is sometimes possible to reduce theorems about angles directly; in particular
it is not necessary to develop the theory of angle ordering to state Euclid’s parallel
postulate. In Fig. 4, we show how to translate the concept “equal alternating
interior angles” into Tarski’s language.
§3. Tarski’s theory of straightedge and compass geometry. Tarski’s
theory is “elementary” only in the sense that it is first-order. It still goes far
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Figure 4. Transversal pq makes alternate interior angles equal
with L and K, if pt = tq and rt = st.
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beyond Euclid.8 To capture Euclid’s geometry, Tarski considered the subtheory
in which the continuity axiom is replaced by “segment-circle continuity”. This
axiom asserts the existence of the intersection points of a line segment and a
circle, if some point on the segment lies inside the circle and some point on the
segment lies outside the circle.
It is this theory that we refer to in the title of this paper as “Tarski’s geometry”.
In the section title, we mention “straightedge and compass”; but henceforth we
use the more common terminology “ruler and compass”, with the same meaning.
3.1. Line-circle continuity. We now formulate the axiom of line-circle con-
tinuity. This tells us when a line and a circle intersect–namely, when there is a
point on the line closer (or equally close) to the center than the radius of the
circle.9 But we have not defined inequalities for segments yet, so the formal
statement is a bit more complex. Moreover, we have to include the case of a
degenerate circle or a line tangent to a circle, without making a case distinc-
tion.10 Therefore we must find a way to express “p is inside the closed circle
with center a passing through y”. For that it suffices that there should be some
x non-strictly between a and y such that ax = ap. Since this will appear in the
antecedent of the axiom, the “some x” will not involve an existential quantifier.
Definition 3.1. ab < cd (or cd > ab) means ∃x(B(c, x, d) ∧ ax = ab)).
ab ≤ cd (or cd ≥ ab) means ∃x(T(c, x, d) ∧ ax = ab), where T is non-strict
betweenness.
Definition 3.2. Let C be a circle with center a. Then point p is strictly
inside C means there exists a point b on C such that ap < ab, and p is inside
C, or non-strictly inside C, means ap ≤ ab.
8It is confusing that in axiomatic geometry, “elementary” sometimes refers to the elementary
constructions, and sometimes to the full first-order theory of Tarski. In this paper we shall not
refer again to the full first-order theory.
9Note that in spite of the use of the word “circle” the axiom, in the form that only asserts
the existence of an intersection point, is valid in n-dimensional Euclidean space, where it refers
to the intersections of lines and spheres.
10Avigad et. al. count only transverse intersection, not tangential intersection, as
“intersection.”
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Replacing ‘<’ by ‘>’, we obtain the definition of outside. The version of line-
circle continuity given in [29, ] is better described as “segment-circle” continuity:
ax = ap ∧T(a, x, b) ∧T(a, b, y) ∧ ay = aq → ∃z (T(p, z, q) ∧ az = ab)
This axiom says that if p is inside circle C and q is outside C, then segment pq
meets circle C. See Fig. 5.
Figure 5. Segment-circle continuity. p is inside the circle, q is
outside, so L meets the segment pq.
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One may also consider a geometrically simpler formulation of line-circle con-
tinuity: if line L = Line (u, v) has a point p inside circle C, then there is a point
that lies on both L and C. See Fig. 6.
Figure 6. Line-circle continuity. p is inside the circle, so L
meets the circle.
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We consider two versions of this axiom. The weaker version (one-point line-
circle) only asserts the existence of one intersection point. The stronger version
(two-point line-circle) adds the extra assertion that if p 6= b (i.e., p is strictly
inside the circle) then there are two distinct intersection points.
Here are the formal expressions of these axioms. (The formula Col, for
collinearity, is given in Definition 2.2.)
Col(u, v, p) ∧ u 6= v ∧T(a, p, b) → (one-point line-circle)
∃z (Col(u, v, z) ∧ az = ab)
Col(u, v, p) ∧ u 6= v ∧T(a, p, b) → (two-point line-circle)
∃y, z (az = ab ∧ ay = ab ∧T(y, p, z) ∧ (p 6= a → y 6= z))
Classically, we could take a shorter version of two-point line-circle:
Col(u, v, p) ∧ u 6= v ∧T(a, p, b) ∧ p 6= a → (classical two-point line-circle)
∃y, z (ay = ab ∧ az = ab ∧B(y, p, z))
This is classically equivalent to two-point line circle, since the case when p = a
is trivial; but constructively, we cannot make a case distinction whether p = a
or not. The longer form is necessary for a constructive version.
The equivalence of these three continuity axioms, relative to the other axioms
of Tarski geometry, is not at all obvious (even with classical logic), because
(i) in order to show line-circle implies segment-circle, we need to construct
points on the line outside the circle, which requires the triangle inequality. In
turn the triangle inequality requires perpendiculars.
(ii) in order to show one-point line-circle implies two-point line-circle, we need
to construct the second point somehow. To do that, we need to be able to con-
struct a perpendicular to the line through the center. Classically this requires a
dropped perpendicular from the center to the line (as the case when the center
is on the line is trivial); constructively it requires even more, a “uniform per-
pendicular” construction that works without a case distinction. But even the
former is difficult.
Since two-point line-circle continuity corresponds directly to the uses made
(implicitly) of line-circle continuity in Euclid, we adopt it as an axiom of our
constructive version(s) of Tarski’s theory. We shall show eventually that all
three versions are in fact equivalent, using the other axioms of Tarski’s theory
(and not even using any form of the parallel axiom). But this proof rests on the
work of Gupta [13, ], which we will also discuss below.
3.2. Intersections of circles. We next give the principle known as circle–
circle continuity. It should say that if point p on circleK lies (non-strictly) inside
circle C, and point q on K lies (non-strictly) outside C, then both intersection
points of the circles are defined. This principle would be taken as an axiom,
except that it turns out to be derivable from line-circle continuity, so it is not
necessary as an axiom. This implication will be proved and discussed fully in
§ 8, where it will be shown to be true also with intuitionistic logic.11
11It is also true that circle-circle continuity implies line-circle continuity. See for example
[12, ], p. 201. Proofs of the equivalence of line-circle and circle-circle continuity using Hilbert’s
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In Tarski’s points-only language, circles are given by specifying the center and
a point through which the circle passes. Informally, we write Circle(a, b) for
the circle with center a passing through point b. The case a = b (a “degenerate
circle”) is allowed. To express that p is non-strictly inside (or outside) a circle
C, we use the same technique as just above. Namely, p is inside C if ap = ax for
some x non-strictly between a and a point b on C. The situation is illustrated
in Fig. 7, where circle C is given by center a and point b, and circle K is given
by center c and point d.
Figure 7. Circle-circle continuity. p is inside C and q is outside
C, as witnessed by x and z, so the intersection points 1 and 2
exist.
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We want this principle to apply even to degenerate circles, and to points that
are on C rather than strictly inside, so we must use T rather than B to allow
x = y or y = z, and we must even allow a = x = b = z. But we do not want it
to apply when C and K are the same circle, for then, although classically plenty
of intersection points exist, no special point is singled out by a “construction.”
In order to express this axiom using point variables only, we think of K as
Circle (c, d) and C as Circle (a, b). Then the axiom becomes
ap = ax ∧ aq = az ∧ cp = cd ∧ cq = cd ∧T(a, x, b) ∧T(a, b, z) ∧ a 6= c
→ ∃z1, z2 (cz1 = cd ∧ az1 = ab ∧ cz2 = cd ∧ az2 = ab) (circle-circle)
The use of non-strict betweenness T allows for the cases when the circles are
tangent (either exterior or interior tangency).
axioms (with no continuity and without even the parallel axiom) were found by Strommer [27, ].
Since these axioms are derivable from (A1)-(A9), as shown by Gupta and Szmielew [25, 7, ],
the equivalence can be proved in (A1)-(A9) (with classical logic). We have not studied the
constructivity of Strommer’s proof.
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It is not necessary to assert the existence of two distinct intersection points
when p is strictly inside C, since the second intersection point can be constructed
as the reflection of the first in the line connecting the two centers. Then, using
the plane separation theorem, one can prove the existence of an intersection
point on a given side of the line connecting the centers.
§4. Listing of axioms for reference. In this section, we list the axioms of
all theories used in this paper. It is intended for reference, rather than as part of
a first reading, but we follow Tarski’s example and a referee’s advice in putting
the axioms, in the referee’s phrase, “front and center.”
In the following, ab = cd abbreviates E(a, b, c, d), and T(a, b, c) is non-strict
betweenness, while B(a, b, c) is strict betweenness.
4.1. Classical two-dimensional Tarski geometry. We give the version
preferred by Szmielew. The version in [25, ] has (the classically equivalent)
(A10) instead of (A103). We also give the Skolemized versions here. Col(a, b, c)
(collinearity) is an abbreviation for T(a, b, c) ∨T(b, c, a) ∨T(c, a, b).
ab = ba (A1) Reflexivity of equidistance
ab = pq ∧ ab = rs → pq = rs (A2) Transitivity of equidistance
ab = cc → a = b (A3) Identity of equidistance
∃x (T(q, a, x) ∧ ax = bc) (A4) Segment extension
T(q, a, ext(q, a, b, c)) ∧ E(q, ext(q, a, b, c), b, c) (A4), Skolemized
(a 6= b ∧T(a, b, c) ∧T(A,B,C) ∧ ab = AB ∧ bc = BC
ad = AD ∧ bd = BD) → cd = CD (A5) Five-segment axiom
T(a, b, a) → a = b (A6) Identity for betweenness
T(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) → ∃x (T(p, x, b) ∧T(q, x, a)) (A7) inner Pasch
T(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) →
T(p, ip(a, p, c, b, q), b) ∧T(q, ip(a, p, c, b, q), a) (A7), Skolemized
∃a, b, c¬Col(a, b, c) (A8), lower dimension
¬Col(α, β, γ) (A8), Skolemized
pa = pb ∧ qa = qb ∧ ra = rb → Col(a, b, c) (A9), upper dimension
¬Col(a, b, c) → ∃x (ax = bx ∧ ax = cx) (A103), triangle circumscription
ax = ap ∧T(a, x, b) ∧T(a, b, y) ∧ ay = aq → segment-circle continuity
∃z (T(p, z, q) ∧ az = ab)
In the Skolemized version of the triangle circumscription principle, x is given
by center(a, b, c). We make no use of a Skolemized version of segment-circle, so
we do not give one.
4.2. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry. This theory takes B as primitive
rather than T, so T(a, b, c) is an abbreviation for ¬(a 6= b ∧ b 6= c ∧ ¬B(a, b, c)),
and Col(a, b, c) is an abbreviation for
a 6= b ∧ ¬(¬B(p, a, b) ∧ ¬B(a, p, b) ∧ ¬B(a, b, p) ∧ a 6= p ∧ b 6= p),
which is equivalent to the double negation of the classical definition of Col(a, b, c)
together with a 6= b. In other words, Col(a, b, c) says c lies on Line (a, b). The
axioms (A1)-(A3) and (A5) are unchanged, except that now T is defined in terms
of B. It is inessential whether T or B is taken as primitive.
The differences between classical and intuitionistic Tarski geometry are
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• (A4): Only non-null segments can be extended.
• Axiom (A6) becomes ¬B(a, b, a).
• inner Pasch (A7): The hypothesis T(a, p, c) is changed to B(a, p, c), and
the hypothesis ¬Col(a, b, c) is added, and although T is strengthened to B
in the conclusion. But the hypothesis T(b, q, c) is not changed.
• Symmetry and inner transitivity of betweenness (A14) and (A15) are added.
• A negative formula is used for collinearity in the dimension axioms and the
triangle circumscription principle.
• In line-circle continuity, the two points p and q determining the line are
assumed to be unequal, and we use two-point line-circle continuity instead
of segment-circle.
• We use intuitionistic logic and add the stability axioms.
Intuitionistic Tarski geometry plus classical logic is called “continuous Tarski
geometry”; we can have continuous Tarski geometry with or without Skolem
functions. The changed axioms are as follows:
q 6= a → ∃x (T(q, a, x) ∧ ax = bc) (A4-i) Segment extension
q 6= a → T(q, a, ext(q, a, b, c)) ∧E(q, ext(q, a, b, c), b, c) (A4-i), Skolemized
¬B(a, b, a) (A6-i)
B(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) ∧ ¬Col(a, b, c) →
∃x (B(p, x, b) ∧B(q, x, a)) (A7-i) strict inner Pasch
B(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) ∧ ¬Col(a, b, c) →
B(p, ip(a, p, c, b, q), b) ∧B(q, ip(a, p, c, b, q), a) (A7-i), Skolemized
B(a, b, c) → B(c, b, a) (A14-i), symmetry of betweenness
B(a, b, d) ∧B(b, c, d) → B(a, b, c) (A15-i), inner transitivity
Col(u, v, p) ∧ u 6= v ∧T(a, p, b) → two-point line-circle
∃y, z (az = ab ∧ ay = ab ∧T(y, p, z) ∧ (p 6= a → y 6= z))
The axioms of stability are as follows:
¬¬B(a, b, c) → B(a, b, c)
¬¬E(a, b, c, d) → E(a, b, c, d)
¬a 6= b → a = b
For reference we also state the circle-circle continuity principle, which is not
an axiom but a theorem. The circles must have distinct centers but one of them
could be a null circle (zero radius). See Fig. 7.
ap = ax ∧ aq = az ∧ cp = cd ∧ cq = cd ∧T(a, x, b) ∧T(a, b, z) ∧ a 6= c
→ ∃z1, z2 (cz1 = cd ∧ az1 = ab ∧ cz2 = cd ∧ az2 = ab) (circle-circle)
4.3. Ruler-and-compass Tarski geometry. This theory uses LPT (logic
of partial terms) as given in [2, ], p. 97, which allows a formal treatment of
“undefined terms”. Its axioms are similar to intuitionistic Tarski geometry with
Skolem functions, except that there is an additional 4-ary function symbol iℓ
with the axioms
Col(a, b, x) ∧ Col(p, q, x) ∧ ¬ (Col(a, b, p) ∧ Col(a, b, q)) →
x = iℓ(a, b, p, q) Axiom iℓ-i
iℓ(a, b, p, q) ↓ → Col(a, b, iℓ(a, b, p, q)) ∧ Col(p, q, iℓ(a, b, p, q)) Axiom iℓ-ii
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The Skolem term ip(a, p, c, b, q) is replaced in the Skolemized inner Pasch ax-
iom by iℓ(a, q, b, p). Point c does not occur in this term. The term center(a, b, c)
in the triangle circumscription axiom is not changed.
§5. Tarski’s axioms, continuity, and ruler and compass. Two of Tarski’s
axioms have “degenerate cases”, in the sense that they introduce points that do
not depend continuously on the parameters of the axiom. (The two axioms are
segment extension, which permits extending a null segment, and inner Pasch,
which allows the diagram to collapse to a line.) Even using classical logic, we
consider this undesirable. We would like to have a formulation of Tarski’s the-
ory that would permit us to use Herbrand’s theorem to show that if ∃y A(x, y)
is provable (where x stands for several variables, not just one), then there are
finitely many ruler and compass constructions t1(x), . . . , tn(x) such that for each
x, one of the ti constructs the desired y, i.e.,A(x, ti(x)). In this section, we dis-
cuss how Tarski’s axioms can be slightly modified to eliminate discontinuities. It
may be worth pointing out that a reformulation is necessary, as Tarski’s formu-
lation definitely does not have this property: all ruler and compass constructions
produce points that depend continuously on parameters, but as remarked above,
the existential theorems of Tarski’s theory can produce points that do not depend
continuously on parameters.
5.1. Segment extension and Euclid I.2. (A4) is the segment construction
axiom. Tarski’s version is ∃x (T(q, a, x) ∧ ax = bc). The degenerate case is
extending a null segment, i.e.,when q = a; then the point x is not uniquely
determined, and moreover, x does not depend continuously on q as q approaches
a. One might wonder if x = a, or in other words b = c (extending by a null
segment) is also a degenerate case, but we do not consider it as degenerate, since
there is no discontinuous dependence in that case. Then to avoid degenerate
cases, we could consider
q 6= a → ∃x (T(q, a, x) ∧ ax = bc) (A4-i)
Classically, disallowing q = a costs nothing, since to extend a null segment aa
by bc, we just pick any point d 6= a and extend the non-null segment da by bc.
Of course, this introduces a discontinuous dependence.
5.2. Degenerate cases of inner Pasch. (A7) is inner Pasch; please refer to
Fig. 2. This has a degenerate case when p = a and q = b, for as (p, q) approaches
(a, b), the intersection point x does not have a unique limit, but could approach
any point on ab or not have a limit at all, depending on how (p, q) approaches
(a, b). If p = c or q = c, or if p = a but q 6= b, or if q = b but p 6= a, then
there is an obvious choice of x, so this degenerate case can be removed simply by
replacing T by B in inner Pasch. In fact, it is enough to make this replacement
on one side of the triangle, leaving T on the other side.
Tarski’s version of inner Pasch allows the points a, b, and c to be collinear,
and this case is technically important, because it allows a number of fundamental
theorems about betweenness to be derived that originally were taken as axioms.12
12Tarski viewed it as a good thing when the number of axioms could be reduced by using
degenerate cases of remaining axioms. We note that in 2013, a further possible reduction in
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The point asserted to exist is unique when a, b, and c are not collinear; the
technical question arises, whether the point can be chosen continuously in the
five parameters a, b, c, p, and q, in case collinearity is allowed, but the five points
are required to be distinct. Some computations (not provided here) show that
indeed the point can be continuously chosen.
Nevertheless, we consider the case when a, b, and c are collinear to be ob-
jectionable, on philosophical grounds. Pasch’s axiom is supposed to justify the
construction of certain points by labeling the intersections of lines drawn with a
straightedge as actually “existing” points. In the case when the lines coincide,
the axiom has no conceptual connection with the idea of intersecting lines, and
hence would need some other justification to be accepted as an axiom. If the
justification is just that it provides a single axiom from which several intuitively
evident propositions about betweenness can be deduced, that is a distortion of
the meaning of the word “axiom.”
Whether or not one gives weight to this philosophical argument, there is a
related technical point: we consider below a version of geometry with terms
for the intersection points of lines, and we want to be able to use those terms
to construct the points shown to exist by Pasch’s axiom. In other words, the
problem with Tarski’s too-general version of inner Pasch is that it asserts the
existence of points for which there is no ruler and compass construction. In
that respect, it is unlike any of the other axioms (A1) to (A10), and also unlike
the line-circle and circle-circle continuity axioms. This issue reflects in a precise
mathematical way the philosophical issue about the collinear case of Pasch’s
axiom.
Therefore, we reformulate inner Pasch for continuity, and for constructivity in
the sense of ruler and compass constructions of the points asserted to exist, as
follows:
• We change T(a, p, c) to B(a, p, c).
• We add the hypothesis, ¬Col(a, b, c).
The resulting axiom is
T(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) ∧ p 6= a ∧ ¬Col(a, b, c) →
∃x (B(p, x, b) ∧B(q, x, a)) (A7-i) strict inner Pasch
Note that we did not require both B(a, p, c) and B(b, q, c). Changing just one
of those from T to B is sufficient to allow a ruler and compass construction.
We do not need two versions, one with B(a, p, c) and one with B(b, q, c), by
symmetry. As it turns out, we could use B instead of T in all the parts of this
axiom and prove the same theorems, as is shown in Section 11.4 below.
5.3. Inner Pasch and betweenness. Tarski’s final theory [30, ] had only
one betweenness axiom, known as (A6) or “the identity axiom for betweenness”:
T(a, b, a) → a = b.
the number of axioms was proved possible by Makarios [20, ]: interchanging two variables in
the conclusion of the five-segment allows the elimination of the symmetry axiom of congruence,
ab = ba.
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In terms of strict betweenness, that becomes ¬B(a, x, a), or otherwise expressed,
B(a, b, c) → a 6= c. We also refer to this axiom as (A6). The original version
of Tarski’s theory had more betweenness axioms (see [30, ], p. 188). These were
all shown eventually to be superfluous in classical Tarski geometry, through the
work of Eva Kallin, Scott Taylor, Tarski himself, and especially Tarski’s student
H. N. Gupta [13, ]. These proofs appear in [25, ]. Here we give the axiom
numbers from [30, ], names by which they are known, and also the theorem
numbers of their proofs in [25, ]:
T(a, b, c) → T(c, b, a) (A14), symmetry, Satz 3.2
T(a, b, d) ∧T(b, c, d) → T(a, b, c) (A15), inner transitivity, Satz 3.5a
T(a, b, c) ∧T(b, c, d) ∧ b 6= c →
T(a, b, d) (A16), outer transitivity, Satz 3.7b
T(a, b, d) ∧T(a, c, d) →
T(a, b, c) ∨T(a, c, b) (A17), inner connectivity, Satz 5.3
T(a, b, c) ∧T(a, b, d) ∧ a 6= b →
T(a, c, d) ∨T(a, d, c) (A18), outer connectivity, Satz 5.1
The first of these (A14), is a consequence of inner Pasch, formulated with T,
but the proof uses a degenerate case of inner Pasch, so if we replace inner Pasch
by the non-degenerate form (strict inner Pasch), we will (apparently) have to
reinstate (A14) as an axiom. The question arises as to whether this is also true
of the others. Certainly these cases suffice:
Lemma 5.1. (A14) and (A15) suffice to prove the collinear case of Tarski’s
inner Pasch, using (A4-i) and (A7-i) instead of (A4) and (A7). That is,
Col(a, b, c) ∧ a 6= b ∧T(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) → ∃x (T(p, x, b) ∧T(q, x, a)).
Proof. We first note that T(a, b, b) follows immediately from the definition of
T(a, b, c) in terms of B.
Since we checked above that the degenerate cases of (A7) are provable, we can
assume that all five of the given points are distinct. Since Col(a, b, c), we have
B(a, b, c) ∨B(a, c, b) ∨B(c, a, b).
Case 1, B(a, b, c). Then we take x = b. We have to prove T(p, b, b)∧T(q, b, a).
From T(a, b, c)∧T(b, q, c) we have T(a, b, q) by (A15). Then T(q, b, a) by (A14).
Since p 6= b we have T(p, b, b) as shown above. That completes Case 1.
Case 2, B(c, a, b). Then we take x = a. We have to prove T(p, a, b)∧T(q, a, a).
Since q 6= a we have T(q, a, a) as shown above. By symmetry (A14) we have
T(a, p, c) and T(b, a, c), so by (A15) we have T(b, a, p), so by (A14) again we
have T(p, a, b) as desired. That completes Case 2.
Case 3, B(a, c, b). Then we take x = c. We have to prove T(p, c, b)∧T(q, c, a).
From T(a, c, b) and T(c, q, b) we have by (A15) T(a, c, q), whence by (A14),
T(q, c, a). From T(a, c, b) by (A14), we have T(b, c, a). From T(a, p, c) by (A14),
we have T(c, p, a). From that and T(b, c, a) we have by (A15) T(b, c, p). By
(A14) we have T(p, c, b) as desired. That completes Case 3, and the proof of the
lemma.
§6. Alternate formulations of Tarski’s theory. In this section we con-
sider some reformulations of Tarski’s theories (still using classical logic) that (i)
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isolate and remove “degenerate cases” of the axioms, and (ii) introduce Skolem
functions to achieve a quantifier-free axiomatization, and (iii) introduce addi-
tional axioms to make the intersection points of lines and circles, or circles and
circles, depend continuously on the (points determining the) lines and circles.
6.1. Continuous Tarski geometry. Let “continuous Tarski geometry” re-
fer to classical Tarski geometry with two-point line-circle continuity, with the
following modifications:
• (A4-i) instead of (A4) (extending non-null segments)
• (A7-i) (strict inner Pasch) instead of (A7). That is, use B instead of T in
two of the three occurrences of T in inner Pasch, and require ¬Col(a, b, c).
• Take (A14) and (A15) as axioms (symmetry and transitivity of between-
ness)
• Use the triangle circumscription principle (A103) for the parallel axiom
The reason for the name “continuous Tarski geometry” will be apparent even-
tually, when we show what seems intuitively obvious: that Skolem functions for
these axioms can be implemented by ruler and compass constructions.
Theorem 6.1. Continuous Tarski geometry has the same theorems as Tarski
geometry.
Proof. To extend a null segment bb by cd, first select any point a different from
b, then extend ab by cd. Hence the restriction to (A4-i) costs nothing. By
Lemma 5.1, the restriction to the non-collinear and non-degenerate case of (A7)
is made up for by the inclusion of (A14) and (A15) as axioms. That completes
the proof of the theorem.
6.2. Skolemizing Tarski’s geometry. Since Tarski’s axioms are already in
existential form, one can add Skolem functions to make them quantifier-free.
Perhaps the reason why Tarski did not do so is his desire that there should be
just one model of his theory over the real plane R2. If one introduces Skolem
functions for the intersection points of two circles, then those Skolem functions
can be interpreted quite arbitrarily, unless one also adds further axioms to guar-
antee their continuity, and even then, one has a problem because those Skolem
functions will be meaningless (have arbitrary values) when the circles do not in-
tersect. Tarski did not have circle-circle continuity, but the same problem arises
with Skolem functions for inner Pasch, when the hypotheses are not satisfied.
The problem can be seen in a simpler context, when we try to axiomatize
field theory with a function symbol i(x), the official version of x−1. The point is
that 0 has no multiplicative inverse, yet Skolem functions are total, so i(0) has
to denote something. We phrase the axiom as x 6= 0 → x · i(x) = 1, so we
can’t prove 0 · i(0) = 1, which is good, since we can prove 0 · i(0) = 0. In spite
of this difficulty, the theory with Skolem functions is a conservative extension
of the theory without Skolem functions, as one sees (for theories with classical
logic) from the fact that every model of the theory without can be expanded
by suitably interpreting the Skolem function symbols. We return below to the
question of how this works for intuitionistic theories in Lemma 7.4 below.
Papers on axiomatic geometry often use the phrase “constructive theory” to
mean one with enough function symbols to be formulated with quantifier-free
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axioms. While this is not sufficient to imply that a theory is “constructive”
in the sense of being in accordance with Bishop’s constructive mathematics (or
another branch of constructive mathematics), it is a desirable feature, in the
sense that a constructive theory should provide terms to describe the objects it
can prove to exist. In finding a constructive version of Tarski’s theories, therefore,
we will wish to produce a version with function symbols corresponding to ruler
and compass constructions. In order to compare the constructive theory with
Tarski’s classical theory, we will first consider a Skolemized version of Tarski’s
theory, with classical logic.
6.3. Skolem functions for classical Tarski. One introduces Skolem func-
tions and reformulates the axioms to be quantifier-free. But we want these
Skolem functions to be meaningful as ruler and compass constructions. Hence,
we do not Skolemize Tarski’s theory as he gave it, but rather the modified version
we called “continuous Tarski geometry.” The axioms are listed for reference in
§4; here we just give a list of the Skolem functions:
• ext(a, b, c, d) is a point x such that for a 6= b, we have T(a, b, x) ∧ bx = cd.
• ip(a, p, c, b, q) is the point asserted to exist by inner Pasch (see Fig 2),
provided a, b, and c are not collinear, and B(a, p, c).
• Three constants α, β, and γ for three non-collinear points. (In this paper
we consider only plane geometry, for simplicity.)
• center(a, b, c) is a point equidistant from a, b, and c, provided a, b, and c
are not collinear.
• iℓc1(a, b, c, d) and iℓc2(a, b, c, d) for the two intersection points of Line (a, b)
and Circle (c, d), the circle with center c passing through d.
The function center is needed to remove the existential quantifier in Szmielew’s
parallel axiom (A102), which says that if a, b, and c are not collinear, there exists
a circle through a, b, and c. For the version (A10) of the parallel axiom used
in [25, ], we would need two different Skolem functions. The points asserted to
exist by that version are not unique and do not correspond to any natural ruler
and compass construction, which is a reason to prefer triangle circumscription
as the parallel axiom.
The question arises, what do we do about “undefined terms”, e.g., iℓc1(a, b, c, d)
when the line and circle in question do not actually meet? One approach is to
modify the logic, using the “logic of partial terms”, introducing a new atomic
statement t ↓ (read “t is defined”) for each term t. In Tarski’s geometry as
described here, that is not necessary, since we can explicitly give the conditions
for each term to be defined. In that way, t ↓ can be regarded as an abbreviation
at the meta-level, rather than an official formula. We write the formula as (t ↓)◦
to avoid confusion and for consistency of notation with another section below.
Definition 6.2. When the arguments to the Skolem functions are variables
or constants, we have
(ext(a, b, c, d) ↓)◦ := a 6= b
ip(a, p, c, b, q) ↓)◦ := B(a, p, c) ∧T(b, q, c) ∧ ¬Col(a, b, c)
(center(a, b, c) ↓)◦ := ¬Col(a, b, c)
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If the arguments a, b, c, d are not variables or constants, then we need to add
(recursively) the formulas expressing their definedness on the right.
In addition to the obvious “Skolem axioms” involving these function symbols,
we need additional axioms to ensure that the two intersection points of a line
and circle are distinguished from each other (except when the intersection is of a
circle and a tangent line), and that the intersection points depend continuously
on the (points determining the) lines and circles.
We discuss the two points of intersection of Line (a, b) and Circle (c, d), which
are denoted by iℓc1(a, b, c, d) and iℓc2(a, b, c, d). We want an axiom asserting that
these two points occur on Line (a, b) in the same order as a and b do; that axiom
serves to distinguish the two points and ensure that they depend continuously
on a, b, c, and d. To that end we need to define SameOrder(a, b, c, d), assuming
a 6= b but allowing c = d. This can be done as follows:
SameOrder(a, b, c, d) := (T(c, a, b) → ¬B(d, c, a))
∧ (T(a, c, b) → ¬B(d, c, b))
∧ (T(a, b, c) → T(a, c, d))
The axiom in question is then
SameOrder(a, b, iℓc1(a, b, c, d), iℓc2(a, b, c, d)).
6.4. Continuity of the Skolem functions. We will investigate what addi-
tional axioms are necessary to guarantee that the Skolem functions are uniquely
defined and continuous. Unless we are using the logic of partial terms, technically
Skolem functions are total, in which case we cannot avoid some arbitrariness in
their values, but when their “definedness conditions” given above are satisfied, we
expect them to be uniquely defined and continuous. This will be important for
metatheorems about the continuous dependence on parameters of things proved
constructively to exist; but we think it is also of interest even to the classical
geometer.
Evidently for this purpose we should use the version of the axioms that has
been sanitized of degenerate cases. Thus, ext only Skolemizes axiom (A4-i), for
extending non-degenerate segments, and ip only Skolemizes axiom (A7-i) rather
than A7. These Skolem functions will then be uniquely defined (and provably
so).
Continuity of a term t(x), where x can be several variables x1, . . . , xn, can be
defined in geometry: it means that for every circle C with t(x) as center, where
C is given by t(x) and a point p on C, there exist circles Ki about xi such that
if zi is inside Ki, for i = 1, . . . , n, then t(z) is inside C.
Lemma 6.3. The terms iℓc1(a, b, c, d) and iℓc2(a, b, c, d) are provably continu-
ous in a, b, c, and d (when their definedness conditions hold).
Proof. Once we have defined multiplication and addition, this proof can be
carried out within geometry, using ordinary algebraic calculations. It is very
much easier to believe that these (omitted) proofs can be carried out, than it is
to actually get a theorem-prover or proof-checker to do so. See [4, ] for a full
discussion of the issues involved.
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Theorem 6.4 (Continuity of inner Pasch). Tarski’s geometry, using axioms
(A4-i) and (A7-i), proves the continuity of ip(a, p, c, b, q) as a function of its five
parameters, when the hypotheses of inner Pasch are satisfied.
Remark. If we use axiom (A7), without the modifications in (A7-i), then
ip(a, p, c, b, q) is not continuous as (p, q) approaches (a, b), as discussed above.
Proof. This also can be carried out by introducing coordinates and making
ordinary algebraic computations within Tarski geometry.
6.5. Continuity and the triangle circumscription principle. Above we
have given the triangle circumscription principle with the hypothesis that a, b,
and c are non-collinear (and hence distinct) points. What happens when that
requirement is relaxed? If a and b are allowed to approach each other without
restriction on the direction of approach, then center(a, b, c) does not depend
continuously on its parameters. But if a and b are restricted to lie on a fixed line
L (as is the case when using triangle circumscription to define multiplication as
Hilbert did), then as a approaches b (both remaining away from c), the circle
through a, b, and c nicely approaches the circle through a and c that is tangent
to L at a. The strong triangle circumscription principle says that there is a term
C(a, b, c, p, q) such that when a and b lie on L = Line (p, q) and c does not lie on
L, then e = C(a, b, p, q) is equidistant from a, b, and c, and moreover, if a = b
then ea is perpendicular to L at a (i.e., the circle is tangent to L at a). In [5, ], it
is shown how to construct the term C, using segment extensions and the uniform
perpendicular; so this construction can be carried out in Tarski geometry with
Skolem functions.
§7. A constructive version of Tarski’s theory. Finally we are ready to
move from classical to intuitionistic logic. Our plan is to give two intuitionistic
versions of Tarski’s theory, one with function symbols as in the Skolemized ver-
sion above, and one with existential axioms as in Tarski’s original theory. The
underlying logic will be intuitionistic predicate logic. We first give the specif-
ically intuitionistic parts of our theory, which are very few in number. We do
not adopt decidable equality (a = b ∨ a 6= b), nor even the substitute concept of
“apartness” introduced by Brouwer and Heyting (and discussed below), primar-
ily because we aim to develop a system in which definable terms (constructions)
denote continuous functions, but also because we wish to keep our system closely
related to Euclid’s geometry, which contains nothing like apartness.
7.1. Introduction to constructive geometry. Here we discuss some is-
sues particular to geometry with intuitionistic logic. The main point is that we
must avoid case distinctions in existence proofs. What one has to avoid in con-
structive geometry is not proofs of equality or inequality by contradiction, but
rather constructions (existence proofs) that make a case distinction. For exam-
ple, classically we have two different constructions of a perpendicular through
point p to line L, one for when p is not on L, and another for when p is on
L. Pushing a double negation through an implication, we only get not-not a
perpendicular exists, which is not enough. To constructivize the theorem, we
have to give a uniform construction of the perpendicular, which works without
a case distinction. (Two different such constructions are given in this paper, one
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using line-circle continuity, but not the parallel axiom, and one using the parallel
axiom, but not line-circle.)
In particular, in order to show that the models of geometry are planes over
Euclidean fields, we need to define addition and multiplication by just such
uniform constructions, without case distinctions about the sign of the arguments.
The classical definitions due to Descartes and Hilbert do depend on such case
distinctions; in [5, ] we have given uniform definitions; here we check that their
properties can be proved in intuitionistic Tarski geometry. To actually carry out
the complete development directly would be a project of about the length and
scope of Szmielew’s comparable development of classical geometry from Tarski’s
axioms, in Part I of [25, ]. Therefore it is important that the double-negation
interpretation can be made to carry the load.
We mention here two principles which are not accepted by all constructivists,
at least in the context of real analysis. Here x < y refers to points on a fixed
line L, and can be defined in terms of betweenness.
¬¬x > 0 → x > 0 (Markov’s principle)
x 6= 0 → x < 0 ∨ x > 0 (two-sides)
We accept the former, but not the latter. Markov’s principle follows from the
stability of betweenness and is a fundamental principle of constructive geometry.
It allows us to avoid distinguishing more than one sense of inequality between
points. Geometry without it would be much more complicated.
The principle “two-sides” (which we do not accept) is closely related to “a
point not on a given line is on one side or the other of the line”. (Here the
“line” could be the y-axis, i.e.,a line perpendicular to L at the point 0.) This
principle is not needed in the formalization of Euclid, or the development of the
geometrical theory of arithmetic, and as we will show, it is not a theorem of
intuitionistic Tarski geometry.
One might consider adopting two-sides as an axiom, on grounds similar to
those sometimes used to justify Markov’s principle or apartness, namely that
if we “compute x to sufficient accuracy we will see what sign it has.” That
justification applies only to the model of computable reals, not to various more
general intuitionistic models of sequences generated by free choices of approx-
imations to points. Brouwer argued against this principle in one of his later
papers [8, ] on those grounds; and our development of constructive geometry
shows that it is not needed for the usual theorems, including the geometric defi-
nitions of addition and multiplication. In our opinion, not only is it unnecessary,
it is also constructively undesirable, as the choice of which disjunct holds can-
not depend continuously on x, so anyone claiming its validity must make some
assumptions about how points are “given”, e.g. by a computable sequence of
rational approximations; we do not want to make such assumptions.
On the other hand, the following principle has been accepted by all construc-
tivists in the past who considered geometry:
a < b → x < b ∨ a < x (apartness)
It turns out that apartness is completely unnecessary for the formalization of
Euclid, and is not a theorem of intuitionistic Tarski geometry. The desire to use
apartness probably arose from an unwillingness to the trichotomy law of order,
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and to find some replacement for it. In our work, the law of trichotomy of order is
replaced by the stability of equality and betweenness. If we want to formalize one
of Euclid’s proofs where two points are proved equal by contradiction (consider
III.4 for a specific example), the proof in Euclid shows ¬a 6= b; in other words
¬¬a = b. What we need to formalize such proofs is the principle
¬a 6= b → a = b
or, otherwise expressed, ¬¬a = b → a = b. This principle, already mentioned in
the introduction, is called the “stability of equality.” The trichotomy law can also
be double negated, each case but one shown contradictory, and the final double
negation removed by the stability of betweenness, ¬¬B(a, b, c) → B(a, b, c).
That is the fundamental reason why apartness is not needed in constructive
geometry.
7.2. Stability. The word “stable” is applied to a predicate Q if ¬¬Q → Q.
Our intuitionistic versions of Tarski geometry will all have axioms of stability
for the basic predicates. That is, we include the axioms
¬a 6= b → a = b
¬¬B(a, b, c) → B(a, b, c)
¬¬ab = cd → ab = cd
In this section we justify accepting these axioms. Our intuition is that there is
nothing asserting existence in the meaning of equality, congruence, or between-
ness; hence assertions of equality, congruence, or betweenness can be construc-
tively proved by contradiction. There are many examples in Euclid13 where
Euclid argues that two points, differently constructed, must coincide; such ex-
amples use the stability of equality. Similarly, if point x lies on Line (a, b), we
may wish to argue by cases as to its position on the line relative to a and b.
We double-negate the disjunction of the five possible positions, argue each case
independently, and arrive at the double negation of the desired conclusion. As
long as what we are proving is a betweenness, congruence, or equality, stability
allows us to remove the double negation and reach the desired conclusion.
We explain this point with more detail, for those inexperienced with intuition-
istic reasoning: Suppose P → Q, and R → Q. Then (P ∨ R) → Q (both
classically and intuitionistically). Taking R to be ¬P , if P → Q and ¬P → Q,
then P ∨ ¬P → Q. So, classically, Q holds. But intuitionistically, we may not
be able to prove that the cases P and ¬P are exhaustive; for example we cannot
assert in general that point p is on line L or it is not. But intuitionistically,
we still have ¬¬ (P ∨ ¬P ) → ¬¬Q, since if ¬Q then ¬P and ¬¬P , which is
contradictory. Now if Q is stable we can still conclude Q, since ¬¬(P ∨ ¬P ) is
intuitionistically valid.
What we are not allowed to do, constructively, is argue by cases for an exis-
tential conclusion, using a different construction for each case. (In the previous
paragraph, if Q begins with ∃, then Q will not be stable.) This observation
makes it apparent why the constructivization of geometry hinges on the success-
ful discovery of uniform constructions, continuous in parameters.
13Just to mention one, Euclid III.4
32 MICHAEL BEESON
As we mentioned above, angles can be defined in Tarski’s theory, and one can
show that the equality and ordering of angles is stable. That is,
¬¬α < β → α < β
for angles α and β. Thus, when Euclid wants to prove α = β, and says, if not,
then one of them is greater; let α > β, and so on, the reasoning is constructive,
because we have
¬¬(α < β ∨ α = β ∨ β < α)
and if α < β and β < α lead to contradictions, then ¬¬α = β, whence by
stability, α = β. Similarly if what is to be proved is an inequality of angles.
Julien Narboux pointed out that the stability of equality can be derived from
the stability of congruence:
Lemma 7.1. With the aid of axioms A1 and A3, stability of congruence implies
stability of equality.
Proof. Suppose ¬a 6= b. We want to prove a = b. By A3, it suffices to prove
ab = aa. By the stability of congruence, we may prove this by contradiction.
Suppose, for proof by contradiction, that ab 6= aa. We claim a 6= b. To prove
it, suppose a = b. Then from ab 6= aa we obtain ab 6= ab, contradicting A1.
Therefore a 6= b. But that contradicts the hypothesis ¬a 6= b from the first line
of the proof. That completes the proof of the lemma.
We could therefore drop stability of equality as an axiom, but we retain it
anyway, because of its fundamental character, and to emphasize that it is perhaps
even more fundamental than the facts expressed in A1 and A3.
Stability of incidence. Tarski’s theory has variables for points only, so when
we discuss lines, implicitly each line L is given by two points, L = Line (a, b).
When we say point x lies on line L, that abbreviates
¬¬ (T(x, a, b) ∨T(a, x, b) ∨T(a, b, x)).
Since logically, ¬¬¬P is equivalent to ¬P , the relation x lies on L is stable.
(Four negations is the same as two negations.) We refer to this as the “stability
of incidence.” When the definition of incidence is expanded, this is seen to be
a logical triviality, not even worth of the name “lemma.” But when working
in Tarski’s theories with less than complete formality, we do mention lines and
incidence and justify some proof steps by the “stability of incidence.” In other
words, we are allowed to prove that a point x lies on a line L by contradiction.
7.3. Strict and non-strict betweenness. Should we use strict or non-strict
betweenness in constructive geometry? The answer is, it doesn’t matter much,
because of the stability of B. What we do officially is use strict betweenness B,
and regard T as defined by
T(a, b, c) := ¬(a 6= b ∧ b 6= c ∧ ¬B(a, b, c)).
We could also have taken T as primitive and defined B by
B(a, b, c) := T(a, b, c) ∧ a 6= b ∧ b 6= c.
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7.4. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry with existential axioms. The lan-
guage of this theory takes strict betweennessB(a, b, c) as primitive, and T(a, b, c)
will then be a defined concept, given by Definition 2.1. Some of the axioms will
be “unmodified” from Tarski’s theory, by which we mean that the only change
is to define T in terms of B. The other modifications are described in detail
in §4.2, just before the listing of the modified axioms. Here we summarize the
modifications:
• Modify Axiom A4 (segment extension) so only non degenerate segments
are extendable.
• Axiom (A6) becomes ¬B(a, b, a).
• Replace inner Pasch (A7) by (A7-i), which requires ¬Col(a, b, c) and re-
places two of the three occurrences of T by B.
• Add (A14-i) and (A15-i), the symmetry and inner transitivity axioms for
betweenness:
B(a, b, c) → B(c, b, a)
B(a, b, d) ∧B(b, c, d) → B(a, b, c)
• Use the triangle circumscription principle as the parallel postulate.
• Add two-point line-circle continuity (instead of segment-circle).
• Use intuitionistic logic only.
• add the stability of equality, betweenness, and congruence.
The resulting theory is called “intuitionistic Tarski geometry”, or “intuition-
istic Tarski geometry with existential axioms.” Another way of describing it is:
restrict continuous Tarski geometry to intuitionistic logic, and add the stability
axioms for equality, betweenness, and equidistance, use the triangle circumscrip-
tion principle for the parallel axiom, and add two-point line-circle continuity. We
use the phrase “intuitionistic Tarski geometry without any continuity” to refer
to the theory obtained by dropping the line-circle continuity axiom.
Theorem 7.2. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry plus classical logic is equivalent
to Tarski geometry (with or without line-circle continuity).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 6.1, Since intuitionistic Tarski geometry is
continuous Tarski geometry with intuitionistic logic and stability axioms, it is
classically equivalent to continuous Tarski geometry. But by Theorem 6.1, that
theory is classically equivalent to Tarski geometry. That completes the proof.
7.5. Intuitionistic quantifier-free Tarski geometry. We can use the same
Skolem functions as for the classical theory, since we already made the necessary
restrictions to the Skolem functions for segment extension and Pasch’s axioms.
For the same reason, the conditions for definedness of Skolem terms are not
changed.
Lemma 7.3. For every term t of intuitionistic quantifier-free Tarski geometry,
the sentence ¬¬(t ↓)◦ → (t ↓)◦ is provable.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of t, using the stability of B, E, and
equality for the base case.
Since the conditions for the definedness of Skolem terms are definable, there
is no logical problem about using (total) Skolem functions in this intuitionistic
34 MICHAEL BEESON
theory, without modifying the logic, which is the ordinary intuitionistic first-
order predicate calculus. However, there might be a philosophical problem, as
one might ask, what is the intended interpretation of those total Skolem symbols?
One cannot specify a total (everywhere defined) construction to interpret, for
example, the Skolem symbol for inner Pasch. Therefore it is more philosophically
correct to use the “logic of partial terms”, which is explained in another section
below. However, it is possible to consider the Skolem symbols as mere syntactic
tools, which, even if not meaningful, at least cause no unwanted deductions,
according to the following lemma:
Lemma 7.4. [Conservativity of Skolem functions] Suppose intuitionistic Tarski
with Skolem functions proves a theorem φ that does not contain Skolem functions.
Then intuitionistic Tarski (with existential quantifiers and no Skolem functions)
also proves φ. In fact, the same is true of any intuitionistic theory whose axioms
before Skolemization have the form P (x) → ∃y Q(x, y), with P quantifier-free.
Proof. Consider a Skolem symbol with axiom P (x) → Q(x, f(x)), Skolemizing
the axiom P (x) → ∃y Q(x, y). The corresponding lemma for classical theories
needs no restriction on the form of P ; one simply shows that every model of
the theory without Skolem functions can be expanded to a model of the theory
with Skolem functions. The interpretation of the values of a Skolem symbol,
say f(b) are just taken arbitrarily when P (b) is not satisfied. Then one appeals
to the completeness theorem. One can use the Kripke completeness theorem to
make a similar argument for theories with intuitionistic logic; but in general one
cannot define f(b) at a nodeM of a Kripke model where P (b) fails, because P (b)
might hold later on, and worse, there might be nodes M1 and M2 above M at
which different values of y are required, so there might be no way to define f(b)
at M . That cannot happen, however, if P is quantifier-free, since then, if P (b)
does not hold at M , it also doesn’t hold at any node above M . Hence if P is
quantifier free, we can complete the proof, using Kripke completeness instead of
Go¨del completeness. (For an introduction to Kripke models and a proof of the
completeness theorem, see [31, ], Part V, pp. 324ff.)
§8. Perpendiculars, midpoints and circles. We have included two-point
line-circle continuity in our axiom systems for ruler and compass geometry, since
this corresponds to the the physical use of ruler and compass. Tarski, on the
other hand, had segment-circle continuity. In this section, we will show how to
construct perpendiculars and midpoints, using two-point line-circle continuity.
By definition, ab is perpendicular to bc if a 6= b and abc is a right angle, which
means that if da = ac and B(d, a, c) then ad = ac. We sometimes write this
as ab ⊥ bc. More generally, two lines K and L are perpendicular at b if b lies
on both lines, and there are points a and c on K and L respectively such that
ab ⊥ bc. We sometimes write this as K ⊥ L. It can be shown that K ⊥ L if and
only if L ⊥ K.
We will deal with “dropped perpendiculars” (perpendiculars from a point p
to a line L, assuming p is not on L), and also with “erected perpendiculars”
(perpendiculars to a line L at a point p on L). Our results are of equal interest
for classical and constructive geometry. As in [25, ], we abstain from the use of
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the dimension axioms or the parallel axiom (except in one subsection, where we
mention our use of the parallel axiom explicitly); although these restrictions are
not stated in the lemmas they are adhered to in the proofs.
A fundamental fact about perpendiculars is the uniqueness of the dropped
perpendicular:
Lemma 8.1. Suppose p does not lie on line L, but a and b do lie on L, and
both pa and pb are perpendicular to L. Then a = b.
Proof. This is Satz 8.7 of [25, ]; the proof offered there is completely constructive,
but it does appeal to some earlier theorems. One can either check these proofs
directly, or appeal to the double-negation interpretation (Theorem 12.2 below).
We need to verify that the midpoint of a segment can be constructed by a
term in intuitionistic Tarski geometry with Skolem functions. If we were willing
to use the intersection points of circles, the problem might seem simple: we
could use the two circles drawn in Euclid’s Proposition I.1, and connect the two
intersection points. (This is not Euclid’s construction of midpoints, but still it
is commonly used.) This matter is not as simple as it first appears, as we shall
now explain.
We try to find the midpoint of segment pq. Let K be the circle with center
p passing through q, and let C be the circle with center q passing through p,
and let d and e be the two intersection points of these circles. Now the trick
would be to prove that de meets pq in a point f ; if that could be done, then it is
easy to prove f is the desired midpoint, by the congruence of triangles pef and
qef . But it seems at first that the the full Pasch axiom is required to prove the
existence of f . True, full Pasch follows from inner Pasch and the other axioms,
at least classically, but we would have to verify that constructively using only
the axioms of intuitionistic Tarski, which does not seem trivial. In particular,
we will need the existence of midpoints of segments to do that! (Moreover, the
dimension axiom would need to be used; without it, circle-circle continuity is
sphere-sphere continuity and not every two intersection points d and e of two
spheres will lie in the same plane as pq. Full Pasch fails in three dimensions,
while inner and outer Pasch hold.)
In fact, the existence of midpoints has been the subject of much research, and
it has been shown that one does not need circles and continuity at all! Gupta
[13, ] (in Chapter 3) showed that inner Pasch suffices to construct midpoints,
i.e.,classical Tarski proves the existence of midpoints. Piesyk (who was a student
of Szmielew) proved it [23, ], using outer Pasch instead of inner Pasch. Later
Rigby [24, ] reduced the assumptions further. At the end of this section, we
will give Gupta’s construction, but not his proof. Since the proof just proves
that the constructed point m satisfies ma = mb, by the stability of equality
(and the double-negation interpretation, technically, which we shall come to in
§12.1) we know that Gupta’s classical proof [13, 25, ] can be made constructive.
The simpler construction using line-circle continuity is adequate for most of our
purposes.
8.1. The base of an isosceles triangle has a midpoint. Euclid’s own
midpoint construction is to construct an isosceles triangle on pq and then bisect
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the vertex angle. One of Gupta’s simple lemmas enables us to justify the second
part of this Euclidean midpoint construction, and we present that lemma next.
Lemma 8.2. [Gupta] Intuitionistic Tarski geometry with Skolem functions,
and without continuity, proves that for some term m(x, y, z), if y 6= z and x
is equidistant from y and z, with x, y, and z not collinear, then m(x, y, z) is the
midpoint of yz.
Figure 8. To construct the midpoint w of yz, given x with
xz = xy, using two applications of inner Pasch.
b
x
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Proof. See page 56 of [13, ]. But the proof is so simple and beautiful that we give
it here. Let α and β be two of the three distinct points guaranteed by Axiom
A8. Let
t = ext(x, y, α, β)
u = ext(x, z, α, β)
v = ip(u, z, x, t, y)
w = ip(x, y, t, z, v)
Then w is the desired midpoint. The reader can easily check this; see Fig. 8 for
illustration. Thus we can define
m(x, y, z) = ip(x, y, t, z, v)
= ip(x, y, t, z, ip(u, z, x, t, y))
= ip(x, y, ext(x, y, α, β), z, ip(ext(x, z, α, β), z, x, ext(x, y, α, β), y))
That completes the proof.
Since circle-circle continuity enables us to construct an equilateral triangle
on any segment (via Euclid I.1), we have justified the existence of midpoints
and perpendiculars if circle-circle continuity is used. But that is insufficient for
our purposes, since intuitionistic Tarski geometry does not contain circle-circle
continuity as an axiom. (We show below that it is a theorem, but to prove it, we
need midpoints and perpendiculars, so they must be obtained some other way.)
8.2. A lemma of interest only constructively. In erecting a perpendic-
ular to line L at point a, we need to make use of a point not on L (which occurs
as a parameter in the construction). In fact, we need a point c not on L such
that ca is not perpendicular to L. Classically, we can make the case distinction
whether ca is perpendicular to L, and if it is, there is “nothing to be proved”.
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But constructively, this case distinction is not allowed, so we must first construct
such a point c. Our first lemma does that.
Lemma 8.3. Let point a lie on line L, and point s not lie on line L. Then
there is a point c not on L such that ca is not perpendicular to L, and a point b
on L such that B(c, s, b).
Remark. Classically, this lemma is trivial, but constructively, there is something
to prove.
Proof. Let b be a point on L such that ab = as. (Such a point can be constructed
using only the segment extension axiom.) Then by Lemma 8.2, sb has a midpoint
c, and ac ⊥ bc. We claim that ac cannot be perpendicular to L; for it were, then
triangle cab would have two right angles, one at c and one at a. That contradicts
Lemma 8.1. That completes the proof.
8.3. Erected perpendiculars from triangle circumscription. Following
Szmielew, we have taken as our form of the parallel axiom, the axiom that
given any three non-collinear points, there is another point equidistant from all
three. (That point is then the center of a circumscribed circle containing the
three given points.) An immediate corollary is the existence of midpoints and
perpendiculars.
Lemma 8.4. Every segment has a midpoint and a perpendicular bisector. If p
is a point not on line L, then there is a point x on L with px ⊥ L.
Proof. Let ab be given with a 6= b. By Lemma 8.3, there is a point c such that
a, b, and c are not collinear. By triangle circumscription, there exists a point e
such that ea = eb = ec. Then eab is an isosceles triangle. By Lemma 8.2, ab has
a midpoint m. Since ea = eb, we have em ⊥ ab, by definition of perpendicular.
That completes the proof.
While this is formally pleasing, there is something unsatisfactory here, because
we intend that the axioms of our theories should correspond to ruler and com-
pass constructions, and in order to construct the point required by the triangle
circumscription axiom, we need to construct the perpendicular bisectors of ab
and ac, and find the point of intersection (whose existence is the main point of
the axiom). So from the point of view of ruler and compass constructions, our
argument has been circular. Therefore the matter of perpendiculars cannot be
left here. We must consider how to construct them with ruler and compass.
8.4. Dropped perpendiculars from line-circle continuity. In this sec-
tion we discuss the following method (from Euclid I.12) of dropping a perpendic-
ular from point p to line L: draw a large enough circle C with center p that some
point of L is strictly inside C. Then apply two-point line-circle continuity to get
two points u and v where C meets L. Then puv is an isosceles triangle, so it
has a midpoint and perpendicular bisector. This argument is straightforwardly
formalized in intuitionistic Tarski geometry:
Theorem 8.5 (dropped perpendiculars from line-circle). One can drop a per-
pendicular to line L from a point not on L by a ruler and compass construction
(essentially the construction of Euclid I.12), and prove the construction correct
in intuitionistic Tarski geometry.
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Proof. Let p be a point, and let L be the line through two distinct points a and
b. Suppose p is not on L. Let r = ext(p, a, a, b), so that pr is longer than pa.
Let C be the circle with center p passing through r. Then a is strictly inside C.
By line-circle continuity, there are two points x and y on L where L meets C,
i.e.,px = py. Since by hypothesis p is not on L, the segment xy is the base of
an isosceles triangle, so by Lemma 8.2 it has a midpoint m. Then pm ⊥ L, by
definition of perpendicular. That completes the proof.
We note that the analogous lemmas with one-point line-circle or segment-
circle in place of two-point line-circle will not be proved so easily. In the case of
segment-circle, we would need to construct points outside C in order to apply
the segment-circle axiom; but to show those points are indeed outside C, we
would need the triangle inequality, which requires perpendiculars for its proof.
In the case of one-point line-circle, we would need to construct the other inter-
section point, and the only apparent way to do that is to first have the dropped
perpendicular we are trying to construct.
Of course, these difficulties are resolved if we are willing to use the 1965 dis-
coveries of Gupta, who showed how to construct perpendiculars without any use
of circles. But that is beside the point here, since we are considering whether our
choice of axioms corresponds well to Euclid or not. Also, the use of the triangle
circumscription axiom is no help, since although we could prove the existence
(if not the construction) of erected perpendiculars, we cannot do the same for
dropped perpendiculars.
8.5. Reflection in a line is an isometry. Since we can drop perpendic-
ulars, we can define reflection in a line (for points not on the line). We need
to know that reflection preserves betweenness and equidistance. That reflection
preserves equidistance (i.e., is an isometry), is Satz 10.10 in [25, ], but the proof
uses nothing but things proved before the construction of perpendiculars and
midpoints late in Chapter 8. Strangely, it is not explicitly stated in [25, ] that
reflection in a line preserves betweenness, so we begin by proving that.
Lemma 8.6. Reflection in a line preserves betweenness.
Proof. Suppose B(a, b, c), and let p, q, r be the reflections of a, b, c in line L.
Since reflection is an isometry, we have pq = ab and qr = bc and pr = ac. We
wish to prove B(p, q, r). By the stability of betweenness, we may use proof by
contradiction, so assume ¬B(p, q, r). Since pq = ab < ac = pr, we do not have
B(p, r, q). Similarly we do not have B(q, p, r). Since a, b, c are distinct points,
the reflections p, q, r are also distinct. Therefore q is not on Line(p, r) (see the
discussion of stability of incidence after Lemma 7.1).
Therefore pqr is a triangle in which the sum of two sides pq and qr equals the
third side pr. By Lemma 8.5, we can drop a perpendicular from q to pr. Let t
be the foot of that perpendicular. Each of the two right triangles qtp and qtr
has its base less than its hypotenuse, so pr < pq + qr, contradiction. (We did
not assume B(p, t, r) in this argument.) That completes the proof of the lemma.
8.6. Erected perpendiculars from dropped perpendiculars. Next we
prove the existence of erected perpendiculars, assuming only that we can drop
perpendiculars, and without using any form of the parallel axiom. Gupta’s proof,
as presented in Satz 8.21 of [25, ], accomplished this. It is much simpler than
A CONSTRUCTIVE VERSION OF TARSKI’S GEOMETRY 39
Gupta’s beautiful circle-free construction of dropped perpendiculars, but still
fairly complicated. Gupta uses his Krippenlemma. Below we give a new proof,
avoiding the use of the Krippenlemma, and using only simple ideas that might
have been known to Tarski in 1959. However, we do use both inner and outer
Pasch; but in 1959, Tarski knew that outer Pasch implies inner. The proof
of outer Pasch from inner given by Gupta relies on the existence of dropped
perpendiculars, but is far simpler than Gupta’s circle-free, parallel-axiom-free
construction of dropped perpendiculars. Therefore, the work in this section
gives us simple constructions in intuitionistic Tarski of erected perpendiculars,
assuming either the parallel axiom or line-circle. In other words, the Skolem
terms for the constructions below will involve either center or ilc1 and ilc2 (the
symbols for intersections of lines and circles), depending on how we construct
dropped perpendiculars; if we use Gupta’s construction, then we only need the
Skolem symbol ip for inner Pasch.
The proof we are about to give requires two lemmas, which we prove first.
Lemma 8.7 (Interior 5-segment lemma). The 5-segment axiom is valid if we
replace B(a, b, c) and B(A,B,C) by B(a, c, d) and B(A,C,B), respectively. That
is, in Fig. 9, if the corresponding solid segments are congruent, so are the dashed
segments.
Figure 9. The interior 5-segment lemma. cd = CD.
d
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Proof. This is Satz 4.2 in [25, ]. The proof is an immediate consequence of
axioms (A4) and (A6); we do not repeat it.
Theorem 8.8 (Erected perpendiculars). In intuitionistic Tarski geometry with
line-circle continuity but without circle-circle continuity and without the parallel
axiom, one can prove the following: Let L be a line; let a be a point on L and
let s be a point not on L. Then there exists a point p on the opposite side of L
from s such that pa ⊥ L.
The point r on L such that B(p, r, s), as well as the point p, are given by terms
of intuitionistic Tarski geometry with Skolem functions.
Remarks. No dimension axiom is used, and no parallel axiom. The point s and
line L determine a plane in which p lies. We need s constructively also because
we do not (yet) know how, without circle-circle continuity, to construct a point
not on L by a uniform construction. We need pa longer than the perpendicular
from s to L to avoid a case distinction in the construction of midpoints in the
next lemma.
40 MICHAEL BEESON
Proof. By Lemma 8.3, we can find a point c not on L, and a point b 6= a on L,
such that ca is not perpendicular to L, and B(c, s, b).
By Lemma 8.5, let x be a point on L such that cx ⊥ L. Then x 6= a, since
ca is not perpendicular to L. We have c 6= x since c is not on L but x is on
L. Hence we can construct the reflection d of c in x, namely d = ext(c, x, c, x).
Similarly, c 6= a, so we can define e to be the reflection of c in a. Since angle dxa
is a right angle, da = ca. Since ea = ca, we have da = ea. Then triangle ade is
isosceles, and hence segment de has a midpoint, by Lemma 8.2. Let p be that
midpoint. Let y be the reflection of x in a, and f the reflection of d in a. Fig. 10
illustrates the situation.
Figure 10. Erecting a perpendicular to L at a, given b, s, and c.
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Since reflection preserves congruence, we have xd = xc = ey, and yf = xd =
xc = ey, and ca = da = fa. Since reflection preserves betweenness, we have
B(e, y, f). (Thus f is the reflection of e in y as well as the reflection of d in
a.) Let q be the reflection of p in a. Since ca = fa, angle aqf is a right angle.
Therefore pc = pf . Now consider the four-point configurations (c, x, d, p) and
(f, y, e, p). Of the five corresponding pairs of segments, four are congruent, so
by the interior 5-segment lemma (Lemma 8.7, px = py. Since xa = ya, angle
pax is a right angle and pa ⊥ L, as desired.
It remains to prove that p is on the other side of L from s. Fig. 11 illustrates
the situation.
Segment xa connects two sides of triangle cde, and cp connects the vertex c
to the third side, so by the crossbar theorem (Satz 3.17 of [25, ], derived with
two applications of inner Pasch), there is a point t on xa (and hence on L) with
T(c, t, p). That is, p is on the other side of L from c. Using B(c, s, b), we can
apply inner Pasch to the five points ptcbs, yielding a point r such that B(t, r, b)
and B(p, r, s). Since t and b lie on L, that shows that p and s are on opposite
sides of L. That completes the proof.
8.7. Construction of parallels. We take the opportunity to point out that
even in neutral geometry (that is, without any form of the parallel postulate)
we can always construct a parallel K to a given line L through a given point p
not on L, by dropping a perpendicular M to L through p and then erecting K
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Figure 11. p is on the other side of L from s, by constructing
first t and then r.
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perpendicular toM at p. In the sequel, when a reference is made to “constructing
a parallel to L through p”, this is what is meant.
Using the uniform perpendicular construction to constructK permits a similar
“uniform parallel” construction, which, when given L and p, constructs a line
K through p such that if p is not on L, then K is parallel to L. (But K is
constructed anyway, whether or not p is on L; if p is on L, then K coincides with
L.) The uniform parallel construction is important in establishing the properties
of coordinates, and then addition and multiplication, in [5, ], so the fact that the
uniform parallel can be defined in Tarski geometry permits the construction of
coordinates and arithmetic.
8.8. Midpoints from perpendiculars. Next we intend to construct the
midpoint of a non-degenerate segment ab. This is Satz 8.22 in [25, ]. That proof
consists of a simple construction that goes back to Hilbert [15, ] (Theorem 26),
and a complicated proof that it really constructs the midpoint. The proof of
the correctness of Hilbert’s construction from Tarski’s axioms given in [25, ] is
complicated, appealing to Gupta’s “Krippenlemma”, whose proof is not easy.
Here we give another proof, not relying on the Krippenlemma. We do need to
use the properties of reflection in a line.
Lemma 8.9. Let a 6= b, and suppose ap ⊥ ab and br ⊥ ab, and B(a,m, b) and
B(p,m, r) and br = ap, and p is not on Line(a, b). Then m is the midpoint of
ab, i.e.,am = mb.
Proof. By the stability of equality, we may use classical logic to prove am = mb;
hence we may refer to the proof in [25, ], page 65 (Abb. 31) (which appeals to
the Krippenlemma, whose proof is complicated) without worrying whether it is
constructive. But in the interest of giving a self-contained and simple proof, we
will show how to finish the proof without appealing to the complicated proofs of
Gupta.
Let q and s be the reflections of p and r, respectively, in Line (a, b). Fig. 12
illustrates the construction.
Since ap ⊥ ab and br ⊥ ab we have B(q, a, p) and B(r, b, s). Since reflection
in a line preserves betweenness, and m is its own reflection since B(a,m, b),
we have B(q,m, s). Hence m is the intersection point of the diagonals of the
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Figure 12. Given ap ⊥ ab and br ⊥ ab and br = ap, and ab
meets pr at m, then m is the midpoint of ab.
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quadrilateral qpsr. Since reflection in a line is an isometry, we have qr = ps.
Since qa = ap = rb = bs, we have qp = rs. Hence the opposite sides of
quadrilateral qpsr are equal. By Satz 7.29, the diagonals bisect each other. Hence
mp = mr and mq = ms. Now by the inner five-segment lemma (Lemma 8.7),
applied to the configurations qapm and sbrm, we have ma = mb. Then m is the
midpoint of ab. That completes the proof.
Lemma 8.10 (midpoint existence). In intuitionistic Tarski geometry with only
line-circle continuity, midpoints exist. More precisely, given segment ab (with
a 6= b) and point s not collinear with ab, one can construct the midpoint m of
ab.
Remark. The proof shows how to derive the existence of midpoints from the
existence of (erected) perpendiculars; we have shown above that line-circle con-
tinuity enables us to erect perpendiculars. But we use both inner and outer
Pasch.
Proof. The construction is illustrated in Fig. 13. Let segment ab be given along
with point s not on L = Line (a, b). Erect a perpendicular ap to ab at a (on the
opposite side of L from s). Then erect a perpendicular wb to L at b, with w
on the opposite side of L from p, by Lemma 8.8. Let q = ext(b, w, a, p). Then
B(b, w, q) and ap < qb. Since w is on the opposite side of L from p, there is a
point v on L between w and p. Applying outer Pasch to bwqpv, there exists a
point t with B(a, t, b) and B(p, t, q). Then, construct point r on segment qb so
that rb = ap, which is possible since ap < qb.
Applying inner Pasch to the five-point configuration ptqrb, we find a point m
such that B(a,m, b) and B(p,m, r). By Lemma 8.9, m is the midpoint of ab.
That completes the proof.
Constructions and terms. The above explicit construction corresponds to a term
of intuitionistic Tarski geometry, built up by composing the terms for the con-
struction steps. Such a term can be written explicitly, and we will explain that
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Figure 13. Midpoint from erected perpendiculars; construct t
and m by outer and inner Pasch.
ba b
b
b
t
bp
bq
m
b r
b w
b
v
point now. First, let Perp(a, b, s) and wit(a, b, s) be terms giving the construc-
tion in Lemma 8.8; that is, the first is a point on the perpendicular and the
second is a witness that it is on the other side of Line (a, b). Let op and ip
be Skolem functions corresponding to outer Pasch and inner Pasch. Then the
following script corresponds to the proof above:
midpoint(a,b,s){
p = Perp(a,b,s)
w = Perp(b,a,p)
v = wit(b,a,p)
q = ext(b,w,a,p)
t = op(b,w,q,p,v)
r = ext(ext(w,b,w,b),b,a,p)
m = ip(b,r,q,p,t)
return m
}
Such a script can be converted to a (long) term by composing the right sides of
the equations, eliminating the variables on the left.
From Gupta’s proof of outer Pasch by means of inner Pasch, we can extract
a term built up from ip and ext to substitute for op; and if desired, the terms
Perp and wit, which here involve center or ilc1 and ilc2, can be replaced by
longer terms from Gupta’s perpendicular construction (discussed below), built
up from ext and ip only.
Regarding the role of s: Of course since the midpoint is unique, the value does
not depend on the parameter s. Nevertheless we will not know until Lemma 12.9
below how to get rid of s in the term, as we need a point not on Line (a, b) to
construct a perpendicular to ab. That lemma gives us, in principle, the means
to replace s by a term in a and b, but that term will involve center and rely on
the parallel postulate for its correctness.
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Corollary 8.11. In intuitionistic Tarski geometry (with two-point line-circle
but without any parallel axiom) we can construct both dropped and erected per-
pendiculars, and midpoints.
Proof. We have justified Euclid I.12 for dropped perpendiculars, and shown how
to construct erected perpendiculars from dropped perpendiculars, and midpoints
from erected perpendiculars. That completes the proof.
That result is pleasing, but it leaves open the question of whether the axiom
system required can be weakened. It is not obvious how to weaken it even to
one-point line-circle or segment-circle continuity; but Gupta showed in 1965 that
no continuity whatsoever is required. We discuss his construction in the next
section.
8.9. Gupta’s perpendicular construction. Here we give Gupta’s beauti-
ful construction of a dropped perpendicular. It can be found in his 1965 thesis
[13, ] and again in [25, ], p. 61.
Figure 14. Gupta’s construction of a dropped perpendicular
from c to ab.
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The initial data are two distinct points a and b, and a third point c not collinear
with ab. The construction goes as follows: Extend ba by ac to produce point y.
Then acy is an isosceles triangle, so by Lemma 8.2, we can construct its midpoint
p, and apc is a right angle. Now extend segment cy by ac to point q, and extend
ay by py to produce point z. Then reflect q in z to produce q′. Then extend
q′y by yc to produce point c′. By construction cyc′ is an isosceles triangle, so its
base cc′ has a midpoint x, which is the final result of the construction. It is not
immediately apparent either that x is collinear with ab or that cx ⊥ ax, but both
can be proved. The proof occupies a couple of pages, but it uses only (A1)-(A7);
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in other words, no continuity, no dimension axioms, no parallel axiom. Is the
proof constructive? That point is discussed in §12.1 below, where it is shown in
Corollary 12.5 that at least, Gupta’s proof can be mechanically converted to a
constructive proof.
8.10. Erected perpendiculars from line-circle and the parallel axiom.
There is a very simple construction of an erected perpendicular based on line-
circle continuity and the parallel axiom. It has only two ruler and compass
steps, and is therefore surely the shortest possible construction of an erected
perpendicular.14 This construction is illustrated in Fig. 15.
Figure 15. Erecting a perpendicular to L at a, given c. First
b and then e are constructed by line-circle continuity.
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The construction starts with a line L, a point a on L, and a point c not on L
such that ca is not perpendicular to L. Then we draw the circle with center c
through a, and let b be the other point of intersection with L. Then the line bc
meets the circle at a point e, and ea is the desired perpendicular to L (although
we have not proved it here).
The correctness of this construction, i.e.,that ea is indeed perpendicular to
L, is equivalent to Euclid III.31, which says an angle inscribed in a semicircle
is a right angle. Euclid’s proof uses I.29, which in turn depends on I.11, which
requires erecting a perpendicular. Since III.31 is certainly not valid in hyperbolic
geometry, we will need to use the parallel postulate in any proof of III.31, and
it seems extremely unlikely that we can prove III.31 without first having proved
the existence of erected perpendiculars. Thus, this construction cannot replace
the ones discussed above in the systematic development of geometry. Still, it is
of interest because it is the shortest possible ruler and compass construction.
Once we have perpendiculars, several basic theorems follow easily. The fol-
lowing can be proved without using the parallel axiom or any continuity, from
the assumption that dropped perpendiculars exist. Hence, without appealing
14It has three steps if you count drawing the final perpendicular line, but that step constructs
no new points.
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to Gupta’s construction, they can be proved in intuitionistic Tarski geometry
(using triangle circumscription).
8.11. Angles and congruence of angles. It is a curiosity that perpendic-
ularity can be extensively studied without needing to discuss angles in general.
But angles are fundamental to Euclid and Hilbert. Tarski’s method of treat-
ing angles as triples of points means that we need a notion “abc and ABC are
the same angle”. To define that notion, we first define “x lies on Ray(b, a)” by
¬(¬T(b, x, a) ∧ ¬T(b, a, x)). Then “abc and ABC are the same angle” means
that the same points lie on Ray(b, a) as on Ray(B,A) and the same points lie on
Ray(b, c) as on Ray(B,C). Then there are several ways of defining congruence
of angles, all equivalent. Specifically, two angles abc and ABC are congruent if
by adjusting a and c on the same rays we can make ab = AB and bc = BC and
ac = AC; or equivalently, if the points on all four rays can be so adjusted; or
equivalently, if any adjustment of a and b can be matched by an adjustment of
A and B.
To avoid needing a quantifier, Tarski proceeds as follows: first extend ba by
BA and bc by BC. Then extend BA by ba and BC by bc. Now we have two
angles in the “same angle” relation to the original angles, whose corresponding
sides are congruent segments. Hence it suffices to define congruence for angles
abc and ABC with ab = AB and bc = BC. That definition is just ac = AC.
See [25, ], Chapter 11, for a formal development of the basic properties of angles
(which we do not use here).
The definition of angle ordering is given in [25, ], Definition 11.27, and the
well-definedness depends on an argument by cases using inner and outer Pasch.
It would appear on the face of the matter that one needs a more general version of
Pasch than inner and outer Pasch. However, that is not actually the case: as soon
as we have both inner and outer Pasch, we can derive any and every conceivable
version of Pasch. For example, to constructivize the theory of angle congruence
we need a version that combines inner and outer Pasch, in the following sense.
Theorem 8.12 (Continuous Pasch). Using inner and outer Pasch, we can de-
rive the following: Suppose c 6= a, and suppose p is on the ray from a through c
(but we assume nothing about the order of p and c on that ray). Suppose that b
is not on Line(a, d) and B(c, q, b). Then bp meets the ray from a through q in
a point x such that B(b, x, p), and if B(a, p, c) then B(a, x, q), and if B(a, c, p)
then B(a, q, x).
Proof. Classically, we can simply argue by cases: if B(a, p, c), x exists by inner
Pasch, and if B(a, c, p), then x exists by outer Pasch. Constructively, this case
distinction is illegal. Instead we proceed as follows. First construct point d such
that B(a, p, d), for example by extending the non-null segment ac by ap to get
d. Then by outer Pasch, there exists a point r such that B(b, r, d) and B(a, q, r).
Then by inner Pasch there exists point x such that B(a, x, r) and B(b, x, p).
That is the desired point x. The additional properties of x follow from inner
and outer Pasch as in the classical argument. That completes the proof of the
theorem.
The SAS (side-angle-side) criterion for angle congruence is a postulate in
Hilbert, and Euclid’s failed “proof” in I.4 shows that he, too, should have taken
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Figure 16. Continuous Pasch. Point x exists regardless of
which side of c point p is on.
b
a x
b
q
b
c
b
d
b b
b
p
b
p?
it as a postulate. The five-segment axiom in Tarski is in essence a version of
SAS, as discussed above where the axiom is introduced. But it should be noted
that the five-segment axiom does not immediately cover the case of two right
triangles with corresponding legs congruent. That requires in addition the the-
orem that all right angles are congruent. This theorem is also needed to prove
the uniqueness of the perpendicular to a line at a given point.
Euclid took the congruence of all right angles as his Postulate 4. Hilbert ([15, ],
p. 20) remarks that this was “unjustified”, and says that the proof of it goes
back to Proclus.
Lemma 8.13. All right angles are congruent. In other words, if abc and ABC
are right angles with ab = AB and bc = BC then ac = AC.
Proof. This is Satz 10.12 in [25, ]. However, the proof appeals only to the defi-
nition of angle congruence and simple theorems, such as the fact that reflections
in points and in lines are isometries.
Lemma 8.14. (i) An exterior angle of a triangle is greater than either of the
opposite interior angles.
(ii) The leg of a right triangle is less than the hypotenuse.
(iii) If a, b, and c are not collinear, the triangle inequality holds: ac < ab+ bc.
(iv) Whether or not a, b, and c are collinear, we have ac ≤ ab+ bc.
Proof. (i) is Satz 11.41 of [25, ]; (ii) is a special case of Satz 11.53. Neither of
these proofs uses anything but elementary betweenness and congruence, and the
existence of perpendiculars.
Turning to the triangle inequality, let the non-degenerate triangle abc be given.
Drop a perpendicular cx from c to Line (a, b). Since segment inequality is stable,
we are allowed to argue by cases on the position of x relative to a and b. If
T(a, x, b) then ab = ax+ xb < ac + bc by (ii). If B(a, b, x), then ab < ax < ac;
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and similarly if B(x, a, b), then ab < bx < bc. Hence constructively not not
ab < ac+ bc; so ab < ac+ bc. That proves (iii).
Turning to (iv), we use the uniform perpendicular construction to get a per-
pendicular to Line(a, b) through c. Let x be the point where this perpendicular
meets Line (a, b), and proceed as for (iii), but with ≤ in place of <. That com-
pletes the proof of the lemma.
The following lemma is presented, not for its intrinsic interest, but because it
is needed in what follows. We needed the exterior angle theorem to prove it.
Lemma 8.15. Let a, b, c, and d be distinct points, with ab ⊥ ad and cd ⊥ ad.
If bc meets Line(a, d), then the intersection point m is between a and d.
Proof. By the stability of betweenness, we may proveB(a,m, d) by contradiction,
so suppose ¬B(a,m, b). Without loss of generality, we may assume B(m, a, d).
Then angle amb is an exterior angle of triangle mcd. This is less than a right
angle, since angle mab is a right angle, and the angles of a triangle are less than
two right angles. By the exterior angle theorem (Euclid I.16, or Lemma 8.14
above, or Satz 11.41 in [25, ]), angle amb is greater than the interior angle mdc,
which is a right angle; contradiction. That completes the proof.
§9. Other forms of the parallel axiom. Within neutral geometry (that is,
geometry without any form of the parallel postulate), we can consider the logical
relations between various forms of the parallel axiom. In [5, ], we considered the
Playfair axiom, Euclid 5, and the strong parallel axiom, which are all classically
equivalent to Euclid 5. Constructively, Playfair is weaker, as shown in [5, ]; a for-
mal independence result confirms the intuition that it should be weaker because
it makes no existential assertion. The other versions of the parallel postulate,
which do make existential assertions, each turn out to be fairly easy to prove
equivalent to either Euclid 5 or the strong parallel postulate. In [5, ], we prove
that Euclid 5 and the strong parallel postulate are actually constructively equiv-
alent, although the proof requires first developing the geometrical definitions of
arithmetic using only Euclid 5.
In [5, ], we gave the proof that the triangle circumscription principle is equiv-
alent to the strong parallel axiom; below we prove that Tarski’s version of the
parallel postulate taken as axiom (A10) in [25, ], is equivalent to Euclid 5. Lem-
mas in this section are proved in neutral geometry, i.e., without any form of the
parallel postulate. It follows that all the known versions of the parallel postulate
(that are equivalent in classical Tarski geometry with line-circle continuity) that
make an existential assertion are also equivalent in constructive Tarski geometry,
although some of the proofs are much longer.
Lemma 9.1. Playfair’s axiom implies the alternate interior angle theorem,
that any line traversing a pair of parallel lines makes alternate interior angles
equal.
Proof. Since ordering of angles is stable, we can argue by contradiction. Hence
the usual classical proof of the theorem applies.
9.1. Euclid 5 formulated in Tarski’s language. Here we give a formu-
lation of Euclid’s parallel postulate, expressed in Tarski’s points-only language.
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Euclid’s version mentions angles, and the concept of “corresponding interior an-
gles” made by a transversal. The following is a points-only version of Euclid 5.
See Fig. 17.
Figure 17. Euclid 5. Transversal pq of lines M and L makes
corresponding interior angles less than two right angles, as wit-
nessed by a. The shaded triangles are assumed congruent. Then
M meets L as indicated by the open circle.
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B(q, a, r) ∧B(p, t, q) ∧ pr = qs ∧ pt = qt ∧ rt = st ∧ ¬Col(s, q, p) (Euclid 5)
→ ∃xB(p, a, x) ∧B(s, q, x)
9.2. Tarski’s parallel axiom. As mentioned above, Tarski in [29, ] and later
[25, ] took a different form of the parallel postulate, illustrated in Fig. 18.15 The
following axiom is similar to Tarski’s axiom, and we give it his name, but his
axiom used non-strict betweenness and did not include the hypothesis that a, b,
and c are not collinear. It is intended to say that if t is in the interior of angle
bac, then there is a line through t that meets both sides of the angle. To express
this using variables for points only, Tarski used the point d to witness that t is
in the interior of the angle. See Fig. 18.
Figure 18. Tarski’s parallel axiom
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The degenerate cases are trivial: if a, b, and c are collinear, then we can
(classically, or with more work also constructively) find x and y without any
15Technically, according to [30, ], the versions of the parallel axiom taken in the two cited
references differed in the order of arguments to the last betweenness statement, but that is of
no consequence.
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parallel axiom, and if (say) d = b then we can take x = t and y = c, etc. Hence
the following axiom is classically equivalent in neutral geometry to the one used
by Tarski:
B(a, d, t) ∧B(b, d, c) ∧ a 6= d (Tarski parallel axiom)
∧ (¬B(a, b, c) ∧ ¬B(b, c, a) ∧ ¬B(c, a, b) ∧ a 6= c)
→ ∃x∃y (B(a, b, x) ∧B(a, c, y) ∧B(x, t, y))
Something like this axiom was first considered by Legendre (see [12, ], p. 223),
but he required angle bac to be acute, so Legendre’s axiom is not exactly the same
as Tarski’s parallel axiom. The axiom says a bit more than just that xy meets
both sides of the angle, because of the betweenness conditions in the conclusion;
but it would be equivalent to demand just that x and y lie on the rays forming
angle bac, as can be shown using Pasch.
9.3. Euclid 5 implies Tarski’s parallel axiom.
Theorem 9.2. Euclid 5 implies Tarski’s parallel axiom in neutral intuition-
istic Tarski geometry.
Figure 19. Constructive proof of Tarski’s parallel axiom from
Euclid 5. M is constructed parallel to Line (b, c) and cd = ce
and bd = bg. Then x and y exist by Euclid 5.
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Proof. Assume the hypothesis of Tarski’s parallel axiom. Construct line M par-
allel to Line (b, c) through t. Construct point e by extending segment dc by dc;
then ec = dc and B(d, c, e), as illustrated in Fig. 19. Let L be Line (a, c). Then
Line (d, t) meets L at a, and does not coincide with L since, if it did coincide with
L, then points d and c would be on L, and hence point b, which is on Line (b, c),
would lie on L by Axiom I3; but that would contradict the hypothesis that a,
b, and c are not collinear. Hence Line (d, t) meets L only at a, by Axiom I3.
Hence segment dt does not meet L. By outer Pasch (applied to adtec), there is
a point f on L with B(e, f, t). Now we apply Euclid 5; the two parallel lines are
Line (b, c) and M , and the conclusion is that L meets M in some point, which
we call y. Specifically we match the variables (L,K,M, p, r, a, q) in Euclid 5 to
the following terms in the present situation: (M,Line (b, c),Line (a, c), c, e, f, t).
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Then all the hypotheses have been proved, except that we have B(e, f, t) while
what is required is B(t, f, e); but those are equivalent by the symmetry of be-
tweenness. Hence Euclid 5 is indeed applicable and we have proved the existence
of point y on M and L.
Now, we do the same thing on the other side of angle bac, extending segment db
to point g with db = bg and B(g, d, b), and using the plane separation property
to show that gt meets Line (a, b) in a point h with B(g, h, t). Then Euclid 5
applies to give us a point x on M and Line (a, b).
It only remains to prove B(x, t, y). By outer Pasch applied to xbacd, there
exists a point u with B(x, u, c) and B(a, d, u) (the point u is not shown in the
figure.) Then by outer Pasch applied to acyxu, we obtain a point v withB(a, u, v)
and B(x, v, y). But then v = t, since both lie on the non-coincident lines ad and
xy. Hence B(x, t, y). That completes the proof of the theorem.
9.4. Tarski’s parallel axiom implies Euclid 5. Tarski proved16 that his
parallel axiom implies Playfair’s axiom (see [25, ], Satz 12.11, p. 123). Here
we give a constructive proof that Tarski’s parallel axiom implies the points-only
version of Euclid 5. See Fig. 20.
Figure 20. Tarski’s parallel axiom implies Euclid 5. Points x
and y are produced by Tarski’s parallel axiom because q is in the
interior of angle upa. Then apply Pasch to line L and triangle
xpy to get e.
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Theorem 9.3. Tarski’s parallel axiom implies Euclid 5 in neutral intuition-
istic Tarski geometry.
Proof. Let L be a line, p a point not on L, M be another line through p, and
suppose points p, r, s, and q are as in the hypothesis of Euclid 5 (see Fig. 20).
In particular, because the shaded triangles are congruent, K is parallel to L and
makes alternate interior angles equal with transversal pq.
16The cited proof is in a book with two co-authors, but Tarski used this axiom from the
beginning of his work in geometry, and it seems certain that he had this proof before Szmielew
and Schwabha¨user were involved.
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Let u be a point to the left of p on K, for example u = ext(r, p, α, β). We
can apply inner Pasch to the configuration uprqa, producing a point v such that
B(p, v, q) and B(u, v, a). (This is where we use the hypothesis B(r, a, q).) Then
v witnesses that q is in the interior of angle upa. By Tarski’s parallel axiom,
there exist points x and y with B(x, q, y), B(x, u, p) and B(p, a, y). Then line L
meets side xy of triangle xpy at q, and does not meet the closed side xp, since
K is parallel to L. Then x and y are on opposite sides of L, and x and p are on
the same side of L. By the Plane Separation Theorem (Theorem 2.5), p and y
are on opposite sides of L.
We next wish to prove B(p, a, e). By the stability of betweenness, we may
prove it by contradiction. By hypothesis, r does not lie on L, so a does not lie
on L. Hence a 6= e. Since L and K are parallel, e 6= p. Suppose B(p, e, a). Then
we can apply outer Pasch to parqe (that is, to triangle par with sequent qe),
obtaining a point lying both on Line(q, e) (which is L) and pr (which is part
of K), contradiction. Hence ¬B(p, e, a). Now suppose B(e, p, a). Then we can
apply outer Pasch to triangle eaq with secant rp, obtaining a point on segment
eq (part of L) and also on Line(p, r), which is K; contradiction. Also e cannot
be equal to a, since then r would lie on L and K; and e cannot be equal to
p since then e would lie on both K and L. The only remaining possibility is
B(p, a, e), which we set out to prove by contradiction. That completes the proof
of B(p, a, e).
We still must showB(s, q, e). Since we now haveB(p, a, e), we can apply outer
Pasch to paest to construct a point q′ such that B(p, t, q′) and B(s, q′, e). Then
q′ lies on both Line(p, t) and L (which are distinct lines since p does not lie on
L); but q also lies on both those lines. Hence q′ = q. Hence B(s, q, e) as desired.
That completes the proof of the theorem.
§10. Uniform perpendicular and uniform rotation. In classical geom-
etry there are two different constructions, one for “dropping a perpendicular”
to line L from a point p not on L, and the other for “erecting a perpendicular”
to L at a point p on L. A “uniform perpendicular” construction is a method of
constructing, given three points a, b, and x, with a 6= b, a line perpendicular to
Line (a, b) and passing through x, without a case distinction as to whether x lies
on L or not.
In constructive geometry, it is not sufficient to have dropped and erected per-
pendiculars; we need uniform perpendiculars. Similarly, we need uniform rota-
tions: to rotate a given point x on Line (c, a) clockwise about center c until it
lies on a given line through c, without a case distinction as to whether B(x, c, a)
or x = c or B(c, x, a). We also need uniform reflections: to be able to reflect a
point x in a line L without a case distinction whether x is on L or not. It will
turn out (not surprisingly) that the three problems of perpendiculars, rotations,
and reflections are closely related.
10.1. Uniform perpendicular using line-circle. In this section, we take
up the construction of the uniform perpendicular.
Theorem 10.1. Uniform perpendiculars can be constructed in intuitionistic
Tarski geometry, using two-point line-circle continuity.
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Figure 21. The simplest uniform perpendicular construction.
M = Perp(x, L) is constructed perpendicular to L without a
case distinction whether x is on L or not. Draw a large enough
circle C about x. Then bisect pq and erect K at the midpoint.
To draw C we use radius ab+ ax > ax.
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Proof. Given distinct points a and b (defining L = Line(a, b)), and point x
(without being told whether x is or is not on L), we desire to construct a line
K passing through x and perpendicular to L. The idea is simple: Draw a circle
C around x whose radius exceeds ax. Then by two-point line-circle continuity
there are distinct points p and q on L = Line (a, b) that lie on C. Then the
perpendicular bisector of segment pq is the desired perpendicular. The matter
is, however, trickier than the similar verification of Euclid I.2, because of the
requirement to find a point r through which to draw the circle C. We must
have xr > ax, but we are not allowed to make a case distinction whether x = a
or not, and since we are not allowed to extend a null segment, we cannot find
r by extending the (possibly null) segment ax. First we construct point c by
extending segment ab by ax. Since ab is not null, and we are allowed to extend a
non-null segment by a possibly null segment, this is legal. Then we make use of
the construction e2 corresponding to Euclid I.2, developed in Lemma 12.8. We
define r = e2(x, a, c). Then xr = ac and since ac > ax we have ar > ax. Now
draw the circle C with center x through r. Point r is not shown in the figure,
since its exact location depends on the construction given by e2, which depends
on the constant α. All we know about r is that xr = ac, so we can use it to
draw C with the desired radius.
Then a is inside C, so p and q exist by two-point line-circle continuity, and we
can complete the proof using any construction of the perpendicular bisector, for
example the one developed using two-point line circle continuity only, or Gupta’s
more complicated one.
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It is not difficult to construct a script, and hence in principle a term, describing
this construction. This term does require an “extra” parameter s, for a point
assumed to be not on the line L, in order to erect the required perpendicular.
10.2. Uniform perpendicular without any continuity. The above con-
struction has one disadvantage: it relies on line-circle continuity. Although our
main interest is in intuitionistic Tarski geometry, nevertheless it is of some in-
terest to study the theory that results from deleting line-circle continuity as an
axiom, i.e.,the intuitionistic counterpart of Tarski’s (A1)-(A10). It turns out, one
can also construct a uniform perpendicular in that theory, although of course,
one must use Gupta’s perpendiculars. It turns out that we also need the parallel
axiom to construct uniform perpendiculars, although it is not needed for Gupta’s
perpendiculars.
We begin with some lemmas.17
Lemma 10.2. Let abcd be a quadrilateral with two adjacent right angles at a
and d, and two opposite sides equal, namely ab = cd. Suppose a and d are on
the same side of Line(b, c). Then also the other pair of opposite sides are equal
and abcd is a rectangle.
Remarks. The proof necessarily will require the parallel axiom, as the lemma is
false in hyperbolic geometry. The assumption that a and d are on the same side
of Line(b, c) ensures that the quadrilateral lies in a plane (we do not use any
dimension axiom in the proof).
Proof. We first claim that c is on the same side of ad as b. If not then by the
plane separation theorem, they are on opposite sides, so bc meets Line(a, d) in
a point m. By Lemma 8.15, B(a,m, d), contradicting the hypothesis that a and
d are on opposite sides of Line(b, c). That establishes that c is on the same side
of ad as b.
Let J be the perpendicular bisector of ad, meeting ad at its midpoint q. Then
q is the foot of the perpendicular from p to J . Since reflection in J preserves
congruence, collinearity, and right angles, the reflection b′ of b lies on the per-
pendicular to ad at d, which is cd, and either b′ = c or b′ is the reflection of c in
d. The latter, however, contradicts the fact that c is on the same side of ad as
b. Therefore c is the reflection of b in J . Hence bc is perpendicular to J .
We next claim that ad and bc are parallel; that is, Line(a, d) and Line(b, c)
do not meet. Suppose they meet at point p. Then point p is not between a and
d, since a and d would then be on opposite sides of bc. Interchanging (a, b) and
(d, c) if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that B(p, a, d). Now
pbc and pad are two distinct lines through p, both perpendicular to J . That is
a contradiction (as proved in the first part of Satz 8.18). That establishes the
claim that ad and bc are parallel.
Also ab and cd are parallel, since if they meet at a point u then there would
be two perpendiculars from u to Line (a, d). Hence abcd is a parallelogram.
17Though these are fairly routine exercises in Euclidean geometry, we need to verify that
they are provable in intuitionistic Tarski geometry without any continuity. These theorems do
not occur in [25, ], and even if they had occurred, we would still need to check that they are
provable with triangle circumscription instead of Tarski’s parallel axiom. In fact we will use
Euclid 5, which is provable from triangle circumscription, as shown in [5, ].
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Using the parallel postulate, we can prove that the angles at b and c are
right angles: since bc is parallel to ad, if the angle at b is not a right angle,
then the perpendicular to ab at b is a second, distinct, parallel to ad through b,
contradicting the parallel postulate (see [5, ]). Then triangles abd and cbd are
right triangles with one leg and the hypotenuse congruent; hence their other legs
ad and bc are congruent. That completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 10.3. (in intuitionistic Tarski geometry without continuity) Let abcd
be a quadrilateral whose diagonals ac and bd bisect each other at x. Then (i)
opposite sides of abcd are parallel, and (ii) the lines connecting midpoints of
opposite sides pass through x, and (iii) they are parallel to the other sides, as
shown in Fig. 22.
Figure 22. Given that ac and bd bisect each other at x. Then
the lines that look parallel, are parallel.
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Proof. Since reflection (in point x) preserves betweenness and congruence (see
Satz 7.15 and Satz 7.16 of [25, ]), we have ab = cd and bc = ad, i.e.,opposite
sides are equal. Let m be the midpoint of ab and k the reflection of m in x.
Since reflection preserves congruence, ck = kd. Since reflection in a point also
preserves betweenness, k lies on segment cd. Hence k is the midpoint of cd. Let
n be the midpoint of bc and ℓ the midpoint of ad. Then similarly nℓ passes
through x. That proves that the lines connecting midpoints of opposite sides
pass through x as claimed in (ii) of the theorem.
Suppose point u lies on Line (a, d) and also on Line (b, c). Let v be the re-
flection of u in x. Then since reflection preserves collinearity, by Lemma 8.6, v
also lies on both lines. But v 6= u, since if v = u then v = x = u, but m does
not lie on Line (a, d). Hence there are two distinct points u and v on Line (a, d)
and Line (b, c), contradiction. Hence those two lines are parallel, as claimed.
Similarly, the other two sides of the quadrilateral are parallel. That proves part
(i) of the theorem.
By the inner five-segment lemma (Lemma 8.7) applied to ambx and ckdx,
we have mx = xk. Therefore triangle ckx is congruent to triangle amx. Then
triangle ncx is congruent to triangle ℓax, since they have all three pairs of cor-
responding sides equal.
We next claim that mk = ad. By the stability of equality, we may argue by
contradiction and cases. Drop a perpendicular from d to mk; let f be the foot.
Case 1, f = k. Then dk ⊥ mk, and by reflection in x, bm ⊥ mx, so ma ⊥ mk
and mkda has two adjacent right angles. Hence its opposite sides mk and ad
are equal, by Lemma 10.2, since a and d are on the same side of mk because
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ab and bd both meet Line (m, k) (in m and x respectively). Case 2, B(m, f, k).
Then let g be the reflection of f in x, and h the reflection of g in m. Then the
triangles dfk, bgm, and ahm are congruent right triangles (by reflection), and
B(h,m, g). Then hm = mg = fk. Since hadf has two adjacent right angles, its
opposite sides hf and ad are equal, since again a and d are on the same side of
Line (h, f), so Lemma 10.2 applies. But hf = mk, since they differ by adjoining
and removing equal segments hm and fk. Hence mk = hf = ad, so mk = ad as
claimed. Case 3, B(m, k, f). Reflection in the line mk reduces this case to Case
2. That completes the proof that mk = ad.
Now mkda is a parallelogram with opposite sides equal. Therefore, part (i) of
the theorem, which has already been proved, can be applied to it. Hence mk is
parallel to ad as claimed. That completes the proof.
Lemma 10.4. (in intuitionistic Tarski geometry without continuity) Let line J
be parallel to line M , and suppose M ⊥ L. Then J meets L in a point x and J
is perpendicular to L at x.
Figure 23. Given M ⊥ L and J parallel to M , show J ⊥ L
and construct the intersection point x of J and L by dropping a
perpendicular from p to J . Construct r, t, and s by reflection.
Then ts is parallel to M and hence lies on J , and ts ⊥ L.
Lb
m
b
x
b
p
b r
b q
bs
bt
J M
Proof. See Fig. 23. Let p be the point of intersection of M and L. Drop a
perpendicular from p to J ; let x be the foot of that perpendicular. Let m be
the midpoint of px (using Gupta’s midpoint to avoid any need for continuity).
Let q be any point other than p on M and let r be the reflection of q in p.
Then mq = mr since M ⊥ L. Let s and t be the reflections of q and r in m,
respectively. Since reflection preserves congruence, sx = pq. Then xs is parallel
to M , since if point u on M lies on Line (x, s), then the reflection of u in m is
another point on both lines, contradiction. Now J is by hypothesis parallel to
M , and J passes through x. But by the parallel axiom, there cannot be two
parallels to M through x. Hence the two coincide: J = Line (x, s). We have
ms = mq by reflection, mq = mr since M ⊥ L, and mr = mt by reflection;
hence ms = mt. Then Line(p, x) ⊥ J by the definition of perpendicular. We
now claim that Line(p, x) = L; for that we shall need the dimension axiom, since
otherwise L might be another perpendicular to M in the plane perpendicular to
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M at p. We have mq = mr, so Line(p, x) ⊥M . Then xq = xr also. In order to
show that L coincides with Line(p, x), suppose w lies on L. Then since L ⊥M ,
we have wq = wr. Then w, x, and m are three points, each equidistant from q
and r. By the upper dimension axiom these three points are collinear. Hence
w lies on Line(m,x), which coincides with Line(p, x). Hence L coincides with
Line(p, x). Hence L ⊥ J . Hence J ⊥ L. That completes the proof.
Theorem 10.5. [Uniform perpendicular] Uniform perpendiculars can be con-
structed in intuitionistic Tarski geometry without any continuity axioms. Ex-
plicitly: there is a term Project(x, a, b, w) (“the projection of x on Line(a, b)”)
in intuitionistic Tarski with Skolem functions, such that if a 6= b and w is any
point not on L = Line (a, b), and f = Project(x, a, b, w), then Col(a, b, f), and
the erected perpendicular to L at f contains x.
Remark. The two main points of the lemma are that we do not need a case
distinction whether x is on L or not, and we do not use any continuity axiom.
But we do use the parallel axiom.
Figure 24. Uniform perpendicular. Given L and x construct
perpendicular J to L passing through x, without a case distinc-
tion whether x is on L or not.
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Proof. See Fig. 24. We begin by constructing a point p on L such that px is
not perpendicular to L (unless of course x lies on L, which is a degenerate case).
The existence of such a point x is trivial classically, but constructively, there is
something to prove.) The line L is given by two points a and b; let p be the
result of extending ab by ab to point r and then extending ar by xb to point
p. Then B(b, r, p) and rp = xb. (The idea is that, if a is to the left of b, then
p is far enough to the right that x cannot lie on the perpendicular to L at p.)
Now suppose that px ⊥ L; we will show that x lies on L. By the stability of
incidence, we may prove that by contradiction. If x does not lie on L, then bpx is
a triangle, and it has leg bp greater than the hypotenuse bx = rp, contradiction.
Therefore x is on L as claimed. Then px lies on L too, and p 6= x; hence px
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is not perpendicular to x. That completes the preliminary construction of p.
Note that this part of the proof is not shown in the diagram; but it is needed to
show that the diagram does not degenerate to a single vertical line instead of a
parallelogram.
Erect a perpendicular qp to L at p. (For that we need the point w not on
L.) Let s be the reflection of q in x. Let t be the reflection of p in x. Then
tx = xp and sx = xq. By Lemma 10.3, stqp is a parallelogram whose diagonals
bisect each other. Let m be the midpoint of tq and k the midpoint of sp. By
Lemma 10.3, tq is parallel to sp, so m 6= k. We claim J = Line (k,m) is the
desired perpendicular to L. By Lemma 10.3, J is parallel to qp. But qp ⊥ L by
construction. By the parallel axiom, lines parallel to qp are also perpendicular
to L; so J ⊥ L. By Lemma 10.4, the intersection point f of J and L exists and
J ⊥ L. The point f is the value of Project(x, a, b, s). That completes the proof.
Remark. We do not know how to construct uniform perpendiculars without using
either the parallel axiom or two-point line-circle, although either one suffices, and
any form of the parallel axiom suffices (because we just need a few simple lemmas
about parallelograms).
10.3. Uniform reflection. Another construction from [5, ] that we need to
check can be done with Tarski’s Skolem symbols is the “uniform reflection”. The
construction
Reflect (x, a, b, s)
gives the reflection of point x in L = Line (a, b), without a case distinction as to
whether x is on L or not. (The parameter s is some point not on L.) First we note
a difficulty: even though we can define f = Project(x, a, b, s), we cannot just
extend segment xf by xf , since xf might be a null segment, and in constructive
geometry, we can only extend non-null segments.
The solution given in [5, ] is to first define rotations, and then use the fact
that the reflection of x in Line (a, b) is the same as the result of two ninety-
degree rotations of x about f = Project(x, a, b, s). The construction given for
rotations in [5, ] only involves bisecting the angle in question, and dropping two
perpendiculars to the sides, none of which is problematic in Tarski’s theory.
10.4. Equivalence of line-circle and segment-circle continuity.
Lemma 10.6. Two-point line-circle, one-point line-circle, and segment-circle
continuity are equivalent in (A1)-(A10).
Remark. This proof depends heavily on Gupta’s 1965 dissertation.
Proof. Because of Gupta, we have dropped perpendiculars, and we have shown
above that from dropped perpendiculars, erected perpendiculars, midpoints, and
uniform perpendiculars follow. Then one-point line-circle implies two-point line-
circle, by reflection in the uniform perpendicular from line L through the center
of the circle. Note that classically, the case when L passes through the center
is trivial, so a dropped perpendicular is enough, and the parallel axiom is not
required.
Two-point line-circle implies segment-circle immediately.
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Next we will show that segment-circle implies one-point line-circle. Assume
the hypotheses of one-point line-circle: Let C be a circle with center a through b,
and let L be a line meeting closed segment ab at p. The desired conclusion is the
existence of a point x on L with ax = ab. To obtain that from segment-circle,
it suffices to construct a point q on L outside C (see Fig. 6 and Fig. 5). (Then
segment-circle will give us a point on C between p and q; since p and q are on
L, that point will be on L too.)
Inequality is defined between segments as follows:
uv < xy means ∃z (T(x, z, y) ∧ uv = xy ∧ z 6= y
and
uv ≤ xy means ∃z (T(x, z, y) ∧ uv = xy.
Both strict and non-strict inequality can be shown to be stable, e.g.,
¬¬uv < xy → uv < xy,
so inequalities can be proved by contradiction.
Here is how to construct q. Let z be any point on L different from p, and define
q by extending segment zp by three times the radius ab. Then qa > ab − ap ≥
qp− ab, by the triangle inequality, Lemma 8.14. Then we have
qa > qp− ab > 3ab− 2ab > ab.
This apparently algebraic calculation represents a geometric proof of qa > ab.
In view of the definition of segment inequality, this implies the existence of a
“witness” point y such that B(y, b, a) and ay = aq. This point and q then
satisfy the hypothesis of segment-circle continuity (see Fig. 5). Segment-circle
continuity then yields a point on C between q and p, which is therefore on L.
We have now proved a circular chain of implications between the three asser-
tions of the lemma. That completes the proof.
Remark. One may wonder why Tarski chose segment-circle rather than line-circle
continuity as an axiom. It might be because segment-circle continuity asserts
the existence of something that turns out to be unique; but that consideration
did not bother Tarski when he chose (A10) as his parallel axiom. More likely it
was just shorter. Although the diagram for (either form of) line-circle continuity
is simpler, the formal expression as an axiom is longer, especially if collinearity
is written out rather than abbreviated; and Tarski placed importance on the fact
that his axioms could be written intelligibly without abbreviations.
10.5. Representation theorems. The following important theorem was
stated in 1959 by Tarski [29, ]:
Theorem 10.7. (i) The models of classical Tarski geometry with segment-
circle continuity are the planes F 2 over a Euclidean field F .
(ii) The models of classical Tarski geometry with no continuity axioms are the
planes F 2 over a Pythagorean field F .18
18A Pythagorean field is one in which sums of two squares always have square roots, or
equivalently,
√
1 + x2 always exists, as opposed to Euclidean in which all positive elements
have square roots.
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Remark. Tarski wrote “ordered field” instead of “Pythagorean field” in (ii), but
one needs to be able to take
√
1 + x2 in F to verify the segment extension axiom
in F2, as Tarski surely knew.
There is also a version of the representation theorem for intuitionistic Tarski
geometry. For that to make sense, we must define ordered fields and Euclidean
fields constructively. That is done in [5, ], as follows: We take as axioms the
stability of equality and “Markov’s principle” that ¬x ≤ 0 implies x > 0, which is
similar to the stability of betweenness in geometry. Then we require that nonero
elements have multiplicative inverses; just as classically, a Euclidean field is an
ordered field in which positive elements have square roots (and a Pythagorean
field is one in which sums of two squares have square roots). Then we have a
constructive version of Tarski’s representation theorem:
Theorem 10.8. (i) The models of intuitionistic Tarski geometry with two-
point line-circle continuity are the planes F 2 over a Euclidean field F .
(ii) The models of intuitionistic Tarski geometry with no continuity axioms
are the planes F 2 over a Pythagorean field F .
(iii) Given a model of geometry, the field F and its operations can be explicitly
and constructively defined.
Proof (of both theorems). Once we have (uniform) perpendiculars and mid-
points, the classical constructions of Descartes and Hilbert that define addition
and multiplication can be carried out. In this paper we have proved the existence
of (uniform) perpendiculars and midpoints in intuitionistic Tarski geometry, and
the definitions of (signed uniform) addition and (signed uniform) multiplication
are given in [5, ]. The field laws are proved for these definitions in [25, ]; since
these are quantifier free when expressed with Skolem functions, they are provable
in intuitionistic Tarski geometry (without any continuity axiom) by the double-
negation interpretation. The simple construction of the uniform perpendicular
suffices for (i), with two-point line-circle, but for (ii) we need the more com-
plicated construction given above, based on Gupta’s perpendiculars. Moreover,
even for Tarski’s (i), with segment-circle in place of two-point line-circle, we need
Gupta. That completes the proof.
With classical logic, the representation theorem gives a complete character-
ization of the consequences of the axioms, because according to Go¨del’s com-
pleteness theorem, a sentence of geometry true in all models F 2 is provable in
the corresponding geometry. With intuitionistic logic, the completeness theorem
is not valid. The “correct” way to obtain a complete characterization of the
theorems of constructive geometry in terms of field theory is to exhibit explicit
interpretations mapping formulas of geometry to formulae of field theory, and an
“inverse” interpretation from field theory to geometry. We have actually carried
this program out, but it is highly technical due to the differences in the two
languages, and requires many pages, so we omit it here.
10.6. Historical Note. Tarski claimed in 1959 [29, ] (page 22, line 5) that
(i) he could define addition and multiplication geometrically, and (ii) prove the
field laws, without using his continuity axiom; hence all models of the axioms
(excluding continuity) are planes over ordered fields. The first published proof of
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these claims was in 1983 [25, ], and relies heavily on Gupta’s 1965 dissertation.
In this note we consider what Tarski may have had in mind in 1959.
To define multiplication, we need perpendiculars and midpoints, which were
constructed in (A1)-(A10) by Gupta in 1965. Tarski lectured in 1956 on geom-
etry, but I have not found a copy of his lecture notes. He lectured again on
geometry in 1963, but according to Gupta (in a telephone conversation in Sep-
tember, 2014), Tarski did not base his lectures on his own axiom system (and
again there are apparently no surviving notes). The proofs in this section show
that he could well have defined addition and multiplication using only two-point
line-circle continuity, since we showed here how to construct perpendiculars and
midpoints from two-point line-circle continuity. But he made two claims that
we do not see how to prove without Gupta: that he could use segment-circle
continuity in (i), and that he could get by without any continuity in (ii).
These claims could not have been valid in 1959, since this was some years
before Gupta’s proofs. In 1959, there was no way known to construct dropped
perpendiculars using (A1)-(A10), even with the use of segment-circle continuity;
Tarski could not have justified Euclid I.12 on the basis of segment-circle continu-
ity, since it requires the triangle inequality, which requires perpendiculars, and
Tarski was not using the triangle circumscription axiom but his own form of the
parallel axiom, so he could not even prove that every segment has a midpoint,
as far as I can see.
Tarski did believe that line-circle continuity could be derived from a single
instance of the continuity schema. He explicitly claimed this in [29, ], page 26,
line 8. But the “obvious” derivation requires the triangle inequality, which in
turn seems to require perpendiculars.19 After Gupta, perpendiculars exist, and
the proof of the triangle inequality follows easily, so indeed line-circle continuity
follows from A11. But in 1959, there was no known way to get perpendiculars,
and so, no way to derive the triangle inequality, and hence, no way to derive
line-circle continuity from the continuity schema, or to justify Euclid I.12 to get
dropped perpendiculars from line-circle continuity. All these difficulties disap-
peared once Gupta proved the existence of dropped perpendiculars in (A1)-(A8).
Thus Gupta’s work has a much more central place than is made apparent in [25, ].
Tarski desperately needed perpendiculars.
It is possible that Tarski had in mind using two-point line-circle continuity to
justify dropped perpendiculars, and overlooked the difficulty of proving two-point
line-circle from segment-circle. Even so, to complete a proof of his representation
theorem about Euclidean fields, he would have had to duplicate the results in
this paper about getting erected perpendiculars and midpoints from dropped
perpendiculars. Part (ii) of his theorem, about what happens with no continuity
at all, flat-out requires Gupta’s work, which put everything right, substantiating
the claims of 1959. A discovery of Tarski’s missing 1956 lecture notes seem to
be the only way to resolve the question of “what Tarski knew and when he knew
it.”
19It is straightforward to derive line-circle continuity from A11 together with the facts that
the interior and exterior of a circle are open, and the interior is convex. These facts in turn
are easy to derive from inner Pasch, Euclid III.2 (chord lies inside circle), the density lemma
(Lemma 2.7), and the triangle inequality.
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§11. Geometry with terms for the intersections of lines. It seems
more natural, when thinking of straightedge-and-compass constructions, to in-
clude a symbol iℓ(a, b, c, d) for the (unique) intersection point of Line (a, b) and
Line (c, d). We say “unique” because we want the intersection point of two coin-
cident lines to be undefined; otherwise iℓ(a, b, c, d) will not be continuous on its
domain.
The difficulty with using this Skolem symbol is that the definedness condition
for iℓ(a, b, c, d) is not easily expressible in quantifier-free form. Of course we need
a 6= b ∧ c 6= d, and we want ¬(Col(a, b, c) ∧ Col(a, b, d)) as just explained. But
in addition there are parallel lines that do not meet. Using the strong parallel
postulate, one can indeed express the definedness condition for iℓ(a, b, c, d) in a
quantifier-free way, namely, iℓ(a, b, c, d) is defined if and only if there is a point p
collinear with a and b but not c and d, and a point q collinear with c and d, such
that the transversal pq of the Line (a, b) and Line (c, d) makes alternate interior
angles unequal. This condition can be expressed using points only, as shown in
Fig. 4 above. We can use the strong parallel axiom to prove stability:
¬¬iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓ → iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓ .
But one cannot do this for subtheories with no parallel postulate or other
versions of the parallel postulate. Therefore we prefer, when working with
iℓ(a, b, c, d) to use the Logic of Partial Terms (described below), in which t ↓
is made into an official atomic formula for each term t, instead of an abbrevia-
tion at the meta-level.
11.1. Logic of Partial Terms (LPT). This is a modification of first-order
logic, in which the formation rules for formulas are extended by adding the
following rule: If t is a term then t ↓ is a formula. Then in addition the quantifier
rules are modified so instead of ∀xA(x) → A(t) we have ∀x(t ↓ ∧A(x)) → A(t),
and instead of A(t) → ∃xA(x) we have A(t)∧ t ↓ → ∃xA(x). Details of LPT
can be found in [2, ], p. 97.
LPT includes axioms c ↓ for all constants c of any theory formulated in LPT;
this is in accordance with the philosophy that terms denote things, and while
terms may fail to denote (as in “the King of France”), there is no such thing
as a non-existent thing. Thus 1/0 can be undefined, i.e.,fail to denote, but if a
constant ∞ is used in LPT, it must denote something.
The meaning of t = s is that t and s are both defined and they are equal. We
write t ∼= s to express that if one of t or s is defined, then so is the other, and
they are equal.
Definition 11.1. For terms in any theory using the logic of partial terms,
t ∼= q means
(t ↓ → t = q) ∧ (q ↓ → t = q).
This is read t and q are equal if defined.
Thus “∼=” is an abbreviation at the meta-level, rather than a symbol of the
language.
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LPT contains the axioms of “strictness”, which are as follows (for each func-
tion symbol f and relation symbol R in the language):
f(t1, . . . , tn) ↓ → t1 ↓ ∧ . . . ∧ tn ↓
R(t1, . . . , tn) → t1 ↓ ∧ . . . ∧ tn ↓
Note that in LPT, under a given “valuation” (assignment of elements of a
structure to variables), each formula has a definite truth value, i.e.,we do not use
three-valued logic in the semantics. For example, if P is a formula of field theory
with a reciprocal operation 1/x, then P (1/0) is false, since 1/0 is undefined.
For the same reason ¬P (1/0) is false. Hence P (1/0)∨ ¬P (1/0) is false too; but
that does not contradict the classical validity of ∀x(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)) since we are
required to prove t ↓ before deducing an instance P (t) ∨ ¬P (t).
As an example of the use of LPT, we reformulate the theory of Euclidean
fields [5, ] using the logic of partial terms. The existential quantifiers associated
with the reciprocal axioms, with the axiom of additive inverse, and with the
square-root axiom of Euclidean field theory are replaced by a function symbol√
, a unary minus −, and a function symbol for “reciprocal”, which we write as
1/x instead of reciprocal(x). The changed axioms are
x+ (−x) = 0 (additive inverse)
x 6= 0 → x · (1/x) = 1 (EF1′)
P (x) → x · (1/x) = 1 (EF7′)
x+ y = 0 ∧ ¬P (y) → √x · √x = x (EF5′)
11.2. A version of Tarski’s theory with terms for intersections of
lines. This version of Tarski’s theory we call ruler and compass Tarski. It is
formulated as follows:
• It uses a function symbol iℓ(a, b, p, q) for the intersection point of Line (a, b)
and Line (p, q).
• It uses the logic of partial terms.
• If iℓ(a, b, p, q) is defined, then it is a point on both lines.
• If there is a point on Line (a, b) and Line (p, q), and those lines do not
coincide, then iℓ(a, b, p, q) is such a point.
• Formally, the axioms involving iℓ are
Col(a, b, x) ∧ Col(p, q, x) ∧ ¬(Col(a, b, p) ∧ Col(a, b, q)) → iℓ(a, b, p, q) ↓
iℓ(a, b, p, q) ↓ → a 6= b ∧ p 6= q ∧ Col(a, b, iℓ(a, b, p, q)) ∧Col(p, q, iℓ(a, b, p, q))
• iℓ is used instead of separate Skolem functions for ip. Specifically, the term
ip(a, p, c, b, q) in the Skolemized inner Pasch axiom become iℓ(a, q, b, p). The
point c does not occur in this term.
• The Skolem functions ext (for segment extension) is not changed.
• The Skolem functions for intersections of lines and circles are not changed.
• Stability for equality, betweenness, and congruence, as before.
We could consider replacing Skolem terms center(a, b, c) with terms built up from
iℓ. The two lines to be intersected are the perpendicular bisectors of ab and bc,
where a, b, and c are three non-collinear points. We can define the perpendicular
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bisector by the erected perpendicular at the midpoint, so it is indeed possible to
eliminate the symbol center; but there seems to be no special reason to do so.
We did not include the stability of definedness; that is because it can be proved.
The following lemma is proved in [5, ]; here we give a different proof, based on
the triangle-circumscription form of the strong parallel axiom.
Lemma 11.2. [Stability of iℓ(a, b, c, d)] The strong parallel postulate is equiva-
lent (in ruler and compass Tarski minus the parallel postulate) to the stability of
iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓:
¬¬il(a, b, c, d) ↓ → iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓ .
Proof. (i) First suppose the strong parallel postulate and ¬¬iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓. We
will show iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓. Let L = Line (a, b) and K = Line (c, d). Then lines K
and L do not coincide, for then iℓ(a, b, c, d) would be undefined. Hence, by the
strong parallel postulate, we can find a point on L that is not on K. We may
assume without loss of generality that b is such a point. Construct point f so
that bf is parallel to K; more explicitly, K and bf and the transversal bc make
alternate interior angles equal. If a, b, and f are collinear, then ab and cd are
parallel, so iℓ(a, b, c, d) is undefined, contradiction. Hence a, b, and f are not
collinear. Then line M = Line (b, f) passes through point b and is parallel to
K, and line L also passes through b, and has a point a not on M . Then by the
strong parallel axiom, L meets K. In that case iℓ(a, b, c, d) is defined, as claimed.
(ii) Conversely, suppose the stability of iℓ(a, b, c, d) ↓, and suppose a, b, and c
are not collinear. Let m be the midpoint of ab and n the midpoint of cd, with
pm the perpendicular bisector of ab and qn the perpendicular bisector of cd. We
must prove iℓ(m, p, n, q) ↓. By stability it suffices to derive a contradiction from
the assumption that it is not defined. If it is not defined then mp is parallel to nq
(as not meeting is the definition of parallel). But Line (a, b) and Line (b, c) are
perpendicular to mp and nq respectively; hence they cannot fail to be parallel or
coincident. But since they both contain point b, they are not parallel; hence they
are coincident. Hence a, b, and c are collinear, contradiction. That completes
the proof.
Theorem 11.3 (Stability of definedness). For each term t of ruler and com-
pass Tarski, ¬¬t ↓ → t ↓ is provable.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the term t. If t is a compound term
ts, and ¬¬ts ↓, then ¬¬t ↓ and ¬¬s ↓, so by induction hypothesis, t ↓ and
s ↓. Hence ts ↓. We may therefore suppose t is not a compound term. If the
functor is ic1, ic2, iℓc1, or iℓc2, then it is easy to prove that the conditions for
t to be defined are given geometrically, by the same formulas that were used to
define t ↓ in Tarski with Skolem functions (and without LPT). Hence stability
follows by the stability of equality, congruence, and betweenness. The stability of
iℓ(a, b, c, d) is equivalent to the strong parallel postulate, by the previous lemma.
That completes the proof.
11.3. Intersections of lines and the parallel axiom. In the proof of the
first part of Lemma 11.2, we showed that if lines L andM meet in a point x, then
x can be made to appear as the center of a circle circumscribed about suitably
chosen points a, b, and c. In this section, we will refine this construction to show
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that there is a single term t(a, b, c, d) in the language of Tarski with Skolem
functions that gives the intersection point of Line (a, b) and Line (c, d), when it
exists.
Lemma 11.4. Given two lines L and K that are neither coincident nor par-
allel, one can construct a point p that lies on K but not on L. More precisely,
interpreting L as Line (a, b) and K as Line (q, r), there is a single term t(a, b, q, r)
such that if ¬(Col(a, b, q)∧Col(a, b, r)) and for some x, Col(a, b, x)∧Col(q, r, x),
then e = t(a, b, q, r) satisfies Col(q, r, e) ∧ ¬Col(a, b, e).
Remarks. The point x cannot be used to construct e, which must depend only
on a, b, q, and r, and must be constructed by a single term, and hence depend
continuously on the four parameters. We will use the parallel postulate to con-
struct e; we do not know a construction that does not use the parallel postulate.
Proof. Let M be the perpendicular to K passing through q. We are supposed to
construct M from a, b, q, and r alone. To construct M , we need not just p and
q, but also a point not on K; and a and b are useless here as they might lie on
K. We must appeal to Lemma 12.9 for the construction of some point not on
line K; thus this apparently innocent lemma requires the geometric definition of
arithmetic and the introduction of coordinates, and hence the parallel postulate.
The construction ofM gives us one point u onM different from q. Let v be the
reflection of u in q. Then u and v are equidistant from q. Now, using the uniform
perpendicular construction we construct the line J through u perpendicular to
L. See Fig. 25.20
While we do not know whether u lies on L, the uniform perpendicular con-
struction (Theorem 10.5) provides two points determining J , namely
f = Project(u, a, b, c)
and
h = head(u, a, b, c),
where f is on L and c is not on L. Possibly u is equal to f or to h; we need
a point d on J that is definitely not equal to u or to the reflection of u in L.
To get one, our plan is to draw a circle of sufficiently large radius about u and
intersect it with J = Line (f, h). We use the uniform reflection construction
to define w = Reflect(u, a, b), the reflection of w in L. Then we extend the
non-null segment αβ by the (possibly null) segment uw to get a point z such
that αz > uw. Then we use αz as the “sufficiently large” radius. Here is the
construction:
z = ext(α, β, u, w)
d = iℓc1(f, c, u, e2(u, α, z))
20 In a theory with Skolem functions for the intersection points of two circles, the construc-
tion of M and u becomes trivial (just use the Euclidean construction of a perpendicular), but
axiomatizing the Skolem functions for the circle in such a way as to distinguish the points
of intersection (which is necessary to construct perpendiculars) requires the introduction of
coordinates. So using circle-circle does not obviate the need for coordinates in this lemma.
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Figure 25. Uniform construction of a point c = center(d, u, v)
on K that is not on L. The construction works whether or not
q is on L, or u is on L. The dotted line bisects ud and does not
coincide with L.
L
b
q
c
K
b r
M
bu
bv
bw
bd
Now d lies on J and is different from u, and it is also different from w since w
lies inside the circle centered at u of radius αz. Finally define
c = center(u, v, d).
The three points u, v, and d are not collinear, since then J andM would coincide,
and L and K would both be perpendicular to J , and hence parallel; but L andK
are by hypothesis not parallel. Since u, v, and d are not collinear, c is equidistant
from u, v, and d. Therefore c lies on the perpendicular bisector of uv, which is
K. Also c lies on the perpendicular bisector of ud, which is parallel to L, since
both are perpendicular to J . This perpendicular bisector does not coincide with
L, since d is not the reflection w of u in L. Therefore c does not lie on L. Then
c lies on K but not on L, as desired. That completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 11.5. [Elimination of iℓ] There is a term t(a, b, p, r) of intuitionistic
Tarski with Skolem functions (so t contains ip and center but not iℓ) such that
the following is provable:
Col(a, b, x)∧Col(p, r, x)∧¬(Col(a, b, p)∧Col(a, b, r))∧p 6= r → x = t(a, b, p, r).
Less formally, t(a, b, p, r) gives the intersection point of Line (a, b) and Line (p, r).
Remark. The problem here is to explicitly produce the term t that is implicit in
the proof of Lemma 11.4. This is also closely related to the proof given in [5, ] that
in constructive neutral geometry, the triangle circumscription principle implies
the strong parallel axiom. But here we have to check that this construction can
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be carried out in Tarski’s geometry, i.e., all the lines that are required to intersect
are proved to intersect using only inner Pasch; so there is definitely something
additional to check.
Proof. By Lemma 11.4, we may assume without loss of generality that p does not
lie on L. More explicitly, if we now produce a term t as in the lemma, that works
under the additional assumption that p is not on L, then we can compose that
term with the term given in Lemma 11.4, which produces a point on Line (p, r)
that is not on L, and the composed term will work without the assumption that
p is not on L.
Recall that Project(p, a, b) is the point w on Line (a, b) such that pw ⊥ ab,
and Project(p, a, b) is given by a term in Tarski with Skolem functions. There
is also a term erect(p, r) that produces a point j such that j is not on Line (p, r)
and jp ⊥ pr. (Since p is on Line (p, r), the uniform perpendicular construction
is not needed; the simple Euclidean construction will be enough.) Finally, there
is a term Reflect (x, a, b) that produces the reflection of x in Line (a, b); if we as-
sume x is not on Line (a, b) this is particularly easy: let q = Project(x, a, b) and
take Reflect (x, a, b) = ext(x, q, x, q). The requirement that x is not on Line (a, b)
means that we are extending a non-trivial segment, which is constructively al-
lowed.
Figure 26. Triangle circumscription implies the strong paral-
lel axiom. Given lines L and M , to construct their intersection
point as the center e of an appropriate circle. y and z are re-
flections of x in M and L.
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In Fig. 26, L = Line (a, b) and M = Line (p, r), and p does not lie on L. First
we claim that x does not lie on L. If x does lie on L, then pwx is a right triangle,
so the hypotenuse px is greater than the leg pw; but px = mp, which is less
than pw since m = midpoint(p, w), and p 6= w. Therefore Reflect (x, a, b) can be
defined using the easy construction given above.
68 MICHAEL BEESON
Now we give a construction script corresponding to the figure:
w = Project(p, a, b)
m =midpoint(p, w)
j = erect(p, r)
x = iℓc1(j, p, p,m)
y = iℓc2(j, p, p,m)
z = Reflect (x, a, b)
e = center(x, y, z)
Composing the terms listed above we find a (rather long) term that produces e
from a, b, p, and r. We claim that e is the intersection point of Line (a, b) and
Line (p, r). By the stability of collinearity, we can argue by cases on whether x,
y, and z are collinear or not. (Here it is important that we are not proving a
statement with an existential quantifier, but a quantifier-free statement involving
a single term that constructs the desired point e.) In case x, y, and z are not
collinear, then center(x, y, z) produces a point e that is the center of a circle
containing x, y, and z. Then Euclid III.1 implies that L and M both pass
through e, and we are done. On the other hand, if x, y, and z are collinear,
then M and L are both perpendicular to Line (x, y), so M and L are parallel;
then there is no x as in the hypothesis of the formula that is alleged, so there is
nothing more to prove. That completes the proof of the theorem.
11.4. Interpreting ruler and compass Tarski in intuitionistic Tarski.
Ruler-and-compass Tarski clearly suffices to interpret intuitionistic Tarski (with
or without Skolem functions), because the points asserted to exist by inner Pasch
and the triangle circumscription principle are given as intersections of lines.
Conversely we may ask, whether ruler and compass Tarski can be interpreted in
intuitionistic Tarski with Skolem functions. That is, can terms in iℓ be effectively
replaced by terms built up from ip and center? The answer is “yes”.
Theorem 11.6. Suppose ruler and compass Tarski geometry (with iℓ and other
Skolem functions) proves a theorem φ that does not contain iℓ. Then Tarski ge-
ometry with Skolem functions proves φ. Moreover if φ contains no Skolem func-
tions, then Tarski geometry proves φ. These claims hold both for the theories
with intuitionistic logic and those with classical logic.
Proof. We assign to each term t of ruler and compass Tarski, a corresponding
term t◦ of Tarski with Skolem functions. Let iℓ◦(a, b, q, r) be the term given by
Theorem 11.5. The term t◦ is defined inductively by
x◦ = x where x is a variable or constant
iℓ(a, b, c, d)◦ = iℓ◦(a◦, b◦, c◦, d◦)
f(a, b, c, d) = f(a◦, b◦, c◦, d◦) where f is iℓc1, iℓc2, ic1, ic2, or ext
e(a)◦ = e(a◦)
Then we assign to each formula A of ruler and compass Tarski, a corresponding
formulaA◦ of Tarski with Skolem functions. Namely, the map A 7→ A◦ commutes
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with logical operations and quantifiers, and for atomic A not of the form t ↓, we
define
A(t1, . . . , tn)
◦ = A(t◦1, . . . , t
◦
n
).
For the case when A is t ↓, we define (t ↓)◦ to be t = t when t is a variable or
constant, and when it is a compound term, we use Definition 6.2. By induction
on the complexity of A, A◦[x := t◦] is provably equivalent to (A[x := t])◦.
Then by induction on the length of proofs in ruler and compass Tarski, we show
that if ruler and compass Tarski proves φ, then Tarski with Skolem functions
proves φ◦. A propositional axiom or inference remains one under the interpre-
tation, so it is not even vital to specify exactly which propositional axioms we
are using. In this direction (from LPT to ordinary logic), the quantifier rules
and axioms need no verification, as the extra conditions of definedness needed
in LPT are superfluous in ordinary logic. For example, one of those axioms is
∀xA∧ t ↓ → A[x := t]. That becomes ∀xA◦ ∧ (t ↓)◦ → A[x := t◦], in which the
t ↓ can just be dropped. There are some special axioms in LPT, for example
c ↓ for c a constant and x ↓ for x a variable.
We check the basic axioms for iℓc1. These say that (i) if iℓc1(a, b, c, d) is
defined, then it is a point on Line (a, b) and also on the circle with center c
passing through d, and (ii) if there is an point x on both the line and circle, then
iℓc1(a, b, c, d) is defined. According to the definition of (iℓc1(a, b, c, d) ↓)◦, the
interpretation of “iℓc1 ↓” is “there is a point on the line inside the circle”, where
“inside” means not strictly inside. Since iℓc1 is not affected by the interpretation
(except in the atomic formula iℓc1(a, b, c, d) ↓), the interpretations of the basic
axioms for iℓc1 are equivalent to those same axioms. Similarly for iℓc2, ic1, and
ic2.
Now consider the axioms for iℓ(a, b, p, r). These say that if iℓ(a, b, p, r) ↓
then e = iℓ(a, b, p, r) is a point on Line (a, b) and also on Line (p, r), and if x
is any point on both lines and not both p and r lie on Line (a, b), then then
x = iℓ(a, b, p, r). Recall that (iℓ(a, b, p, r) ↓)◦ says there exists an x on both
lines, and not both p and r are on Line (a, b). Then the interpretation of these
axioms says that if Line (a, b) and Line (p, r) meet and not both p and r lie
on Line (a, b), then iℓ(a, b, p, r)0 is the intersection point. But that is exactly
Theorem 11.5. That completes the proof.
Corollary 11.7. Suppose (classical or intuitionistic) ruler and compass Tarski
geometry proves a theorem of the form P → Q(t), with P and Q negative. Then
(classical or intuitionistic) Tarski geometry proves P → ∃xQ(x).
Proof. Suppose P → Q(t) is provable in ruler and compass geometry. Then
P → ∃xQ(x) is provable, with one more inference. But that formula contains
no occurrences of iℓ. Then by Theorem 11.6, it is provable in classical Tarski
geometry. That completes the proof.
Remark. If we drop the strong parallel axiom (or triangle circumscription prin-
ciple), we obtain “neutral geometry with iℓ ”). It is an open question whether
neutral geometry with iℓ can be interpreted in neutral Tarski with Skolem func-
tions. In other words, can all terms for intersection points of lines that are needed
in proofs of theorems not mentioning iℓ be replaced by terms built up from ip
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and ext? We used center in an essential way in the proof of Theorem 11.5, but
did we have to do so?
§12. Relations between classical and constructive geometry. Our in-
tuition about constructive geometry is this: You may argue classically for the
equality or inequality of points, for the betweenness of points, for collinearity,
for the congruence of segments. But if you assert that something exists, it must
be constructed by a single, uniform construction, not by different constructions
applying in different cases. If you can give a uniform construction, you may
argue by cases that it works, but the construction itself cannot make a case
distinction. Thus the uniform perpendicular construction of a line through x
perpendicular to L works whether or not x is on L; if we wished, we could argue
for its correctness by cases, as we could always push a double negation through
the entire argument and use stability to eliminate it.
There is in Szmielew’s Part I of [25, ] an extensive development from Tarski’s
classical axioms, essentially deriving Hilbert’s axioms and the definitions and
key properties of addition and multiplication. We would like to be able to im-
port arguments and results wholesale from this development into constructive
geometry. In this section we investigate to what extent this is possible.
It is certainly not completely possible to import results without modifying
Tarski’s axioms, since constructive proofs will produce points that depend con-
tinuously on parameters, while as we have discussed above, Tarski’s version of
inner Pasch and segment extension axioms do not have this property. Those
defects have been remedied above by formulating “continuous Tarski geometry”,
a theory classically equivalent to Tarski’s geometry.
12.1. The double-negation interpretation. The difference between intu-
itionistic and classical mathematics shows up in the interpretations of existence
(∃) and disjunction (∨).
Definition 12.1. A formula is called negative if it does not contain ∃ or ∨
(existential quantifiers or disjunction).
Intuitively, negative formulas make no existential claims, and hence have the
same meaning classically as constructively, at least in theories with stable atomic
formulas. Classically we can always express “exists” as “not for all not” and ex-
press P ∨Q as ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q). If we do this, then every classical theorem should
become intuitionistically meaningful: classical mathematics is, somewhat sur-
prisingly, contained in intuitionistic mathematics, although often intuitionistic
mathematics is considered as a restriction of classical mathematics.
Go¨del made these considerations precise by introducing his double-negation
interpretation [11, ] , which assigns a negative formula A− to every formula A, by
replacing ∃ by ¬∀¬ and replacing A ∨B by ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B). For atomic formulae,
A− is defined to be ¬¬A. The rules of intuitionistic logic are such that if A
is classically provable (in predicate logic) then A− is intuitionistically provable.
Hence, if we have a theory T with classical logic, and another theory S with
intuitionistic logic, whose language includes that of T , and for every axiom A
of T , S proves A−, then S also proves A− for every theorem A of T . In case
the atomic formulas in the language of T are stable in S, i.e.,equivalent to their
A CONSTRUCTIVE VERSION OF TARSKI’S GEOMETRY 71
double negations, then of course we can drop the double negations on atomic
formulas in A−.
In [3, ] we applied this theorem to a version of constructive geometry based on
Hilbert’s axioms. Given the extensive almost-formal development of geometry
from Tarski’s axioms in [25, ], one might like to use the double-negation inter-
pretation with T taken to be Tarski’s theory, and S taken to be some suitable
constructive version of Tarski’s theory. We now investigate this possibility.
A double-negation interpretation from a classical theory to a constructive ver-
sion of that theory becomes a better theorem if it applies to the Skolemized
versions of the theories, because in the un-Skolemized version, an existential
quantifier is double-negated, while the corresponding formula of the Skolemized
theory may replace the existentially quantified variable by a term, so no double
negated quantifier is involved, and no constructive content is lost. But if we
Skolemize Tarski’s version of inner Pasch, we get an essentially non-constructive
axiom, as shown above. Hence there is no double-negation interpretation for that
theory. However, it works fine if we replace Tarski’s axioms by the (classically
equivalent) axioms of continuous Tarski with Skolem functions:
Theorem 12.2. Let T be intuitionistic Tarski geometry with Skolem func-
tions. If T plus classical logic proves φ, then T proves the double-negation inter-
pretation φ−.
Proof. It suffices to verify that the double-negation interpretations of the axioms
are provable. But the axioms are negative and quantifier-free, so they are their
own double-negation interpretations. That completes the proof.
Corollary 12.3. If φ is negative, and classical Tarski geometry without Skolem
functions proves φ, then intuitionistic Tarski geometry proves φ.
Proof. Suppose φ is provable in classical Tarski geometry (with or without
Skolem functions). Then since φ itself has no Skolem functions, φ is provable in
classical Tarski geometry without Skolem functions, and hence by Theorem 7.2,
it is provable in intuitionistic Tarski geometry with Skolem functions. Hence, by
Theorem 12.2, φ− is provable. Since φ is negative, it is equivalent to φ−. That
completes the proof.
12.2. Applications of the double-negation interpretation. We illus-
trate the use of Theorem 12.2 by importing the work of Eva Kallin, Scott Taylor,
H. N. Gupta, and Tarski mentioned in Section 2.7.
Corollary 12.4. The formulas (A16) through (A18), which were once ax-
ioms of Tarski’s theory, but were shown classically provable from the remaining
axioms, are also provable in intuitionistic Tarski without Skolem functions.
Proof. By Corollary 12.3.
We would like to emphasize something has been achieved with the double-
negation theorem even for negative theorems, as it would be quite laborious to
check the long proofs of (A16)-(A18) directly to verify that they are constructive.
For example, (A18) is Satz 5.1 in [25, ]. Let us consider trying to check directly if
this proof is constructive. You can see that the proof proceeds by contradiction,
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which is permissible by stability; in the crucial part of the proof, inner Pasch
is applied to a triangle which ultimately must collapse (as the contradiction is
reached) to a single point. Therefore we can constructivize this part provided the
non-collinearity hypothesis is satisfied for the application of Pasch. By stability,
we may assume that the vertices of this triangle are actually collinear. But can we
finish the proof in that case? It looks plausible that (A15) or similar propositions
might apply, but it is far from clear. Yet the double-negation interpretation
applies, and we do not need to settle the issue by hand. We had to assume
(A15), but we do not have to assume (A18), because it is already provable.
Corollary 12.5. The correctness of Gupta’s perpendicular construction given
in §14 is provable in intuitionistic Tarski geometry.
Proof. Please refer to Fig. 14 and the discussion in § 8.9. Two conclusions are
to be proved: (i) that x lies on Line(a, b), and (ii) that cx ⊥ ax. We will show
that both of these are equivalent to negative formulas; hence the double-negation
interpretation applies.
Ad (i): The statement that x lies on Line(a, b) is informal; its exact formal
meaning is
¬¬ (T(x, a, b) ∨T(a, x, b) ∨T(a, b, x)).
(See the discussion after Lemma 7.1). Pushing inner negation sign through the
disjunction we see that this is equivalent to a negative sentence.
Ad (ii): By the definition of perpendicularity, and the theorem that L ⊥ K
if and only if K ⊥ L, and the fact that x is by definition the midpoint of cc′,
cx ⊥ ax is equivalent to ac = ac′, which is negative. Hence the double-negation
interpretation applies to that conclusion.
It follows from the double-negation interpretation that the correctness of
Gupta’s construction is provable in intuitionistic Tarski geometry. That com-
pletes the proof.
The following theorems (numbered as in [25, ]) have proofs simple enough to
check directly (as we did before developing the double negation interpretation),
but with the aid of the double negation interpretation, we do not need to check
them directly.
Lemma 12.6. The following basic properties of betweenness are provable in
intuitionistic Tarski geometry. Note that T(a, b, c) is a defined concept; B(a, b, c)
is primitive. The theorem numbers refer to [25, ].
T(a, b, b) Satz 3.1
T(a, b, c) → T(c, b, a) Satz 3.2
T(a, a, b) Satz 3.3
T(a, b, c) ∧T(b, a, c) → a = b Satz 3.4
T(a, b, d) ∧T(b, c, d) → T(a, b, c) Satz 3.5a
T(a, b, c) ∧T(a, c, d) → T(b, c, d) Satz 3.6a
T(a, b, c) ∧T(b, c, d) ∧ b 6= c → T(a, c, d) Satz 3.7a
T(a, b, d) ∧T(b, c, d) → T(a, c, d) Satz 3.5b
T(a, b, c) ∧T(a, c, d) → T(a, b, d) Satz 3.6b
T(a, b, c) ∧T(b, c, d) ∧ b 6= c → T(a, b, d) Satz 3.7b
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Proof. By the double negation interpretation, since each of these theorems is
negative.
Does the double negation interpretation help us to be able to “import” proofs
of existential theorems from [25, ] to intuitionistic Tarski? It gives us the follow-
ing recipe: Given an existential theorem proved in classical Tarski, we examine
the proof to see if we can construct a Skolem term (or terms) for the point(s)
asserted to exist. If the proof constructs points using inner Pasch, we need to
verify whether degenerate cases or a possibly collinear case are used. If they are
not used then the strict inner Pasch axiom (A7-i) suffices. The crucial question
is whether the point alleged to exist can be constructed by a single term, or
whether the proof is an argument by cases in which different terms are used
for different cases. In the latter case, the proof is not constructive (though the
theorem might still be, with a different proof). But in the former case, the
double-negation interpretation will apply.
Thus the double-negation interpretation fully justifies the claim that the essence
of constructive geometry is the avoidance of arguments by cases, providing in-
stead uniform constructions depending continuously on parameters.
12.3. Euclid I.2 revisited. Consider the first axiom of Tarski’s geometry,
which says any segment (null or not) can be extended: ∃d (T(a, b, d) ∧ bd = bc).
Clearly d cannot depend continuously on a as a approaches b while b and c
remain fixed, since as a spirals in towards b, d circles around b outside a fixed
circle. Therefore Axiom (A4) of Tarski’s (classical) geometry is essentially non-
constructive; the modification to (A4-i) that we made in order to pass to a
constructive version was essential.
Euclid I.2 says that given three points a, b, c, there exists a point d such that
ad = bc. Euclid gave a clever proof that works when the three points are distinct,
and classically a simple argument by cases completes the proof. Constructively,
that does not work, since when b and c remain fixed and a approaches b, d from
Euclid’s construction does not depend continuously on a. We will show in this
section that it is only Euclid’s proof that is non-constructive; the theorem itself
is provable in intuitionistic Tarski geometry, by a different proof.
Lemma 12.7. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry proves
(i) T(a, b, c) and T(p, q, r) and ac = pr and bc = qr implies ab = pq
(ii) a segment ac cannot be congruent to (a proper subsegment) bc with B(a, b, c).
Proof. We first show (ii) follows from (i). Suppose ac = bc and B(a, b, c). Then
in (i) take p = q = a and r = c. Then (i) implies ab = aa , contrary to axiom
(A3). Hence (i) implies (ii) as claimed.
Now (i) is Satz 4.3 in [25, ], and since it is negative, we can conclude from the
double negation interpretation that it is constructively provable. That completes
the proof.
Lemma 12.8. In intuitionistic Tarski geometry, null segments can be extended,
and Euclid I.2 is provable. Indeed, there is a term (using Skolem functions) e(x)
such that e(x) 6= x is provable, and a term e2 corresponding to Euclid I.2, such
that if d = e2(a, b, c), then ad = bc.
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Remarks. Thus, it is only Euclid’s proof of I.2 that is non-constructive, as dis-
cussed in [5, ], not the theorem itself. Note that a constructive proof of the
theorem should produce a continuous vector field on the plane, so the construc-
tive content of ∀x∃y (y 6= x) is nontrivial. Notice how the proof fulfills this
prediction.
Proof. Let α and β be two of the three constants used in the dimension axioms,
and define
e(x) = ext(α, β, α, x)
Since α 6= β, axiom (A4) applies. Let d = e(x); we claim d 6= x. By (A4) we
have T(α, β, d) and βd = αd. Then the subsegment βd is congruent to the whole
segment αd, contrary to Lemma 12.7. That completes the proof that e(x) 6= x.
Define
e2(a, b, c) := ext(e(a), a, b, c).
Then the segment with endpoints e(a) and a is not a null segment, so e2(a, b, c)
is everywhere defined, and if d = e2(a, b, c), we have ad = bc by (A4). That
completes the proof.
12.4. Constructing a point not on a given line. Consider the proposition
that for every line L there exists a point c not on L. In Tarski’s language that
becomes
∀a, b(a 6= b → ∃c (¬Col(a, b, c))).
Classically, the theorem is a trivial consequence of the lower dimension axiom
(A8), which gives us three non-collinear points α, β, and γ. One of those points
will do for c. But that argument is not constructively valid, since it uses a
case distinction to consider whether a and b both lie on Line (α, β) or not. It
is an interesting example, because it illustrates in a simple situation exactly
what more is required for a constructive proof than for a non-constructive proof.
For a constructive proof,we would need to find a uniform ruler and compass
construction that applies to any two points a and b (determining a line L), and
produces a point not on L.
If we could erect a perpendicular to line L at a, then (since lines are given by
two points) we would already have constructed a point off L. Gupta constructs
perpendiculars without circles: maybe he has solved the problem? No, as it
turns out. Gupta’s construction has to start with a given point p not on L. He
shows how to construct a perpendicular to L at a, but the first step is to draw
the line ap. The same is true for all the constructions of erected perpendiculars
discussed above.
Lemma 12.9. Given a 6= b, there exists a point c not collinear with a and b.
Remarks. We do not know a direct construction; the proof we give uses the
introduction of coordinates. It does in principle provide a geometric construction,
but it will be very complicated and not visualizable. If we assume circle-circle
continuity, we have an easy solution: by the method of Euclid I.1 we produce
an equilateral triangle abc, whose vertex c can be shown not to lie on line L.
But we note that the proof of circle-circle continuity that we give below via the
radical axis requires a point not on the line connecting the centers to get started,
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so cannot be used to prove this lemma. In order to prove circle-circle continuity
without assuming an “extra” point, we also need to introduce coordinates.
Proof. Let α, β, and γ be the three pairwise non-collinear points guaranteed
by (A8). Let Line (α, β) be called the x-axis. Let 0 be another name for α
and 1 another name for β. Since γ does not lie on the x-axis, we can use it
to erect a perpendicular 0p to the x-axis at 0, on the other side of the x-axis
from γ. Call that line the y-axis. Let i = ext(p, 0, 0, 1). (Then i is on the same
side of the x-axis as γ.) Using the uniform perpendicular construction, and the
point i not lying on the x-axis, we define X(p) to be the point on the x axis
such that the perpendicular to the x-axis at X(p) passes through p. Similarly
we define Y (p) using the point 1 not on the y-axis. As shown in [5, ], using
the parallel axiom we can define a point p = (x, y) given points x and y on the
x-axis and y-axis, such that X(p) = x and Y (p) = y, and define addition and
multiplication on the X-axis and prove their field properties. Then coordinate
algebra can be used in geometry. Given distinct points with coordinates (a, b)
and (p, q) determining line L, we can calculate the coordinates of a point not on
L, for example (a, b) + (b − q, p− a). That completes the proof.
Applying our metatheorems below to this lemma, we see that there is a term
t(a, b) such that A(a, b, t(a, b)) is provable. Of course, since the theorem is clas-
sically provable, by Herbrand’s theorem there must be a finite number of terms,
such that in each case one of those terms will work, and indeed, the three con-
stants α, β, and γ illustrate Herbrand’s theorem in this case:
a 6= b → ¬Col(a, b, α) ∨ ¬Col(a, b, β) ∨ ¬Col(a, b, γ).
But constructively, the matter is much more delicate.
12.5. Hilbert planes and constructive geometry. In this paper, we have
considered line-circle as an axiom. Classically, there is a tradition of studying the
consequences of (A1)-(A9) alone, which is known as the theory of Hilbert planes;
this theory corresponds to Hilbert’s axioms without any form of continuity and
without the parallel axiom. The question to be considered here is whether there
is an interesting constructive geometry of Hilbert planes. There should be such
a theory, with ruler and compass replaced by “Hilbert’s tools”, which permit
one to extend line segments and “transport angles”, i.e.,to construct a copy of
a given angle with specified vertex b on a specified side of a given line L. That
“tool” corresponds to a Skolem function for Hilbert’s axiom C3.
Indeed, most of the development in [25, ] from A1-A9 is perfectly constructive.
In particular, we can prove Hilbert’s C3 and the related “triangle construction
theorem” enabling us to copy a triangle on a specified side of a line, where the side
is specified by giving a point not on the line. Hence, there is a viable constructive
theory of Hilbert planes. Developing that theory, however, is beyond the scope
of this paper; even the classical theory of Hilbert planes is a difficult subject.
It is curious that if Hilbert’s C3 is classically weakened by removing the (clas-
sically) superfluous hypothesis about “a specified side of the line”, so that it just
requires being able to copy a triangle abc to a congruent triangle ABC with AB
on L and A given, then it becomes much more difficult to prove constructively,
because we first have to construct a point not on L, which (apparently) requires
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the introduction of coordinates, and hence the parallel axiom. We do not know
whether A1-A9 can prove that for every line L, we can construct a point not
on L; we do know that coordinates cannot be introduced on the basis of A1-A9
alone, so the proof that works for A1-A10 fails for A1-A9.
§13. Metatheorems. In this section, we prove some metatheorems about
the two Skolemized constructive theories of Tarski geometry, i.e., either intu-
itionistic Tarski with Skolem functions, or ruler and compass Tarski. Both theo-
ries have line-circle and circle-continuity with terms for the intersections, and a
Skolem function symbol center for the triangle circumscription principle; ruler
and compass Tarski has the logic of partial terms and a symbol iℓ(a, b, c, d) for the
intersection point of two lines, while intuitionistic Tarski with Skolem functions
has a Skolem function symbol ip for inner Pasch. Straightedge and compass con-
structions correspond to terms of ruler and compass Tarski; we have shown that
these can all be imitated by terms of intuitionistic Tarski with Skolem functions,
i.e.,iℓ is eliminable.
13.1. Things proved to exist can be constructed. In this section we
take up our plan of doing for constructive geometry what cut-elimination and
recursive realizability did for intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis, namely, to
show that existence proofs lead to programs (or terms) producing the object
whose existence is proved. In the case of constructive geometry, we want to
produce geometrical constructions, not just recursive constructions (which could
already be produced by known techniques, since geometry is interpretable in
Heyting’s arithmetic of finite types, using pairs of Cauchy sequences of rational
numbers as points).
Theorem 13.1 (Constructions extracted from proofs). Suppose intuitionistic
Tarski geometry with Skolem functions proves
P (x) → ∃y φ(x, y)
where P is negative. Then there is a term t(x) of intuitionistic Tarski geometry
with Skolem functions such that
P (x) → φ(x, t(x))
is provable.
Remark. We emphasize that there is a single term t(x). That corresponds to a
uniform construction, that applies without case distinctions on x. We shall see in
the next theorem that things proved to exist classically can also be constructed
(under appropriate conditions), but that several different constructions may be
needed, for different cases on x.
Proof. We use cut-elimination. Readers unfamiliar with cut-elimination, or
desiring a specific axiomatization, are referred to Chapter XV of [16, ]. Cut-
elimination works with “sequents”, which we write Γ ⇒ ∆. (Kleene wrote
Γ → ∆, but we use → for implication.) Γ and ∆ are finite lists of formulas; for
intuitionistic systems, ∆ contains at most one formula φ, so we also write Γ⇒ φ.
Since our axiomatization is quantifier-free, if ψ ⇒ ∃y φ is provable, then there
is a list Γ of quantifier-free axioms such that Γ, ψ ⇒ ∃y φ is provable by a cut-free
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(hence quantifier-free) proof. If the existential quantifier is introduced at the last
step of that proof, then we obtain the desired proof just by omitting the last
step of the proof. Hence (as always in such applications of cut-elimination) we
need to be able to permute the inferences until the existential quantifier is indeed
introduced at the last step. This issue was studied in a fundamental paper by
Kleene [17, ], who verified that the desired permutations are possible except for
a few combinations of connectives, all involving disjunction or ∃. Hence, if the
axioms are purely universal and disjunction-free, and P is negative, we do not
have a problem on the left side of the sequent. Certain occurrences of ∃ also do
not make trouble, and in first position on the right side of the proved sequent
is one of the harmless cases. Hence, by [17, ], we can permute the inferences as
desired. That completes the proof. The hard part of the work was in arranging
the axiom system to be quantifier-free and disjunction-free.
Remark. To see that inferences cannot always be permuted, consider the
example of proving that there is a perpendicular to line L through point p, with
the left side Γ of the sequent saying that p is either on L or not. Using the
separate dropped-perpendicular and erected-perpendicular constructions we can
prove both cases, and then finish the proof, introducing ∨ on the left at the last
step. Explicitly, if ψ says that p is not on L, and φ says Line(p, q) is perpendicular
to L and contains p, then both sequents ψ ⇒ ∃p, q φ and ¬ψ ⇒ ∃p, q φ are
provable, and hence ψ ∨ ¬ψ ⇒ ∃p, q φ is provable. But this proof obviously
does not produce a single construction that works in either case, so we would
not expect to be able to permute the introduction of ∃ on the right with the
introduction of ∨ on the left.
The term t(x) in the preceding theorem represents a geometrical construction,
but the points constructed by intersecting lines are always given either by center
or ip terms, so the construction contains a “justification” for the fact that the
lines intersect. On the other hand, the construction cannot be read literally
as a construction script, but requires extra steps to construct the lines implicit
in the center and ip constructions. Moreover, there is nothing in the theorem
itself to guarantee that the “definedness conditions” for t(x) are met, since the
Skolem functions are total. The following theorem about ruler and compass
Tarski geometry does not have that defect, since that theory uses the logic of
partial terms.
Theorem 13.2 (Constructions extracted from proofs). Suppose intuitionistic
ruler-and-compass Tarski geometry proves
P (x) → ∃y φ(x, y)
where P is negative (does not contain ∃ or ∨). Then there is a term t(x) of
intuitionistic ruler and compass Tarski geometry such that
P (x) → φ(x, t(x))
is also provable. Moreover, if the proof of P (x) → ∃y φ(x, y) does not use
certain axioms, then the term t(x) does not involve the Skolem symbols for the
unused axioms.
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Remark. If the formula P (x) → ∃y φ(x, y) does not contain any Skolem function
symbols at all, i.e., it lies in Tarski’s original language, then it lies in both Tarski
geometry with Skolem symbols and ruler-and-compass Tarski geometry. Thus
we have a choice whether to realize the existential quantifiers using the symbols
ip and center, as in the former theory, or using the symbol il.
Proof. We have a choice of two proofs. We could use cut-elimination directly,
but then we need it for the logic of partial terms and not just for ordinary in-
tuitionistic predicate calculus. The details of the cut-elimination theorem for
such logics have not been published, but they are not significantly different from
Gentzen’s formulation for first-order logic. While we are explaining this point, it
is no more complicated to explain it for multi-sorted theories with LPT, which
were used in [3, ] with axioms for Hilbert-style geometry. Specifically, we reduce
such theories to ordinary predicate calculus as follows: introduce a unary predi-
cate for each sort, and then if t is a term of sort P , interpret t ↓ as P (t). Now
we have a theory in first-order one-sorted predicate calculus, which is quantifier-
free and disjunction-free if the original theory was, and we can apply ordinary
cut-elimination, as in the proof of Theorem 13.1.
Alternately, we can avoid using cut-elimination for LPT, by first translating
the original formula from ruler and compass Tarski to intuitionistic Tarski with
Skolem functions using Theorem 11.5. Then the resulting construction term t
involves the function symbol ip; but it is easy to express ip in terms if iℓ if that
is desired, i.e., to interpret intuitionistic Tarski with Skolem functions into ruler
and compass Tarski. That completes the proof.
13.2. Extracting constructions from classical proofs. The following
theorem illustrates the essential difference between constructive and classical
(non-constructive) geometry: in a constructive existence theorem, we must sup-
ply a single (uniform) construction of the point(s) whose existence is asserted,
but in a classical theorem, there can be several cases, with a different construc-
tion in each case.
Theorem 13.3 (Constructions extracted from classical proofs). Suppose clas-
sical Tarski geometry with Skolem functions proves
P (x) → ∃y φ(x, y)
where P is quantifier-free and disjunction-free. Then there are terms ti(x) such
that
P (x) → φ(x, t1(x)) ∨ . . . ∨ φ(x, tn(x))
is also provable.
Proof. This is a special case of Herbrand’s theorem.
Example 1. There exists a perpendicular to line L through point p. Classically,
one argues by cases: if p is on L, then we can “erect” the perpendicular, and
if p is not on L then we can “drop” the perpendicular. So the proof provides
two constructions, t1 and t2. This is not a constructive proof. In this paper, we
have given a construction (in fact two different constructions) of the “uniform
perpendicular”. This constructive proof of the existence of a perpendicular to L
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through p provides a single term for the construction, instead of two terms (one
of which works in each case).
Example 2. Euclid’s proof of Book I, Proposition 2 provides us with two such
constructions, t1(a, b, c) = c and t2(a, b, c) the result of Euclid’s construction of
a point d with ad = bc, valid if a 6= b. Classically we have ∀a, b, c ∃d(ad = bc),
but we need two terms t1 and t2 to cover all cases.
Example 3. Let p and q be distinct points and L a given line, and a, b, and c
points on L, with a and b on the same side of L as c. Then there exists a point
d which is equal to p if b is between a and c and equal to q if a is between b and
c. The two terms t1 and t2 for this example can be taken to be the variables p
and q. One term will not suffice, since d cannot depend continuously on a and
b, but all constructed points do depend continuously on their parameters. This
classical theorem is therefore not constructively provable.
13.3. Disjunction properties. Wementioned above that intuitionistic Tarski
geometry cannot prove any non-trivial disjunctive theorem. That is a simple con-
sequence of the fact that its axioms contain no disjunction. We now spell this
out:
Theorem 13.4 (No nontrivial disjunctive theorems). Suppose intuitionistic
Tarski geometry proves H(x) → P (x) ∨ Q(x), where H is negative. Then
either H(x) → P (x) or H(x) → Q(x) is also provable. (This result depends
only on the lack of disjunction in the axioms.)
Proof. Consider a cut-free proof of Γ, H(x) → P (x) ∨ Q(x), where Γ is a list
of some axioms. Tracing the disjunction upwards in the proof, if we reach a
place where the disjunction was introduced on the right before reaching a leaf
of the proof tree, then we can erase the other disjunct below that introduction,
obtaining a proof of one disjunct as required. If we reach a leaf of the proof tree
with P (x) ∨ Q(x) still present on the right, then it occurs on the left, where it
appears positively. Its descendants will also be positive, so it cannot participate
in application of the rule for proof by cases (which introduces ∨ in the left side of
a sequent); and it cannot reach left side of the bottom sequent, namely Γ, H(x),
as these formulas contain no disjunction. But a glance at the rules of cut-free
proof, e.g. on p. 442 of [17, ], will show that these are the only possibilities.
That completes the proof.
We note that order on a fixed line L can be defined using betweenness, so it
makes sense to discuss the provability of statements about order.
Corollary 13.5. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry does not prove apartness
a < b → x < b ∨ a < x.
Proof. The statement in question is a disjunctive theorem, so Theorem 13.4
applies.
Corollary 13.6. Intuitionistic Tarski geometry does not prove the principle
x 6= 0 → x < 0 ∨ x > 0 or the equivalent principle that if point p does not
lie on line L, then any other point x is either on the same side of L as p or the
other side.
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Proof. The statement in question is a disjunctive theorem, so Theorem 13.4
applies.
13.4. Interpretation of Euclidean field theory. A Euclidean field is de-
fined constructively as an ordered ring in which nonzero elements have recipro-
cals. The relation a < b is primitive; a ≤ b abbreviates ¬b < a. The axioms of
Euclidean field theory include stability of equality and order. Stability of order,
that is ¬b ≤ a → a < b, is also known as Markov’s principle. Classically,
the models of ruler and compass geometry are planes over Euclidean fields. We
showed in [5, ] that a plane over a Euclidean field is a model of ruler-and- com-
pass geometry, when ruler and compass geometry is defined in any sensible way;
constructively, this theorem takes the form of an interpretation φ 7→ φ¯ from some
geometric formal theory to the theory EF of Euclidean fields.
The converse direction is much more difficult; we have to show that any model
of geometry is a plane over a Euclidean field F . To do that, we fix a line F to
serve as the x-axis (and the domain of the field); fix a point 0 on that line, erect
a perpendicular Y to F at 0 to serve as the y-axis. Given any pair of points (x, y)
on F , we rotate y by ninety degrees to a point y′ on the y-axis, and then erect
perpendiculars at x to F and at y′ to Y . These perpendiculars should meet at a
point MakePoint (x, y). It is possible to show by the strong parallel axiom that
they do meet. This construction is the starting point for the following theorem:
Theorem 13.7. Every model of intuitionistic Tarski geometry is a plane over
a Euclidean field. Moreover, there is an interpretation φ 7→ φ◦ from the theory
of Euclidean fields to intuitionistic Tarski geometry.
Proof. In addition to introducing coordinates as discussed above, one also has to
define addition and multiplication geometrically in order to interpret the addition
and multiplication symbols of Euclidean field theory. It has been shown in
[5, ] how to do this; the proofs there can be formalized in intuitionistic Tarski
geometry, so we obtain a model-theoretic characterization of the models of that
theory.
Moreover, our work with the double-negation interpretation above can now
be put to good use. For example, the definition of multiplication can be given
directly following Hilbert’s definition, which is based on the triangle circum-
scription principle. It is easy to give a term HilbertMultiply (a, b) that takes two
points a and b on a fixed line (the “x-axis”) and produces their product (also a
point on the x-axis), using center and the uniform rotation construction. (See
[5, ] for details.) But once that term is given, the assertions that it satisfies the
associative and commutative laws are quantifier-free, and hence, the proofs in
[25, ] are “importable.” Technically, one must check that the degenerate cases
of inner Pasch are not used, but that is all that one has to check by hand. In
[5, ], there is a definition of “uniform addition”, i.e., without a case distinction
on the signs of the addends. A term Add (x, y) defining the sum of x and y is
given in [5, ]. Again, once the term is given, we can be assured by the double-
negation interpretation that its properties are provable in intuitionistic Tarski
with Skolem functions, if we just check [25, ] to make sure the degenerate cases
of inner Pasch are not used.
A CONSTRUCTIVE VERSION OF TARSKI’S GEOMETRY 81
The terms Add and HilbertMultiply can then be used to define a syntactic
interpretation φ 7→ φ◦ from the theory of Euclidean fields to intuitionistic Tarski
geometry. That completes the proof of the theorem.
§14. Circle-circle continuity. In this section we show that circle-circle con-
tinuity is a theorem of intuitionistic Tarski geometry; that is, we can derive the
existence of the intersection points of two circles (under the appropriate hypothe-
ses). The similar theorem for classical Tarski geometry can be derived indirectly,
using the representation theorem (Theorem 10.7) and Go¨del’s completeness the-
orem; but for intuitionistic Tarski geometry, we must actually exhibit a construc-
tion for the intersection points of two circles, and prove constructively that it
works. This question relies on Euclid III.35, a theorem about how two chords
of a circle divide each other into proportional segments, and III.36, a similar
theorem, and constructively it requires a combined version of those two proposi-
tions without a case distinction as to which applies (i.e., two lines cross inside or
outside a circle). Aside from those theorems, it uses only very straightforward
geometry.
Theorem 14.1. In intuitionistic Tarski geometry with only line-circle conti-
nuity: given two circles C and K satisfying the hypotheses of circle-circle conti-
nuity, and a point not on the line L connecting their centers, we can construct
the point(s) of intersection of C and K.
A point not on L can of course be constructed, by Lemma 12.9, but to do
so we have to introduce coordinates, which we wish to avoid here for esthetic
reasons, so here we just leave that point as a parameter of the construction.
There are two approaches to proving this theorem, which we will discuss sep-
arately. The first method proceeds by introducing coordinates and reducing the
problem to algebraic calculations by analytic geometry. While in principle this
does produce an ultimately purely geometric proof, one cannot visualize the
lengthy sequence of constructions required. For esthetic reasons, therefore, we
also give a second proof, which avoids the use of coordinates by the use of a
well-known construction called the “radical axis.” In this more geometric proof,
essential use is made of the “extra point” in the hypothesis.21
14.1. Circle-circle continuity via analytic geometry. Given two circles
C and K with distinct centers s and t, let L be the line through the centers.
Given a point not on L, we can erect a perpendicular to L at s, and introduce
coordinates in the manner of Descartes and Hilbert, with constructive extension
to negative arguments as developed in [5, ]. We can choose the point t as 1. Now
the tools of analytic geometry are available. Let r be the radius of circle C and
R the radius of circle K, and calculate the equations of C and K and solve for
a point (x, y) lying on both circles. It turns out that some crucial terms cancel,
and we can solve the equations using only square roots, which means that we can
21 Both these proofs use the parallel axiom essentially. There is a proof in the literature that
line-circle continuity implies circle-circle continuity without the use of the parallel axiom [27, ].
It is based on Hilbert’s axioms rather than Tarski’s, and we do not know if it is constructively
justifiable or not. But we have no reason to avoid the parallel axiom for present purposes.
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solve them geometrically using the methods of Descartes and Hilbert, with the
constructive modifications op. cit. To derive circle- circle continuity, we must
show that the hypothesis that circle C has a point inside circle K makes the
quantities under the square root non-negative, and the extra hypothesis that the
circle C has a point strictly inside K makes the two solutions of the equation
distinct.
A similar theorem is proved classically in [14, ], p. 144, but a few details are
missing there. The issue is that it is not enough to observe that the equations
for the intersection points are quadratic. One has to translate the hypothesis
that one circle has a point inside and a point outside the other circle into algebra
and show algebraically that this implies the equations for the intersection are
solvable.
This is a fairly routine exercise and is all perfectly constructive; but it is a bit
long, and besides, it is somewhat unsatisfying to have to resort to coordinates.
One would like to see a direct geometric construction of the points of intersection
of two circles, using only a few steps, rather than the dozens or perhaps hundreds
of not-visualizable steps required to geometrize an algebraic calculation. There is
indeed such a geometric construction, using the “radical axis” of the two circles.
Below we verify that the radical axis construction can be carried out construc-
tively (i.e., does not require any case distinctions in its definition), and that the
correctness proof can be carried out in intuitionistic Tarski geometry. Although
the construction itself is easy to visualize (it is only a few steps with ruler and
compass), the correctness proof in Tarski geometry is more complicated.
14.2. Euclid Book III in Tarski geometry. The correctness proof of the
radical axis construction requires the last two propositions of Euclid Book III;
and moreover the formalization of Book III in Tarski geometry is of independent
interest.
Book III of Euclid can be formalized in intuitionistic Tarski geometry, but
since most of the theorems mention angles, we need to use the developments
of Chapter 11 of [25, ], where angles, angle congruence, etc. are developed.
However, some propositions can be proved quite simply, for example III.31 (an
angle inscribed in a semicircle is right), which goes back to I.29 and I.11 and
hence to the construction of perpendiculars (and not to Book II at all). We also
will need a related proposition that might have been (but does not seem to be)
in Euclid:
Lemma 14.2. (in Tarski geometry with segment-circle continuity) If axb is a
right angle and ab is a diameter of a circle C then x lies on C.
Proof. By segment-circle continuity, we can find a point y on C and on the ray
from a through x. Then by Euclid III.30, ayb is a right angle, so if y 6= x then xb
and yb are two perpendiculars to ay through b, contradiction. By the stability
of equality we have y = x, so x lies on C. That completes the proof.
We present here another proposition from Euclid Book III that can be proved
directly from the Tarski axioms.
Lemma 14.3 (Euclid III.18). Suppose line L meets circle C with center c in
exactly one point a. Then ca ⊥ L.
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Remark. We need dropped perpendiculars to prove this lemma, but we already
derived the existence of dropped perpendiculars from line-circle continuity, so
that is not a problem. The proof uses Euclid’s idea, but Tarski’s definition of
perpendicular.
Proof. Drop a perpendicular cb from c to line L, which can be done by Lemma 8.5.
We want to prove b = a. By the stability of equality, we can proceed by con-
tradiction, so suppose b 6= a. Point b is outside the circle (i.e.,there is a point
e on C with B(c, e, b), since otherwise by line-circle continuity, L meets C in a
second point. Let e be the reflection of a in b; then ab = be, and since ce ⊥ L,
we have ca = ce. That is, e lies on circle C as well as line L, contradicting the
hypothesis that L meets C only once. That completes the proof.
Despite these examples, the radical axis construction that we use makes use of
some developments of Euclid Book III that are not so straightforward, because
they rest on the theory of proportionality in Euclid Book II. We want to make
sense of the phrase
ab · cd = pq · rs.
In Euclid, this is written “the rectangle contained by ab and cd is equal to the
rectangle contained by pq and rs.” But Euclid has no concept of “area” as
represented by (the length of) a segment. To define this relation geometrically,
we could use a definition of similar triangles, involving two right triangles with
sides ab, pq and cd, rs respectively. Book II of Euclid develops (quadratic)
algebra on that basis.
There is another way to define the notion ab · cd = pq · rs. Namely, introduce
coordinates, define multiplication geometrically, and interpret ab · cd as multi-
plication of segments on the x-axis congruent to ab and cd. This is not actually
so different from the first (Euclidean) interpretation, since similar triangles are
used in defining multiplication. For the modern analysis of Euclid’s notion of
equality for “figures” see page 197 of [14, ], and for the connection to geometric
multiplication see page 206. There it is proved that equality in Euclid’s sense
corresponds to algebraic equality using geometric arithmetic; in particular, the
two definitions of ab · cd = pq · rs are provably equivalent.
To carry out the radical axis construction constructively, we need to extend
the notion ab · cd to allow signed segments. To do this directly using similar
triangles would be to duplicate the effort of defining signed multiplication in
[5, ]. Therefore we use the geometric-multiplication definition, following [14, ].
Either definition can be expressed in a quantifier-free way using intuitionistic
Tarski geometry with Skolem functions, so the two notions are provably equiva-
lent in intuitionistic Tarski geometry if and only if they are provably equivalent
in classical Tarski geometry. Since Hartshorne op. cit. proves them equivalent in
classical Hilbert geometry (and without using circle-circle continuity), and since
Hilbert’s axioms (except continuity) are provable in classical Tarski geometry
(without continuity) (as shown in [25, ]), it follows that the two definitions are
provably equivalent in intuitionistic Tarski geometry.
We need to define the notion of the power of a point in intuitionistic Tarski
geometry, and check that its principal properties can be proved there. That
notion is usually defined as follows, when b is not the center of C: Let c be the
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center of C, and x the point of intersection of Line (b, c) with C that is on the
same side of c as b, and y the other point of intersection. Then the power of b
with respect to C is bx ·by. If we interpret the dot as (signed) multiplication (see
[5, ]) of (directed) segments on the x-axis of points congruent to the segments
mentioned, then this definition makes sense in intuitionistic Tarski geometry. It
does, however, have the disadvantage that the power of the center of the circle
is not defined; and we cannot just define it to be −1, as we could classically,
because constructively we cannot make the case distinction whether b is or is
not the center. This definition can be fixed constructively as follows. Fix a
diameter pq of circle C, whose center is c. Then given any point b, extend
segment pc by bc to produce point B. (If b = c, this is still legal and produces
c.) Then the power of b with respect to C is Bq · Bp, where the dot is signed
multiplication (so that Bq and Bp have opposite signs when b is inside C.) This
gives the same answer as the usual definition when b is not the center.
The following lemma shows that the power of p with respect to C can be
computed from any chord, not just from the diameter. See Fig. 27, which shows
separately the cases when b is inside or outside C.
Figure 27. The power of b with respect to c can be computed
from any chord, because ba · bc = bd · be.
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Lemma 14.4. In Tarski geometry with only line-circle continuity: Let C be a
circle and let b be any point. Let L be any line through b meeting C in points a
and c. Then the power of C with respect to C is ba · bc.
Remark. For the case when b is inside C (first part of Fig. 27), this is Euclid
III.35, and for b outside it is III.36. The general case is mentioned in Heath’s
commentary on III.35 [9, ] as a corollary of III.35 and III.36. It also occurs as
Exercise 20.3 in [14, ]. The proof implicitly suggested there by Exercise 20.2 is
the same one suggested in Heath’s commentary.
Proof. Hilbert multiplication can be defined by Skolem terms in intuitionistic
Tarski geometry, without circle-circle continuity, as the constructions in [5, ]
show. To recap: multiplication is defined by using the triangle circumscription
axiom to draw a circle, and then the product is given by the intersection of that
circle with a line. In addition there are some rotations involved, which also can
be defined by terms. When formulated in intuitionistic Tarski geometry with
Skolem functions, the statement of the lemma is quantifier-free. By the double-
negation interpretation, it is provable constructively if and only if it is classically
provable. And it is classically provable, cf. the exercise mentioned in the remark.
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Of course, the textbook containing the exercise is based on Hilbert’s axioms, but
[25, ] derives all of Hilbert’s axioms from Tarski’s (classically), so once you solve
Exercise 20.3 op. cit., it follows that the result is provable in intuitionistic Tarski
geometry with Skolem functions.
14.3. The radical axis. In this section, we discuss the construction of the
“radical axis” of two circles, with attention to constructivity. In the next section
we will use the radical axis to give a second proof that line-circle continuity
implies circle-circle continuity.
The “radical axis” of two circles is a line, defined whether or not the circles
intersect, such that if they do intersect, the line passes through the points of
intersection (and if they are tangent, it is the common tangent line). On page 182
of [14, ], a ruler and compass construction of the radical axis is given. Fig. 28
illustrates the construction, for the benefit of readers who do not have [14, ] at
hand.22
Figure 28. Construction of the radical axis.
m = midpoint(a, b); draw sm and mt and drop perpendiculars
from a to sm and from b to mt. Their intersection is p and the
radical axis is perpendicular to st through p.
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22The radical axis was already old in 1826 [26, ], although there it is constructed from the
intersection points of circles, rather than the other way around. I do not know the origin of
the ruler and compass construction used here.
86 MICHAEL BEESON
The initial data are the centers s and t of the two circles, with s 6= t, and two
points a and b on the circles, such that a 6= b and ab does not meet the line
joining the centers. (That hypothesis allows one of the circles to be a null circle
(zero radius), but not both). The construction is as follows: First define m as the
midpoint of ab. Then B(a,m, b). If s = m or t = m then ab meets st, contrary
to hypothesis. Hence we can construct the lines sm and tm. Then construct
perpendiculars to those lines through a and b respectively (using the uniform
perpendicular, so we do not need to worry if a and b are on those lines or not).
Then p is to be the intersection of these two perpendiculars, and the radical axis
is the perpendicular to st through p, again using the uniform perpendicular.
Lemma 14.5. Given two circles C and K, the radical axis as constructed above
does not depend on the particular points a and b chosen, and can be constructed
from the two circles and one additional point not lying on the line joining the
centers.
Remark. The “extra point” is a necessary parameter. The circles are presumed
given by center and point, but the points giving the circles might happen to lie
on the center line.
Proof. Let the two circles C and K have centers s and t, and let a and b be
distinct points on C and K, respectively, such that the midpoint m of ab does
not lie on the line L containing the centers s and t. We need a point r not on L
to be able to choose a and b. For example, we can use r to erect a perpendicular
to L at s, and let a be one of its intersections with C, and then construct a
perpendicular to L at t, on the same side of L as a, and let b be the intersection
of this perpendicular with K.
We wish to construct the radical axis R of C and K. The first step is to con-
struct the midpoint m of ab, which can be done using only line-circle continuity
by Lemma 8.10. Then ms and mt are not null segments, since m does not lie on
L (since s and t are on the same side of L, so not on opposite sides of it). Then
we need to construct perpendiculars to sm and mt that pass through p. By
the uniform perpendicular construction, we can do that without worrying about
whether p lies on Line(s,m) or not, or whether p lies on Line(m, t) or not. But
we do have to worry about whether the intersection p of those perpendiculars
exists. By the strong parallel axiom, it will exist if the two perpendiculars are
not parallel or coincident. That can only happen if m, s, and t are collinear, but
we have chosen a and b so that b does not lie on L; hence indeed p exists. Then
define line R as the (uniform) perpendicular to L through p.
Now we will prove (constructively and using only line-circle continuity) that
every point x on R has equal powers with respect to C and Q. Suppose x is on
the radical axis R. Define circle M to be the circle with center m and passing
through a and b. See Fig. 29.
Let z be the intersection of M with Line (a, p), and let y be the intersection of
M with Line (b, x). Then the power of x with respect to C, namely xz · ax (by
Lemma 14.4) is equal to the power of x with respect to M . Similarly, the power
of x with respect to K is yx · yb, which is also the power of x with respect to M .
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Figure 29. The power of p with respect to each of C and K is
equal to the power of p with respect to M .
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Since the powers of x with respect to C and to K are both equal to the power
of x with respect to M , they are equal. That completes the proof.
14.4. Circle-circle continuity via the radical axis. We observe that the
power of x with respect to circle C is negative when x is inside C, zero when x
is on C, and positive when x is outside C. Intuitively, the radical axis of two
intersecting circles is the line joining the two intersection points. In this section
we use this idea to prove circle-circle continuity. One more idea is necessary: the
“radical center.”
Second proof of Theorem 14.1. Let circles C and K be given, satisfying the
hypothesis of the circle-circle continuity axiom. That is, K has a point (say b)
outside C and a point (say x) inside C. We will use b as one of the points to start
the radical axis construction, and we will choose the other point a very carefully.
Construct the perpendicular to xb at x. Since x is inside C, by segment-circle
continuity that perpendicular meets C in some point a such that the interior
of ab does not meet Line (s, t). In other words, a and b lie on the same side of
Line (s, t) unless b already lies on Line (s, t).
Now use a and b as starting points for the radical axis construction; let the
constructed point be p. By construction of a, if x 6= b, then angle axb is a right
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angle with a and x at the ends of a diameter of circle M ; that is the result of
choosing a as we did. See Fig. 30. Therefore the vertex x of this right angle lies
on circle M , by Lemma 14.2. On the other hand, if x = b (that is vb is tangent
to K) then x also lies on M ; by the stability of equality, x lies on M (that is
xt = bt) whether or not x = b.
Figure 30. b and x are given on K with b outside C and x
inside C. Then a is chosen so ax ⊥ xb. Then it turns out that
x lies on M , and the constructed point p is inside both circles.
b
s b
t
b
a
b
bb
m
bp
b y
b
v
C
K
M
b
x
By segment-circle continuity, there is a point v on C with B(v, x, p). We claim
T(v, p, b). By the stability of betweenness we can prove this by contradiction.
Since ¬¬(A ∨ B) is equivalent to ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B), we can argue by cases for the
contradiction. There are two cases to consider: B(p, v, b) and B(v, b, p). Let y be
the other point of intersection (besides v) of Line(b, x) with C. Then B(v, x, y)
since x is inside C.
Case 1: B(p, v, b). We will show that the power of p with respect to C is less
than the power of p with respect to K. The former is pv · py, the latter is px · pb,
and because T(v, x, y) we have pv ≤ px and because T(p, y, b) we have py ≤ pb.
Therefore pv · py ≤ px · pb. For equality to hold, we would need v = x and y = b,
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but we have arranged x 6= v. Hence the power of p with respect to C is strictly
less than the power of p with respect to K, contradiction.
Case 2: B(v, b, p). We similarly can show that the power of p with respect toK
is less than the power of p with respect to C. Hence both cases are contradictory.
Hence T(v, p, b) as claimed.
SinceT(v, p, b) andT(v, x, y) andT(x, p, b), it follows classically thatT(v, p, y)
or T(y, p, b). In the first case, p is inside C; in the second case, p is inside K.
But since the power of p with respect to C is equal to the power of p with respect
to K, p is inside C if and only if it is inside K. Double-negating each step of the
argument, we find that p is not not inside C; but by the stability of “inside”, p
is inside C.
Then by line-circle continuity, since p lies on the radical axis R, R meets C
in a point x. Since x lies on C, the power of x with respect to C is zero. Since
x lies on R, the power of x with respect to K is equal to the power of x with
respect to C, which is zero. Hence x lies on K as well as on C. That completes
the proof.
We have shown that points on the radical axis have equal powers with respect
to both circles. The following lemma is the converse. We do not need it, but the
proof is short and pretty.
Lemma 14.6. Let C and K be distinct circles. If they meet, then the radical
axis of C and K consists of exactly those points whose powers with respect to C
and K are equal.
Remark. The lemma is true even if the circles do not meet, but I do not know a
simple geometric proof.
Proof. We have already proved that points on the radical axis have equal powers.
It suffices to prove the converse. Suppose that u has equal powers with respect
to C and K. We must prove u lies on the radical axis. Let v lie on both circles.
When we compute the powers of u with respect to both C and K using the
line uv, we get different answers unless u lies on the radical axis (so that the
endpoints on C and K are the same). That completes the proof.
14.5. Skolem functions for circle-circle continuity. Terms of Tarski ge-
ometry (intuitionistic or continuous, which has classical logic) correspond to
(certain) ruler and compass constructions; in effect, to constructions in which
you can form the intersection of lines that must intersect by inner Pasch, and
intersections of lines and circles. Since inner Pasch implies outer Pasch (in the
presence of other axioms) the points formed by outer Pasch are also given by
terms; of course those terms will involve the complicated constructions of Gupta’s
perpendiculars. That is, the Skolem function for outer Pasch, defined in terms of
the Skolem function for inner Pasch, is very complicated. Similarly, since circle-
circle continuity is implied by line-circle continuity, then there must be terms for
constructing those intersection points as well.
But there is an issue to consider, in that the terms for erected and uniform
perpendiculars have an extra parameter, a point not on the line; and the radical
axis construction also has an extra parameter for a point not on the center line.
Examination of those constructions reveals that if the “extra” point is changed
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to the other side of the line, then the “head” of the perpendicular changes sides
too; and in the radical axis construction, the result is that the two intersection
points of the two circles switch places. If we then fix that choice once and for
all by using Lemma 11.4, we can construct terms that give the two intersection
points of two circles continuously. However, those terms will be complicated,
because the term for constructing a point not on a line involves coordinates and
cross products.
In previous work on constructive geometry, we had circle-circle continuity as
an axiom, and built-in function symbols for the intersection points. It was a point
of difficulty to distinguish the two, which we wanted to do by saying whether
the triple of points from the center of one circle to the other center to the point
of intersection was a “right turn” or a “left turn”. The concepts Right (a, b, c)
and Left (a, b, c) had to be defined, either by a complicated set of axioms, or by
introducing coordinates and using cross products as in [5, ]. Here we can recover
those same terms, but now the coordinates and cross products are at least no
longer in the axioms! If we perform a complex conjugation (i.e.,reflect in the x-
axis) then the two terms for the intersection points of two circles change places,
exactly as in [5, ].
If one wishes (for example for connecting these theories to computer graphics)
to have explicit function symbols for circle-circle continuity, of course they can
be conservatively added.
§15. Conclusion. We have exhibited a constructive version of Tarski’s Eu-
clidean geometry. Because of the double-negation interpretation, it can prove at
least some version of each classical theorem. Using the uniform perpendicular,
rotation, and reflection constructions given in this paper, it is possible (by the
methods of [5, ]) to give geometric definitions of addition and multiplication,
without case distinctions as to the sign of the arguments, and proofs of their
properties, so that coordinates in a Euclidean field provably exist. Hence the
theory has not omitted anything essential. To achieve these results, we had to
modify Tarski’s axioms to eliminate degenerate cases, and add back some for-
mer axioms that Tarski had eliminated using those degenerate cases. Even with
classical logic, this theory now connects nicely with ruler-and- compass construc-
tions, since each of the points asserted to exist can be constructed with ruler and
compass.
By cut-elimination, things proved to exist (under a negative hypothesis, as is
always the case in Euclid) can be constructed, by a uniform straightedge-and-
compass construction. Even stronger, these constructions need not involve taking
the intersections of arbitrary lines, but only those lines that have to intersect by
the strong parallel axiom or inner Pasch.
By contrast, in Tarski’s (classical) theory, we obtain (by Herbrand’s theorem)
a similar result but without uniformity, i.e., there are several constructions (not
necessarily just one), such that for every choice of the “given points”, one of the
constructions will work. (The classical result (unlike the constructive one) holds
only for formulas ∀x∃y A(x, y), where A is quantifier-free.)
These points-only axiom system have conservative extensions with variables for
lines and circles, and further conservative extensions with variables for angles,
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segments, and arcs, which can serve for the direct constructive formalization
of Euclidean geometry using Hilbert’s primitives (as in [3, ]). Therefore, this
points-only theory, with its short list of axioms, can be said to provide the
logical foundations of constructive Euclidean geometry. In particular, it supplies
one detailed example of a formalization of constructive geometry, to which the
independence results about the parallel postulate of [5, ] apply.
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